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I. INTRODUCTION
Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions
handed down in 1997 by the Alaska Supreme Court, the Alaska
Court of Appeals, and the Ninth Circuit.  The summaries focus on
the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common
law principles interpreted, and the essence of each of the holdings.
Space does not permit review of all cases decided by the courts this
year, but the authors of the Review have attempted to highlight de-
cisions signaling a departure from prior law or resolving issues of
first impression.  The cases that were omitted applied well-settled
principles of law or involved narrow holdings of limited import.
The appendix lists the omitted cases and includes a brief paren-
thetical synopsis of each.  Attorneys are advised not to rely upon
the information contained in this review without further reference
to the cases cited.
The opinions have been grouped according to general subject
matter rather than by the nature of the underlying claims.  The
summaries are presented alphabetically in the following eleven ar-
eas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitu-
tional, criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, torts,
and trusts and estates.
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II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Public Contracting
In United Utilities, Inc. v. Alaska Public Utilities Commission,1
the Alaska Supreme Court upheld the Alaska Public Utilities
Commission’s (“APUC’s”) contract award as being supported by a
reasonable basis in the record of decision.2  United Utilities ap-
pealed the award of a telephone contract to Summit Telephone
Co. by APUC based on the theory that the APUC did not follow
its own adjudicative precedents in making its decision.3  Under
Alaska Statutes section 42.05.241, “‘[w]here competing applicants
seek a certificate that may be issued only to one entity, the
[APUC] must select the applicant it considers the most fit, will-
ing[,] and able of those who demonstrate threshold levels of fit-
ness, willingness[,] and ability to serve.’”4  Summit proposed a sys-
tem using underground cable, while United’s proposal focused on
the use of a microwave system.5  The supreme court held that “the
APUC did consider the strengths and weaknesses of each appli-
cant”6 and dismissed the claim after finding a reasonable basis in
the record for APUC’s decision.7
In Mortvedt v. Department of Natural Resources,8 the supreme
court held that an archaeological report detailing specific ar-
chaeological features on a proposed lease site combined with con-
sideration of the likely effects of actual occupancy provided suffi-
cient evidentiary basis for the Department of Natural Resources
(“DNR”) to reject an application for a negotiated commercial
lease on the site.9  After an extensive review, DNR denied Mort-
vedt’s application for a negotiated commercial lease because, in
part, the type of use requested was inconsistent with the mandates
of the Alaska Historic Preservation Act.10  On the basis of reports
prepared by professional archaeologists, DNR concluded that ar-
cheological resources were located in the vicinity of the proposed
1. 935 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1997).
2. See id. at 815-16.
3. See id. at 813-14.
4. Id. at 814 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 42.05.241 (Michie 1996)).
5. See id. at 815-16.
6. Id. at 815.
7. Id. at 815-16.
8. 941 P.2d 126 (Alaska 1997).
9. See id. at 129-30.
10. See id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.010 (Michie 1996).  The policy of
the Alaska Historic Preservation Act is to “protect the historic, prehistoric, and
archeological resources of Alaska from loss, desecration and destruction,” and to
preserve them for future generations.  See id.
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site and that a negotiated lease in this area would potentially jeop-
ardize the site.11  The court was persuaded that DNR’s decision to
deny the commercial lease had a reasonable basis in law and fact
and was reflective of a “hard look.”12
The supreme court also rejected Mortvedt’s argument that
DNR should have been estopped from denying his application for
a personal use cabin permit (“PUCP”).13  The court concluded that
Mortvedt’s reliance on a tentative approval sent to him by DNR
was not reasonable and did not support an estoppel claim because
the document explicitly stated that adversely affected third parties
had the right to appeal an adverse decision.14  The court held that
DNR’s decision that Mortvedt’s use of the site would conflict with
public interest should be sustained.15  The court further held that
the fact that DNR did not discover the archeological significance
of Mortvedt’s site until after DNR had tentatively approved his
application for a PUCP did not preclude subsequent denial of his
application because “it does not make sense, on a policy level, to
ignore subsequently discovered information which is relevant to
. . . DNR’s decision.”16
In Eastwind Inc. v. Department of Labor,17 the supreme court
concluded that the wage determination provisions of the 1993
amendments to Alaska Statutes section 36.05.01018 regarding pub-
lic construction contracts were not applicable to “contracts bid on
prior to the effective date of the amendments.”19  Prior to the 1993
amendments, all public works construction contractors were re-
quired to adjust their wages every time the Department of Labor
issued new prevailing wage rates.20  Under the 1993 amendments,
wages in public contracts were frozen for the first twenty-four
months of a contract.21  Rejecting the argument of Eastwind Inc., a
public construction contractor, the supreme court concluded that
the amended statute should not be interpreted to apply retroac-
tively to Eastwind’s contract because it was entered into prior to
the effective date of the amendments.22  The court reasoned that
“application of the 1993 amendments to pre-existing contracts
11. See Mortvedt, 941 P.2d at 129.
12. See id. at 130.
13. See id. at 130-31.
14. See id. at 130.
15. See id. at 131.
16. Id.
17. 951 P.2d 844 (Alaska 1997).
18. ALASKA STAT. § 36.05.010 (Michie 1996).
19. Eastwind, 951 P.2d. at 844.
20. See id. at 845.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 847.
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would give a different legal effect to significant pre-enactment
conduct” and such a result would be “inconsistent with the statu-
tory presumption against retroactivity.”23
B. Land Use and Resource Management
In Kachemak Bay Watch, Inc. v. Noah,24 the Alaska Supreme
Court held that the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”)
did not follow statutory requirements in identifying appropriate
areas for aquatic farming, and therefore the court invalidated
DNR’s decision to accept applications for aquatic farming
throughout Southeast and Southcentral Alaska.25  Alaska Statutes
section 38.05.855(a)26 required DNR to identify districts where
sites for aquatic farming could exist.27  DNR argued that the statute
did not require substantive decision-making,28 but the court held
that that statute required DNR’s designation of Southeast and
Southcentral as districts to be a “conscious act and determina-
tion.”29  In its action, DNR effectively “collapsed the identification
and permit processes.”30 Accordingly, the court held that “[t]o
comply with the statute, DNR must identify districts and then con-
sider . . . what sites within those districts can be developed for
aquatic farming.”31
Conversely, the supreme court held that DNR did not need to
comply with the state’s Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”)
because “the identification of aquatic farm districts under section
38.05.855(a) does not constitute a regulation under the APA.”32
The court noted that a regulation may be present when a “practice
implements, interprets or makes specific the law enforced or ad-
ministered by the state agency” or when a “practice affects the
public or is used by the agency in dealing with the public.”33  Al-
though it was a “close question,” the court held that DNR was not
required to comply with the APA in identifying districts.34
In Ellis v. Department of Natural Resources,35 the supreme
23. Id. at 850.
24. 935 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1997).
25. See id. at 828.
26. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.855(a) (Michie 1996).
27. See Kachemak Bay Watch, 935 P.2d at 822.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 823.
31. Id. at 824 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 826.
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id. at 824-25.
35. 944 P.2d 491 (Alaska 1997).
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court affirmed the Department of Natural Resources’s (“DNR”)
decision to close state land to new mineral entry, finding that the
decision was reasonable and supported by evidence in the record,
was preceded by adequate notice, and was within DNR’s constitu-
tional and statutory authority.36  DNR had concluded that the land
in question had “significant surface uses” that would be incom-
patible with mining, such as fishing, boating, and hunting.37  The
court upheld this conclusion as reasonable and held that a miner
has no property right to a claim on state land until that claim is dis-
covered, located, and recorded.38
In Payton v. State,39 the supreme court held that the Board of
Fisheries, in its denial of a subsistence use fishing permit, miscon-
strued the portion of Alaska Statutes section 16.05.258(a)40 that re-
fers to “customary and traditional” uses.41  The court concluded
that the Board of Fisheries incorrectly required a familial relation-
ship between current residents of the upper Yetna River and prior
generations in determining whether salmon fishing was traditional
for that area.42  The focus should have been “whether the use has
occurred consistently for an extended period of time.”43  The su-
preme court further concluded that the Board of Fisheries erred
when it determined that the salmon users in the upper Yetna River
did not “handle, prepare, preserve, and store salmon based on tra-
ditional practices.”44  Finally, the court concluded that the Board of
Fisheries and the Board of Game are “separate entities acting un-
der different statutory authority” and are not required to come to
the same conclusion from the same facts.45
In Krohn v. Department of Fish and Game,46 the supreme
court held that issues regarding the validity of subsistence regula-
tions adopted by the Board of Fisheries, the Board of Game, and
the Commissioner of the Department of Fish and Game were ren-
dered moot because the regulations had been repealed.47  The
court found that the issue of the validity of the repealed regula-
tions did not fall within the public interest exception to the moot-
36. See id. at 493.
37. Id. at 494.
38. See id. at 495-96.
39. 938 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1997).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.258 (a) (Michie 1996).
41. See Payton, 938 P.2d at 1042.
42. See id. at 1042-43.
43. Id. at 1043.
44. Id. at 1044.
45. Id. at 1045.
46. 938 P.2d 1019 (Alaska 1997).
47. See id. at 1021; see also ALASKA STAT. §§  16.05.258, .270 (Michie 1992).
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ness doctrine.48  The court accepted the state’s argument that the
factual and legal issues regarding the regulations were wholly de-
pendent upon the particular circumstances that existed at the time
of the adoption of the regulations and therefore were not capable
of repetition.49
In Jones v. State,50 the court of appeals held that the state
could enforce its fish and game laws against the defendant even if
the parcel of land on which the defendant shot a deer constituted
“Indian Country” under the allotment clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1151.51
Noting that “it is far from clear whether Congress meant for
Alaska Native allotments to be considered ‘Indian Country,’”52 the
court concluded that this designation would not inhibit Alaska’s
authority to enforce its game laws on allotted parcels because “‘the
criminal laws of [Alaska] have the same force and effect within . . .
Indian Country as they have elsewhere within the State.’”53  The
court of appeals based its decision, in part, on Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan,54 a U.S. Supreme Court case, which held that Alaska
could enforce a law banning the use of fish traps against the vil-
lages of Kake and Angoon because “‘[s]tate authority over Indians
is . . . more extensive over activities, such as [the operation of fish
traps] . . . not on any reservation.’”55  The court of appeals rejected
the argument that Alaska’s game and fish laws were regulatory and
thus not considered criminal for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a).56
The court also held that Alaska has the authority to enforce
its gaming laws against a defendant even if the allegedly illegal
deer hunting occurred on federal public land.57  The court con-
cluded that resolution of the issue of whether the land was federal
public land was irrelevant since Alaska had the authority “to
regulate the method and means of hunting, even on federal lands
within the state, so long as the [s]tate regulations do not conflict
with federal law.”58
In Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen,59 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that there was neither a statutory directive nor
48. See Krohn, 938 P.2d at 1022.
49. See id.
50. 936 P.2d 1263 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
51. See id. at 1265; 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
52. Jones, 936 P.2d at 1265.
53. Id. at 1266 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1994)).
54. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
55. Jones, 936 P.2d at 1265 (quoting Organized Village of Kake, 369 U.S. at
75).
56. See id. at 1266.
57. See id.
58. Id. (citing Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954 (Alaska 1995)).
59. 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997).
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congressional intent that contradicted the National Park Service’s
allowance of commercial fishing in nonwilderness areas of Glacier
Bay National Park.60  The court held that in the absence of a statu-
tory directive in either the Organic Act,61 which created the na-
tional park system, or the Alaskan National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act,62 the court must defer to the Park Service’s
interpretation of congressional intent so long as such interpreta-
tion is reasonable.63
C. Administrative Procedure
In Kilmer v. Dillingham City School District,64 Alaska Su-
preme Court held that a lawsuit for wrongful termination was an
administrative appeal and carried with it no right to a jury trial.65
The court determined that the superintendent of the Dillingham
city schools had requested a bench trial and therefore waived his
right to a jury trial.66  The court also held that, even though the suit
was filed more than thirty days after the termination, the superior
court properly allowed the suit to proceed.67  The superintendent
was allowed to file the suit nine months after termination on a
strict interpretation of Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2),68 which
requires a claimant to appeal within thirty days of an agency’s final
order.69  In this case, the superintendent was never informed that
the decision was final or that he had thirty days to appeal, there-
fore relaxation of Rule 602(a)(2) was appropriate.70
In Faulk v. Board of Equalization,71 the supreme court held
that the Board of Equalization for the Kenai Peninsula Borough
made inadequate findings in concluding that property should be
valued at more than twice the amount paid for it approximately
thirty days before the appraisal.72  Faulk challenged the assessment
as “improper and excessive,” but the Board refused the appeal be-
cause Faulk had “not presented sufficient evidence.”73  The court
60. See id. at 1074.
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
62. Id. §§ 3101-3233.
63. See Alaska Wildlife Alliance, 108 F.3d. at 1069-70.
64. 932 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1997).
65. See id. at 758-59.
66. See id. at 762-63.
67. See id.
68. ALASKA R. APP. P. 602(a)(2).
69. See Kilmer, 932 P.2d at 763.
70. See id.
71. 934 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1997).
72. See id.
73. Id. at 751.
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held that the record did not sufficiently reflect the basis for the
Board’s decision so as to enable meaningful review and, therefore,
remanded the matter to the Board to state the reasons for rejecting
the appeal and some basis for evaluating the Board’s decision-
making process.74
In Bruner v. Peterson,75 the supreme court held that a school
may condition graduation on completion of a course not listed as
required in the course catalog for persons who have fallen below
the academic standards, where the catalog does not state that only
the listed classes will be necessary for graduation and where the
school follows its established procedures for hearing student griev-
ances.76  Peterson, head of the Admission and Retention Commit-
tee of the University of Alaska Anchorage’s (“UAA”) Nursing
Program, required Bruner to pass an English class before re-
enrolling in a nursing class Bruner had failed.77  Although the Eng-
lish class was not listed as a requirement for the nursing program
in the course catalog, the catalog did state that certain conditions
may be placed on re-enrollment in required classes, subject to re-
view of the faculty.78  Bruner objected to this requirement, and met
with the interim dean of the School of Nursing to discuss his objec-
tions.79  After this meeting, the dean sent Bruner a letter affirming
the Committee’s decision and stating that this decision was the fi-
nal decision of UAA.80  The supreme court held that because the
school had followed the procedures for addressing student griev-
ances and because the course catalog indicated that additional
work might be required of students who fall below academic stan-
dards, Bruner was afforded all the procedural requirements due
and no breach of contract occurred.81
In Szejner v. University of Alaska,82 the supreme court upheld
the University of Alaska Anchorage’s (“UAA”) decision not to
admit a student to the teacher certification program based on his
past academic record.83  Szejner had been expelled from a UAA
graduate program and then readmitted on a probationary basis to
finish his Master’s degree.84  Szejner then applied to the Teacher
74. See id. at 752.
75. 944 P.2d 43 (Alaska 1997).
76. See id.
77. See id. at 45.
78. See id. at 45-46.
79. See id. at 46.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 48-49.
82. See 944 P.2d 481 (Alaska 1997).
83. See id. at 485.
84. See id. at 483.
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Certification Program, to which he was not accepted.85  The court
rejected Szejner’s argument that UAA improperly based his rejec-
tion on his expulsion from UAA in 1989, holding that subjective
factors such as “motivation, maturity, and demonstrated humani-
tarian qualities are valid considerations in academic admissions
decisions.”86  Finally, the court held that denying Szejner admission
did not violate his due process rights because there was no
“‘underlying charge of dishonesty or publication of reasons for
such denial,’” and Szejner did not identify any property or liberty
interest sufficient to invoke due process.87
In Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Fair-
banks North Star Borough,88 the supreme court held that the De-
partment of Transportation and Public Facilities was not required
to exhaust its administrative remedies prior to filing a declaratory
action to challenge the validity of a property ordinance adopted by
Fairbanks North Star Borough.89  The supreme court concluded
that because the Department’s complaint did not allege any error
in an administrative action, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies
was inapplicable.90  The purpose of the doctrine91 and the fact that
the Department sought a judicial, as opposed to an administrative,
remedy were reinforcing factors in the court’s decision to reverse.92
In Broeckel v. Department of Corrections,93 the supreme court
held that an action for breach of contract against the Department
of Corrections (“DOC”) was properly dismissed for failure to ex-
haust administrative remedies.94  The issue of whether the exhaus-
tion of remedies doctrine was applicable to prison inmates’ griev-
ances was an issue of first impression in Alaska.95 Although
Broeckel attempted to resolve his grievance with the DOC infor-
85. See id.
86. Id. at 485.
87. Id. (quoting Phelps v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 632 F. Supp. 455, 459
(D. Kan. 1986)).
88. 936 P.2d 1259 (Alaska 1997).
89. See id. at 1260.
90. See id. at 1262.
91. “‘[The] basic purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to allow an administra-
tive agency to perform functions within its special competence – to make a factual
record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial
controversies.’”  Id. at 1262 (quoting Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Municipality of An-
chorage, 761 P.2d 119, 121-22 (Alaska 1988)).
92. See id. at 1262.
93. 941 P.2d 893 (Alaska 1997).
94. See id. at 900.
95. See id. at 896.  The DOC inmate grievance procedure begins with informal
procedures, progresses to formal proceedings, and culminates with an appeal to
the regional director.  See id. at 895.
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mally before filing his claim, the court determined that Broeckel
did not make a “‘good faith effort’ to pursue” his grievances inter-
nally because he failed to invoke DOC’s formal grievance proce-
dure.96
Broeckel alleged that he should be excused from exhausting
the administrative remedies because the formal grievance process
would be futile.97  The court rejected that argument because Bro-
eckel failed to produce any facts indicating that the regional direc-
tor, who would have heard the final appeal of the grievance, would
be biased.98  Furthermore, a general claim by Broeckel that all em-
ployees of the DOC are prejudiced and biased against inmate
grievances was not sufficient to prove that pursuing every level of
the DOC grievance procedure would have been futile.99
In Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Rue,100 the supreme court held
that time sheets of hours worked for a public employer are public
records subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act,101 but
that the time sheets could be withheld where threats upon the
public employees’ lives created an expectation of privacy such as
to create a protected right to privacy under the Alaska Constitu-
tion.102  The Alaska Wildlife Alliance (“AWA”) sought, among
other things, time sheets maintained by the Alaska Department of
Fish and Game of its employees working on the Department’s wolf
control program.103  The Department refused to disclose the docu-
ments, and the Commissioner of the Department upheld the deci-
sion.104  AWA appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the
Department’s decision.105  The supreme court ruled, as a matter of
first impression, that time sheets of public employers are subject to
the Public Records Act, and therefore must be disclosed.106  Fur-
thermore, it held that these records are not protected from disclo-
sure as confidential personnel records under Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 39.25.080.107  However, the court held that there was an
expectation of privacy concerning the records where employees
working on the wolf control program and their families had re-
96. Id. at 896 (quoting Casey v. City of Fairbanks, 670 P.2d 1133, 1136-37
(Alaska 1983)).
97. See id. at 897-98.
98. See id. at 898.
99. See id.
100. 948 P.2d 976 (Alaska 1997).
101. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.100-.220 (Michie 1996).
102. See Alaska Wildlife Alliance, 948 P.2d at 980.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 39.25.080 (Michie 1996).
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ceived death threats, and that this expectation created a constitu-
tionally protected right to privacy under the Alaska Constitution.108
Finally, the court refused to find a compelling state interest in
“verifying accountability of public funds” sufficient to overcome
the employees’ constitutionally protected right to privacy at issue
in this case.109
In Department of Revenue, Permanent Fund Dividend Divi-
sion v. Wilder,110 the supreme court held that despite active duty
military service in Alaska, the failure to return to Alaska or re-
quest reassignment to Alaska prevented the establishment of resi-
dency and eligibility for permanent fund dividends (“PFDs”).111
Wilder, an officer in the U.S. Air Force, was stationed in Alaska
from 1975 through 1980.112  While in Alaska, he obtained a driver’s
license, registered to vote, opened Alaskan bank accounts, and ob-
tained Alaska motor vehicle registrations.113  After the Wilder
family moved to Alabama in 1980, they only visited Alaska once in
June 1989 for less than a week.114  The Wilder family applied for
and received PFDs through 1991, but in 1992 was notified by the
Department of Revenue that their PFD applications had been de-
nied for 1989, 1990, and 1991.115  After a formal hearing, the De-
partment affirmed the denials, finding the Wilders had not demon-
strated an intent “to return and remain in Alaska permanently.”116
The supreme court held that Wilder’s absence from the state for
longer than five years established a presumption of ineligibility.117
In Crum v. Stalnaker,118 the supreme court held that the Divi-
sion of Retirement and Benefits was equitably estopped from de-
nying an application for unused sick leave credit that was received
two and a half months after the statutory deadline.119  The court
noted that the following four elements are required for the doc-
trine of equitable estoppel to apply to a governmental agency: “(1)
the governmental body asserts a position by conduct or words; (2)
the private party acts in reasonable reliance thereon; (3) the pri-
vate party suffers resulting prejudice; and (4) the estoppel serves
108. See Alaska Wildlife Alliance, 948 P.2d at 980.
109. Id. at 981.
110. 929 P.2d 1280 (Alaska 1997).
111. See id. at 1282-83.
112. See id. at 1281.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 1282.
118. 936 P.2d 1254 (Alaska 1997).
119. See id. at 1258.
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the interest of justice so as to limit public injury.”120  The court con-
cluded that the Division’s failure to provide Crum with notice of
the proper procedure for applying for unused sick leave credit and
a form for doing so, constituted an “omission” that satisfied the
first element of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.121  Because the
Division’s “Retiree Information Form” instructions regarding the
unused sick leave credit procedure were poorly written and mis-
leading, Crum’s failure to file a timely claim was reasonable for
purposes of the second element.122  The court concluded that the
third and fourth elements were also met because the application of
equitable estoppel in Crum’s case would serve “‘the interest of jus-
tice so as to limit public injury.’”123  Thus, the court reversed the
superior court’s decision dismissing Crum’s claim and held that the
Division should be estopped from rejecting the late application.124
In Board of Marine Pilots v. Renwick,125 the supreme court
held that deference should be afforded the Alaska Board of Ma-
rine Pilots when applying the Alaska Marine Pilotage Act and im-
plementing regulations to suspend a marine pilot.126  Renwick
abandoned his ship as it reached a state of extremis because the
crew refused to listen to him and because “he couldn’t afford
[being aboard the ship when it grounded] with his license prob-
lem.”127  The Board suspended Renwick under Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 08.01.075(c)128 because of this action and his intent to leave the
ship if it ever moved near danger again.129  The court held that the
interpretation of title 12 of the Alaska Administrative Code sec-
tions 56.960(a) and 56.990(14), which require “a pilot to remain on
board a vessel and assist in its navigation even if the master of the
vessel countermands the pilot’s orders,”130 was within the Board’s
wide range of expertise.  Accordingly, the court afforded the
Board deference in its finding that Renwick should be suspended
120. Id. at 1256 (citing Wassink v. Hawkins, 763 P.2d 971, 975 (Alaska 1988)).
121. See id. at 1258.
122. See id.
123. Id. (quoting Municipality of Anchorage v. Schneider, 685 P.2d 94, 97
(Alaska 1984)).
124. See id.
125. 936 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1997).
126. See id. at 532; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.62.010-.190 (Michie 1996);
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, §§ 56.960(a), 56.990(14) (1996).
127. Renwick, 936 P.2d at 529.
128. ALASKA STAT. § 08.01.075(c) (Michie 1996) (providing in part that “[a]
board may summarily suspend a licensee from the practice of the profession be-
fore a final hearing is held or during an appeal if the board finds that the licensee
poses a clear and immediate danger to the public health and safety”).
129. See Renwick, 936 P.2d at 530.
130. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 12, §§ 56.960(a), 56.990(14) (1996).
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under its regulation.131
In Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion v. Gerke,132 the supreme court held that the Alaska Child Sup-
port Enforcement Division (“CSED”) was not bound by court
rules in administrative collection proceedings,133 and therefore, the
superior court could not condition its collections on a showing of
good cause, pursuant to those rules and Alaska Statutes.134  For
over seven years, Gerke had failed to pay child support, accumu-
lating arrearages of more than $25,000.135  CSED moved in superior
court to reduce Gerke’s arrearages to judgment.136  The superior
court granted CSED’s motions, but, in a handwritten note included
in its order, conditioned the collection of any arrearages older than
five years to the “the requirements of the Cross/Dean decision,”137
a case that required execution of judgment for purposes of judicial
collection to conform to Alaska Statutes section 09.35.020 and
Civil Rule 69(d).138  The supreme court held that the court could
not condition CSED’s administrative collections because the leg-
islature has granted CSED independent powers of enforcement
not subject to judicial rules.139
In Thoma v. Hickel,140 the supreme court held that a public of-
ficial may be held liable for violating state regulations by using in-
formation of criminal convictions from the Alaska Public Safety
Information Network (“APSIN”) to discredit a person attempting
to have the official recalled.141  Thoma, an environmental activist,
filed an ethics complaint against Governor Hickel and involved
himself in an effort to recall the governor, which was endorsed by
131. See Renwick, 936 P.2d at 531-32.
132. 942 P.2d 423 (Alaska 1997).
133. See id. at 426.
134. See id. at 427.
135. See id. at 424.
136. See id.
137. Id. at 425.  The decisions to which the note refers are the consolidated
cases heard by the Alaska Supreme Court in State ex rel. Inman v. Dean, 902 P.2d
1321 (Alaska 1995).  See Gerke, 942 P.2d at 425 n.3.  According to the party’s in-
terpretation of the superior court’s order, the collection of child support would be
conditioned on a showing of good cause why the arrearages more than five years
old had not been previously collected.  See id. at 425, 427.
138. See id. at 427; see also ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.020 (Michie 1996); ALASKA
R. CIV. P. 69(d).
139. See Gerke, 942 P.2d at 426; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.27.230-.260
(Michie 1996) (granting authority to CSED to issue administrative orders to col-
lect child support by means of garnishing wages and attaching property).
140. 947 P.2d 816 (Alaska 1997).
141. See id. at 822.
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the local chapter of the Sierra Club.142  Shortly after Thoma filed
his complaint, aides of the governor became privy to information
about Thoma’s prior criminal convictions accessible through
APSIN.143  This information was used in a letter to the Sierra Club,
issued by Hickel’s press secretary, to discredit Thoma’s charac-
ter.144  Thoma subsequently filed suit claiming that his rights had
been violated by Hickel and asserting state and federal claims.145
The court held that Hickel was entitled only to qualified immunity
in the case, protecting his acts only if they were done “‘in good
faith and are not malicious or corrupt.’”146  The court held that
Thoma stated a valid claim for violation of state APSIN regula-
tions because the Alaska Administrative Code restricts releasing
information to persons other than law enforcement officials.147  Be-
cause Thoma stated a claim for violation of state regulations, the
court did not reach Thoma’s state constitutional claims, holding
that they were superfluous.148 However, a divided court affirmed
the superior court’s summary judgment dismissing Thoma’s federal
claims, finding that no federal constitutional tort claim can be up-
held where a party retaliates through protected speech.149
In Rexford v. State,150 the court of appeals upheld the Depart-
ment of Public Safety’s authority to revoke administratively a mi-
nor’s driver’s license for possessing or consuming alcohol while
under the age of twenty-one, even though a criminal prosecution
may still be pending.151  Rexford was arrested for possessing or
consuming alcohol as a minor, in violation of Alaska Statutes sec-
tion 04.16.050.152  Based on Rexford’s arrest, the Department of
Public Safety used administrative procedures to revoke Rexford’s
driver’s license.153  Because criminal prosecution was still pending
at the time his license was revoked, Rexford argued before the su-
perior court that the revocation should be reversed based on the
double jeopardy protections under the state and federal constitu-
142. See id. at 818.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. Id. (quoting Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield, 739 P.2d 150, 158
(Alaska 1987)).
147. See id. at 823; see also ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, § 25.280 (1996).
148. See Thoma, 947 P.2d at 824, 827.
149. See id. at 821.  The equally divided court resulted in an affirmance of the
decision of the trial court in accord with Alaska precedent.  See id. at 824; City of
Kenai v. Burnett, 860 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1993).
150. 941 P.2d 906 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
151. See id.
152. See id; ALASKA STAT. § 04.16.050 (Michie 1996).
153. See Rexford, 941 P.2d at 906.
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tions.154  A magistrate judge concluded that the Department of
Public Safety could only use its regulatory authority to revoke
Rexford’s license if doing so “had a direct relation to the govern-
ment’s proper regulatory goal of making the highways safe,”155 and
that studies showing the high incidence of highway fatalities among
young people established the necessary relation.156  The court of
appeals affirmed the decision of the magistrate on the ground that
Rexford had not rebutted the magistrate’s finding of a “valid ad-
ministrative purpose” for revoking the license and therefore the
revocation was not “punishment” under double jeopardy analysis,
but a valid use of the state’s regulatory powers.157
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp.,158 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a Native corporation’s “Financial Security Plan” was un-
authorized by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(“ANCSA”)159 in that it was not a social welfare program but
merely a method of distributing corporate assets to certain share-
holders.160  The Kake Tribal Corporation had adopted a Financial
Security Plan, which conferred benefits on the original sharehold-
ers who retained the 100 shares they were issued when the corpo-
ration was organized.161  Hanson and other members of the corpo-
ration who were not among the original shareholders filed a class
action, alleging the Plan unfairly discriminated against them.162
The supreme court found that the stated purpose of the Plan was
to ensure the financial security of the original shareholders, not to
be charitable gifts.163  The court determined that no provision in
ANCSA authorized such a plan, thus the payments were illegal.164
The court also held that the class action suit was contractual in
nature and was therefore governed by the six-year statute of limi-
tations set forth in Alaska Statutes section 09.10.070,165 and that a
separate cause of action accrued with each payment,166 as estab-
154. See id.
155. Id. at 907.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. 939 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1997).
159. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994).
160. See Hanson, 939 P.2d at 1324.
161. See id. at 1322.
162. See id. at 1323.
163. See id. at 1324.
164. See id.
165. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (Michie 1996).
166. See Hanson, 939 P.2d. at 1325.
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lished by Bibo v. Jeffrey’s Restaurant.167  Following from these
holdings, the court stated that all claims payments made before the
six-year period were time-barred but the minority tolling statute
was properly applied to protect the cause of action for children,
even for those who had competent custodians. 168
The supreme court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with a di-
rect action, as opposed to a derivative suit, finding it unlikely that a
derivative suit would be an adequate remedy.169  The court re-
manded two issues for consideration by the superior court: deter-
mination of whether a lump sum payment of damages would be
consistent with Alaska Statutes section 10.06.358170 and whether a
lump sum payment would impermissibly deplete the defendant’s
assets. 171  The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision
to restrict expansion of the class unless the plaintiffs agreed to re-
open liability issues and payment of costs for wasted time.172
In Alaska Continental v. Trickey,173 the supreme court held
that a newly-formed corporation could advance claims once held
by its dissolved predecessor corporation’s shareholders, even
though six years had passed between the dissolution of the first
corporation and the formation of the second.174  The court then
ruled that this assignment need not be explicit under Alaska Stat-
utes section 10.06.633(g),175 since the shareholders in the new and
the dissolved corporations were the same, and they impliedly had
notice of the transfer.176
In Carver v. Quality Inspection and Testing, Inc.,177 the su-
preme court affirmed the findings of the trial court in an action
against a closely held corporation brought by one of the share-
holders for alleged violations of the corporate dissolution statute.178
Carver, one of three shareholders in a closely held corporation
known as Quality Inspection and Testing, Inc. (“QIT”) appealed
from a judgment entered in his favor and alleged that the $20,000
price placed on the corporation at dissolution was so low as to be
erroneous.179  The supreme court concluded that the trial court did
167. 770 P.2d 290, 295-96 (Alaska 1989).
168. See Hanson, 939 P.2d at 1325-26.
169. See id.
170. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.358 (Michie 1996).
171. See Hanson, 939 P.2d at 1328.
172. See id. at 1330.
173. 933 P.2d 528 (Alaska 1997).
174. See id. at 530.
175. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.633(g) (Michie 1996).
176. See Alaska Continental, 933 P.2d at 532.
177. 946 P.2d 450 (Alaska 1997).
178. See id. at 452.
179. See id. at 453.
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not err in relying on the valuation opinion of the defendant’s ex-
pert.180  The court also affirmed the trial court’s finding that QIT
had no significant goodwill and negative cashflow at dissolution.181
It held that it was harmless error for the trial court “to base QIT’s
dissolution value on the amount of its initial start-up capital, in-
stead of value at dissolution,” since under the latter method Carver
would have received nothing.182  Finally, the court affirmed the trial
court’s determination that the defendant shareholders committed
only harmless error by not notifying QIT’s creditors of its dissolu-
tion because all of QIT’s debts and assets were converted upon
dissolution to a new closely held corporation created by the defen-
dant shareholders.183
In Bradford v. First National Bank of Anchorage,184 the su-
preme court held that withdrawing partners become sureties for
partnership debts upon their withdrawal, and that, in the absence
of evidence that the creditor impliedly discharged them from their
obligations, the withdrawing partners are liable as sureties.185  The
Bradfords were members of a partnership that had extended a per-
sonal guarantee on a $3 million debt held by First National Bank
of Anchorage.186  They withdrew from the partnership in 1985, re-
linquishing their interest in return for real property.187  In February
1994, the partnership stopped making payments on the loan, and
First National brought suit.188
Relying on surety law as set forth in the Restatement of Secu-
rity189 and State v. McKinnon,190 the court determined that termina-
tion agreements in which one partner continues to uphold the obli-
gations of the partnership while the other withdraws create a
suretyship in the withdrawing partner.191  The court determined
that continuing partners assumed all obligations in return for ade-
quate consideration, and rejected the argument that an agreement
was necessary to establish a suretyship.192  The court held that a
suretyship is discharged only if the creditor consents to material
180. See id. at 454.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 455.
183. See id. at 455-56.
184. 932 P.2d 256 (Alaska 1997).
185. See id. at 262.
186. See id. at 259.
187. See id.
188. See id.
189. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 83(d) (1941).
190. 667 P.2d 1239 (Alaska 1983).
191. See Bradford, 932 P.2d at 260.
192. See id. at 261.
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alterations in the nature or time of payment,193 and an implied
waiver by the creditor requires “‘direct, unequivocal conduct indi-
cating purpose to abandon or waive the legal right.’”194  The court
concluded that First National’s actions were consistent with an in-
tent to hold the Bradfords liable for the debt.195
In Alaska Marine Pilots v. Hendsch,196 the supreme court ruled
that a licensed marine pilot may bring a private cause of action
against a pilot organization that denies him membership.197
Hendsch was a licensed marine pilot who contracted with defen-
dant Boyd Enterprises, a dispatch service.198  After Hendsch was
terminated, he brought a breach of contract claim.199  While
Hendsch’s case was still pending, he applied for membership in a
regional dispatch service, Alaska Marine Pilots (“AMP”), an or-
ganization with some of the same pilots as Boyd Enterprises.200
AMP refused Hendsch’s application, and he added AMP to his
suit, alleging that AMP wrongly denied him membership in the
pilot organization in violation of Alaska Statutes section
08.62.175(c)201 and intentionally interfered with prospective eco-
nomic advantage.202  Hendsch was awarded judgment on all of his
claims.203  The supreme court held that section 08.62.175(c) implies
a private cause of action because there are “no other apparent
remedies” available to Hendsch, “a private right of action will not
interfere with governmental enforcement” of the statute, and pro-
viding a private right will not “unduly burden the courts.”204  How-
ever, the court also held that Hendsch did not have a claim of in-
tentional interference with prospective economic advantage
against AMP because AMP’s actions did not involve any third per-
son with whom Hendsch could have had a relationship with which
to gain economic advantage.205
193. See id. at 262.
194. Id. (quoting Airoulofski v. State, 922 P.2d 889, 894-95 (Alaska 1996)).
195. See id. at 262.
196. 950 P.2d 98 (Alaska 1997).
197. See id. at 105.
198. See id. at 101.
199. See id. at 102.
200. See id.
201. ALASKA STAT. § 08.62.175(c) (Michie 1996).  Section 08.62.175(c) states
that “a pilot organization . . . shall . . . be open to membership by all persons li-
censed under this chapter to pilot vessels in the pilotage region in which the or-
ganization is recognized.”
202. See Alaska Marine Pilots, 950 P.2d at 102-03.
203. See id. at 103.
204. Id. at 105.
205. See id. at 106.
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In Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice,206 the supreme court up-
held an oral promise under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, in
spite of the Statute of Frauds, where there was reasonable reliance
on the promise and injustice could be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise.207  In so doing, the court effectively adopted Section
139 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.208  Rice was prom-
ised a two-year position with the Alaska Democratic Party as ex-
ecutive director and, based on this promise, she quit her job
working for the Maryland Democratic Party and moved to
Alaska.209  However, the job failed to materialize.210  The court
found that the Party could have reasonably expected Rice to act
based on its promise and that her reliance also was reasonable.211
Furthermore, the court stated that “the jury could reasonably find
that Rice would be a victim of injustice without an award of dam-
ages . . . .”212  Because Rice met the clear and convincing proof
standard within the Restatement, she was awarded damages based
on her reliance on the broken promise.213
In Davis v. Dykman,214 the supreme court held that an injured
party’s letter to an insurer was too indefinite about the calculation
of attorney’s fees to constitute a valid settlement offer and, there-
fore, the insurer’s acceptance did not form a settlement contract.215
The supreme court rejected Dykman’s argument that a method for
calculating attorney’s fees was implicit in Davis’s letter.216  The
court also refused to add terms to the letter according to the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties because the court determined
that the parties did not agree to the projected verdict, an essential
term.217  Concluding that a contract to negotiate is unenforceable
because it contains no basis for a court to determine the existence
of a breach or an appropriate remedy, the supreme court rejected
Dykman’s argument that the parties had at least agreed to negoti-
ate.218
In Diksen v. Troxell,219 the supreme court held that an issue of
206. 934 P.2d 1313 (Alaska 1997).
207. See id. at 1317.
208. See id. at 1316; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981).
209. See Alaska Democratic Party, 934 P.2d at 1315.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 1317.
212. Id.
213. See id.
214. 938 P.2d 1002 (Alaska 1997).
215. See id. at 1006.
216. See id. at 1007.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 1008.
219. 938 P.2d 1009 (Alaska 1997).
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fact existed as to whether a transfer agreement included a promise
to reconvey a fishing permit, which would render it illegal pursuant
to Alaska Statutes section 16.43.150(g),220 or whether the transfer
was a sale, in which case the transferor might be entitled to collect
damages for breach of contract.221  The court found that both par-
ties had made evidentiary admissions that conflicted with their le-
gal positions, and that these admissions created a genuine issue of
fact.222  The evidence that Diksen’s transfer of a limited entry per-
mit to Troxell was a lease included Diksen’s characterization of the
transaction as such, as well as Diksen’s deposition testimony that
the permit was to revert to her if Troxell decided to stop using it
for the purposes of fishing.223  However, Troxell testified that it was
his understanding that the permit would never revert to Diksen,
providing evidence that the transfer was a sale.224  Because of this
conflicting testimony, the court concluded that a genuine issue of
fact existed and ordered that the case be remanded to determine
whether the parties’ transfer agreement contained an illegal
term.225
In Nautilus Marine Enterprises Inc. v. Valdez Fisheries Devel-
opment Ass’n,226 the supreme court held that in disputes concerning
performance under a contract that limits the parties’ expectations
as to quantity, extrinsic evidence concerning the historic availabil-
ity of the product to be supplied is irrelevant, and thus properly
excluded by the trial court.227  Nautilus entered into a contract with
Valdez to buy up to 50,000 salmon a day, as available during the
1993 fishing season.228  Under the terms of the contract, Nautilus
would pay Valdez within forty-eight hours of delivery, and failure
to pay was grounds for suspending the contract until payment was
made.229  While the contract was in effect, disputes arose involving
the payments made to Valdez, and Valdez sued, with Nautilus
counterclaiming for breach of contract.230  The supreme court held
that the extrinsic evidence relating to the average availability of
salmon in years past was not relevant because the agreement was
not an output contract, but rather one that imposed a quantity
220. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.150(g) (Michie 1996) (providing that an entry per-
mit may not be transferred).
221. See Diksen, 938 P.2d at 1012-13.
222. See id. at 1013.
223. See id. at 1012.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 1012-13.
226. 943 P.2d 1201 (Alaska 1997).
227. See id.
228. See id. at 1202.
229. See id.
230. See id.
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limitation of 50,000 fish.231
In Little Susitna Construction Co. v. Soil Processing, Inc.,232 the
supreme court held that a trial court may properly allow a jury to
interpret a “turn-key” provision of a lease to determine the lease’s
factual meaning.233  Little Susitna Construction Company, Inc.
(“LSC”) entered a “turn-key” lease agreement with Soil Process-
ing, Inc. (“SPI”) for the use of soil-remediation equipment in order
to complete a government contract.234  The equipment was leased
“at the turn-key price of $44.00 per ton” of processed soil.235  LSC
experienced several delays causing the project to commence during
the winter months, at which time the equipment suffered break-
downs due to the cold weather, which in turn caused costly delays
to LSC.236  LSC refused to pay SPI for the use of the equipment,
claiming that SPI was responsible for the costs incurred by the
equipments’ failure, repair, and delays.237  SPI sued for breach of
contract.238  The trial court found that both parties had different in-
terpretations of a “turn-key” provision, and allowed the jury to de-
cide the factual meaning of the term.239  The supreme court held
that even though “turn-key” is accepted as meaning “all risks as-
sumed by the contractor” in some areas of case law, the meaning
of the provision in equipment lease agreements is unsettled, and
the trial court may properly allow a jury to resolve the contract’s
ambiguity.240  The court found that the evidence presented at trial
supported a finding that the contract’s meaning was in fact am-
biguous, and therefore refused to disturb the jury’s special ver-
dict.241
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
In D.L.M. v. M.W.,242 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
superior court’s “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law” in an
adoption matter constituted a final judgment sufficient to begin
231. See id. at 1203-04.
232. 944 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1997).
233. See id.
234. See id. at 22.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 23-25.
241. See id. at 25.
242. 941 P.2d 900 (Alaska 1997).
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tolling the time in which motions for costs must be filed.243  M.W.
was involved in custody litigation with the grandparents of his
child, who were seeking to adopt the child.244  In May 1994, at the
close of the adoption trial, the superior court denied the adoption
petition and entered written “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.”245  The grandparents sought review, and the supreme court
vacated the custody order and affirmed the dismissal of the adop-
tion proceedings.246  On January 3, 1995, the superior court entered
final judgment on the dismissal of the adoption petition, and M.W.
filed a motion for costs and attorney’s fees that same day.247  The
supreme court held that M.W.’s motion for costs was time-barred
because it did not come within ten days of the court’s final disposi-
tion on the merits.248  The supreme court found that the “Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law” was a “final judgment” for the
purpose of the time limitation because it disposed of the case and
made the case ready for appeal, despite the fact that the court’s
order was not labeled formally as a “final judgment.”249
In Alaska Center for the Environment v. State,250 the supreme
court held that the Alaska Center for the Environment (“ACE”)
was the “prevailing party” because it achieved the “principal re-
lief” sought by its litigation and therefore was entitled to recovery
of attorney’s fees.251  The underlying dispute was a response to a
settlement agreement issued by the state legislature to resolve a
land dispute regarding federal land granted by the United States
Congress to the territory of Alaska in 1956 as a public trust for the
benefit of the state’s mental health program.252  Although ACE
prevailed on only two of the eleven issues raised in its motion for
summary judgment, it succeeded in defeating the settlement
agreement, the main relief it desired.253  However, the superior
court denied ACE’s request for attorney’s fees finding that it was
not the “prevailing party” because it prevailed only on two of the
eleven issues and the two issues were neither the most important
issues in the case nor could they be characterized as the “main is-
sue.”254
243. See id. at 902-03.
244. See id. at 901.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 902.
248. See id. at 902-03.
249. See id.
250. 940 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1997).
251. See id. at 922.
252. See id. at 917-18.
253. See id. at 921-22.
254. See id. at 920.
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The supreme court reversed, holding that ACE was the
“prevailing party” because it achieved the rejection of the settle-
ment agreement, the “principal relief” sought.255  Rejecting the
state’s argument “that prevailing party status depends on whether
a party’s legal arguments ‘directly,’ ‘primarily,’ or necessarily cause
the court’s favorable decision,” the supreme court remarked that
the superior court “should have asked the simpler and more objec-
tive question of whether ACE obtained the relief it sought.”256
In Hughes v. Foster Wheeler Co.,257 the supreme court awarded
attorney’s fees and costs, under Civil Rule 82,258 for prevailing in an
admiralty case on the basis of forum non conveniens.259  Hughes ar-
gued that “admiralty law does not provide for awards of attorney’s
fees and costs,”260 but the court rejected that argument by deciding
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens “‘has long been a doc-
trine of general application.’”261  The court rejected the argument
that the award of attorney’s fees and costs would damage the uni-
formity required under admiralty law.262  Despite the fact that the
case was not adjudicated on its merits, the court held that Foster
Wheeler was the prevailing party within the terms of Civil Rule
82.263
In Fairbanks Fire Fighters Ass’n, Local 1324 v. City of Fair-
banks,264 the supreme court denied the firefighters’ request for rea-
sonable attorney’s fees incurred in acquiring an injunction because
the court found that the city did not act in bad faith and that the
firefighters were not public interest litigants.265  During collective
bargaining, the city of Fairbanks had unilaterally reduced the
number of firefighters from eight to six for each twenty-four hour
shift based on budgetary constraints.266  The firefighters acquired a
preliminary injunction to thwart this action based on the serious
threat of harm to both the public and the firefighters, and conse-
quently the city rescinded the staffing cuts. 267  Although the court
found that this conduct could possibly constitute bad faith on the
255. See id. at 921-22.
256. Id.
257. 932 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1997).
258. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
259. See Hughes, 932 P.2d at 786.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 787 (quoting American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 450
(1994)).
262. See id. at 789-90.
263. See id. at 791.
264. 934 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1997).
265. See id. at 762-63.
266. See id. at 760-61.
267. See id. at 761.
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part of the city, the “evidence [did] not compel [the court] to con-
clude that the superior court’s finding that the [c]ity did not act in
bad faith was clearly erroneous.”268
The court also did not qualify the firefighters as a public inter-
est litigant.269  The court stated that a party must satisfy the fol-
lowing four requirements to qualify as a public interest litigant: the
case is designed to effectuate strong public policies; numerous
people would benefit from a successful lawsuit; only a private party
could have been expected to bring the lawsuit; and the party would
have sufficient economic incentive to file suit even if the action in-
volved only narrow issues lacking general importance.270  Because
the firefighters had a “direct economic stake in the action,” based
on the fact that they would receive more overtime payments, they
could not qualify as public interest litigants even if the litigation
was motivated in part by safety concerns.271
In Grimes v. Kinney Shoe Corp.,272 the supreme court held that
the prevailing employer/defendant in an Alaska Wage and Hour
Act (“AWHA”)273 case was not entitled to recover attorney’s fees
and costs under former Alaska Statutes section 23.10.110(c) or
Civil Rule 82.274  Prior to the 1995 amendments, section
23.10.110(c) provided that prevailing plaintiffs should be awarded
attorney’s fees and costs, but was silent as to whether prevailing
defendants may be awarded costs and fees.275  Because there was
no statutory authority to the contrary, Kinney argued that Civil
Rule 82, which provides that “‘the prevailing party in a civil case
shall be awarded attorney’s fees,’” allows an award of attorney’s
fees to prevailing defendants in an AWHA case.276  Rejecting Kin-
ney’s argument, the court concluded that “analogous case law and
the plain language” of section 23.10.110(c) suggest that, prior to
the 1995 amendments, a prevailing defendant was not entitled to
attorney’s fees and costs in an action under section 23.10.110(c),
nor is a defendant entitled to an award under Civil Rule 82.277  The
1995 amendments to section 23.10.110(c), providing for fees and
costs to a prevailing defendant in an action under AWHA, did not
268. Id. at 762.
269. See id. at 764.
270. See id. at 763.
271. Id. at 763-64.
272. 938 P.2d 997 (Alaska 1997).
273. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.050-.150 (Michie 1996).
274. See Grimes, 938 P.2d at 1001; ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(c) (Michie 1994);
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82.
275. See Grimes, 938 P.2d at 998.
276. Id. at 999 (quoting ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82).
277. Id. at 1001.
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support Kinney’s argument because the amendment provides an
award “only in the event of a frivolous or bad faith claim.”278
In Law Offices of Vincent Vitale, P.C. v. Tabbytite,279 the su-
preme court held that an attorney could not collect on an attor-
ney’s lien for fees accrued in winning a condemnation case under
25 U.S.C. § 410 for a Native Alaskan condemnee.280  Tabbytite
owned Indian allotment land upon which a road was unlawfully
constructed.281  The road was later annexed by the Municipality of
Anchorage.282  After decades of litigation, Anchorage finally ac-
quired the road through formal condemnation, and Tabbytite was
awarded $165,962 in damages.283  Vitale acted as Tabbytite’s lawyer
from 1976 to 1980, after which time he filed an attorney’s lien for
fees from the litigation proceeds.284  Under Alaska Bar Rule 39,285
the matter was heard by a fee arbitration panel, which awarded Vi-
tale $64,375.286  The superior court refused to reduce Vitale’s award
to judgment on the grounds that 25 U.S.C. § 410, the statute gov-
erning Indian allotments, precluded funds from the sales of Indian
allotment lands to be used for payment of any debt or claim.287  The
supreme court held that although Vitale was entitled to personal
judgment based on the arbitration award,288 the condemnation ac-
tion was an “enforced sale” and, therefore, 25 U.S.C. § 410 pre-
vented him from collecting his fees from the proceeds of the con-
demnation action.289
In Department of Natural Resources v. Tongass Conservation
Society,290 the supreme court held that a conservation society’s at-
tempt to recover attorney’s fees and costs from an appeal chal-
lenging a land exchange agreement was a nonjusticiable political
question.291  The Tongass Conservation Society filed an administra-
tive appeal to prevent a land exchange between the Department of
Natural Resources and the Cape Fox Corporation.292  Because the
land value exceeded $5 million, the exchange required legislative
278. Id. at 1000.
279. 942 P.2d 1141 (Alaska 1997).
280. See id. at 1144; see also 25 U.S.C. § 410 (1994).
281. See Law Offices of Vincent Vitale, 942 P.2d at 1144.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 1145.
284. See id.
285. ALASKA BAR R. 39; see ALASKA STAT. §§  09.43.120-.180 (Michie 1996).
286. See Law Offices of Vincent Vitale, 942 P.2d at 1145.
287. See id. at 1145-46.
288. See id. at 1146.
289. Id. at 1148-49.
290. 931 P.2d 1016 (Alaska 1997).
291. See id. at 1017-18.
292. See id. at 1016.
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approval, but the bill died in committee and the parties rescinded
the agreement.293  After the rescission, Tongass moved to recover
fees and costs, claiming it was the “prevailing party because the
relief it sought had occurred [and] the appeal was a catalyst in
bringing about the relief.”294
The supreme court agreed that Tongass’s goal in filing the ap-
peal was to prevent the land exchange, and the goal was accom-
plished because the exchange was not approved, but found that the
question of whether the appeal was a catalyst in producing the
legislature’s inaction was a political question.295  Relying on Malone
v. Meekins,296 which adopted the political question standards estab-
lished by the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr,297 the court
provided three reasons why the issue presented a political ques-
tion.298  First, requiring legislative approval for land exchanges of
value in excess of $5 million reflected a “‘textually demonstrable
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.’”299
Furthermore, “[i]mputing a motive to the legislature . . . risks ex-
pressing a lack of respect for that branch of government.”300  Fi-
nally, there were no “‘judicially discoverable and manageable
standards’ which might be used to resolve the question as to why
the legislature failed to take a particular action.”301
B. Conflicts
In McCaffrey v. Green,302 the Alaska Supreme Court deter-
mined that in child custody cases, a parent subject to personal ju-
risdiction on visitation and transportation issues was also subject to
jurisdiction on child support claims.303  Kerri McCaffrey and David
Green were divorced in Texas in 1987.304  In 1991, McCaffrey
moved to Alaska with the children, and in 1994, Green moved to
Oregon.305  The final terms of the custody agreement, issued under
a Texas court’s continuing jurisdiction, raised Green’s child sup-
port obligation, provided a detailed visitation schedule, and pro-
293. See id. at 1016-17.
294. Id. at 1017.
295. See id. at 1017-18.
296. 650 P.2d 351 (Alaska 1982).
297. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
298. See Tongass, 931 P.2d at 1019.
299. Id.  (quoting Malone, 650 P.2d at 357).
300. Id. at 1019.
301. Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
302. 931 P.2d 407 (Alaska 1997).
303. See id. at 413.
304. See id. at 407.
305. See id.
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vided for the sharing of transportation costs.306  In May 1994,
McCaffrey filed a complaint in the Alaska Superior Court for
modification of the child support and transportation cost provi-
sions of the decree, to which Green objected on the ground of a
lack of personal jurisdiction.307  The motion was denied by the su-
perior court.308
The supreme court determined that the superior court had
misapplied Puhlman v. Turner309 and Kulko v. Superior Court310 in
finding no personal jurisdiction over Green.311  The court found the
following: both parents had moved across the continent, Alaska
was the only state in which all of McCaffrey’s claims could be liti-
gated, and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,312 which
established Alaska jurisdiction to make a child custody determina-
tion if Alaska is the home state of the child at the time of the pro-
ceeding, had been enacted.313  Finally, the court decided that asser-
tion of jurisdiction was the most logical method to decide child
support issues, because an Alaska court was already deciding cus-
tody and visitation issues.314
In State v. Arnariak,315 the supreme court held that the federal
Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”)316 did not preempt
state law punishing activities associated with hunting walruses on a
game sanctuary established by Alaska.317  The Arnariaks were ar-
rested for entering Round Island, part of the Walrus Islands State
Game Sanctuary, without a license and unlawfully discharging a
firearm.318  Before trial, the Arnariaks moved to dismiss the
charges on the grounds that the MMPA preempts the state law
making their activities a crime.319  Because the MMPA forbids
states from “enforc[ing] . . . or attempt[ing] to enforce . . . any
[s]tate law or regulation relating to the taking of any . . . marine
mammal within the [s]tate”320 and specifically exempts some
Alaska Natives from federal regulations when they hunt in certain
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 408.
309. 874 P.2d 291 (Alaska 1994).
310. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
311. See McCaffrey, 931 P.2d at 409-12.
312. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-.910 (Michie 1996).
313. See McCaffrey, 931 P.2d at 412.
314. See id. at 413.
315. 941 P.2d 154 (Alaska 1997).
316. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994).
317. See Arnariak, 941 P.2d at 158.
318. See id. at 156.
319. See id.
320. 16 U.S.C. § 1379(a).
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circumstances,321 the district court dismissed the charges against the
Arnariaks, and the court of appeals affirmed.322  The supreme court
held that reading the MMPA to preclude states from prohibiting
persons from entering state property to hunt would be an unconsti-
tutional taking without condemnation.323  Under the principle that
statutes should be construed so as to avoid unconstitutionality, the
court interpreted the MMPA as not precluding “the [s]tate from
restricting access to or from prohibiting the discharge of firearms
on state land.”324  The court also cited legislative history of the
MMPA, stating that the Act was not intended to prevent the use of
game sanctuaries and that the primary purpose was to protect ma-
rine animals.325  Finally, the court employed the “clear statement”
doctrine, noting that there is a presumption against federal pre-
emption in areas of traditional state control which, absent a clear
and definite statement of Congress’s intent to preempt, will disfa-
vor federal preemption.326
In Hinde v. Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co.,327 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Rule 38 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure,328 which permits attorney fee awards
only if an appeal is frivolous, preempts Rule 508 of the Alaska
Rules of Civil Procedure,329 which would have permitted a fee
award.330  The court found that because “the Alaska rule was pro-
cedural, and not substantive,” it is preempted by Rule 38 in federal
diversity cases.331
In In re Durheim,332 the federal district court decided to ab-
stain from hearing a wrongful death claim based on state law and
the federal Jones Act.333  The estate of Santos had brought a
wrongful death claim against Durheim for negligently recruiting
Santos to work as a commercial diver and failing to provide him
with sufficient training.334  Just before the close of discovery, Dur-
heim filed a Chapter 7 petition with the district court, which was
321. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(b).
322. See Arnariak, 941 P.2d at 156 (citing State v. Arnariak, 893 P.2d 1273,
1277 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995)).
323. See id. at 156-57.
324. Id. at 157.
325. See id.
326. See id. at 158 (citing Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 966 (Alaska 1995)).
327. 112 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1997).
328. FED. R. APP. P. 38.
329. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 508.
330. See Hinde, 112 F.2d at 412.
331. Id.
332. 215 B.R. 876 (D. Alaska 1997).
333. See id. at 879-80; 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
334. See In re Durheim, 215 B.R. at 877.
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transferred to U.S. Bankruptcy Court in accordance with local
rules.335  Santos’s state court litigation was allowed to proceed but
Durheim removed the action to federal district court.336  In re-
sponse, Santos requested that the federal court abstain from hear-
ing the claim.337
Durheim argued that abstention was improper because the ac-
tion depended on federal law.338  He contended that “the gravamen
of Santos’[s] action is a wrongful death claim by a seaman arising
on the high seas.”339  The court noted that there is a strong policy
against removal to federal court of a maritime claim and that Jones
Act claims are not removable to federal court.340  Therefore, if San-
tos’s claims were based on state tort law, the action was properly
removed but the district court would abstain.341  On the other hand,
if Santos’s claims were in fact Jones Act claims, then removal was
improper and the case would be remanded to the state.342  Regard-
less, the federal district court declined to retain jurisdiction over
the issue.343
C. Timeliness of Prosecution and Appeal
In Metcalf v. Felec Services,344 the Alaska Supreme Court held
that the superior court abused its discretion by dismissing an ap-
peal from an administrative agency due to lack of prosecution de-
spite the fact that the brief was filed after the court-ordered dead-
line.345  The court found an abuse of discretion because Metcalf’s
rationale for missing the deadline was “interrelated with the sub-
stantive appellate issues he was attempting to raise,” and because
Felec Services did not show that they would have been prejudiced
by the delay.346  The court concluded that the harsh remedy of dis-
missal was justified only if the movant showed some “controlling
335. See id.
336. See id. at 878.  Federal law allows for removal of a civil action brought in a
state court if the district courts have original jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-
(b) (1994).  Section 157 allows wrongful death claims to be tried in the district
court in which the bankruptcy case is pending.  See id. § 157(b)(5).
337. See In re Durheim, 215 B.R. at 878.  Federal law allows for a district court
to abstain from hearing a “particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in
or related to a case under title 11.”  28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1).
338. See In re Durheim, 215 B.R. at 879.
339. Id.
340. See id.
341. See id. at 880.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. 938 P.2d 1023 (Alaska 1997).
345. See id. at 1025.
346. Id.
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principle, such as need to punish the wrongdoer, deter like con-
duct, preserve the integrity of the fact finding process, or protect
the dignity of the court.”347  The fact that the superior court judge
had already received Metcalf’s brief when he made his decision to
dismiss the case mitigated against the need to impose a strict and
harsh result.348  Because no prejudicial affect was shown and the
delay did not work in Metcalf’s favor, the court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded.349
In Mundt v. Northwest Explorations, Inc.,350 the supreme court
held that the superior court erred by refusing to permit a grantee
of land to intervene in a post-judgment motion to quiet title to
land in which the grantee had a partial interest.351  Northwest Ex-
plorations Inc. filed a motion to quiet title to parcels it had re-
ceived from Ashbrook in a settlement agreement and to invalidate
all deeds conveying those parcels to any parties other than itself.352
The superior court granted Northwest’s motion and issued an or-
der over Ashbrook’s objections.353  Because the order invalidated
deeds conveying parcels from Ashbrook to Mundt, Mundt sought
to intervene by filing a motion for reconsideration.354  The supreme
court concluded that the superior court’s denial of Mundt’s motion
to intervene was erroneous because her application was timely and
Ashbrook did not adequately represent Mundt’s interests.355  Be-
cause it was unclear whether Mundt knew that her parcels would
be affected prior to the post-judgment order, the fact that she
waited to file a motion to intervene until after the order was issued
did not make her motion to intervene untimely.356  The supreme
court noted that in order to intervene, Mundt must also show that
she had an interest in the subject matter of the post-judgment that
would be impaired as a consequence of the action and that her in-
terest had not been adequately represented by any existing party.357
Because the supreme court concluded that Ashbrook’s interests
were not coextensive with Mundt’s and he had no particular inter-
est in arguing for her interests, it reversed the superior court’s de-
nial of Mundt’s motion and remanded with instructions to consider
347. Id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. 947 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1997).
351. See id. at 829.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id. at 830.
356. See id.
357. See id. at 829.
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her claim on its merits.358
In Bauman v. Day,359 the supreme court held that courts must
liberally grant motions to amend complaints where the complain-
ing party does not act with “‘undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory
motive.’”360  Bauman and his wife sued Day over land they pur-
chased from him that was allegedly covered with permafrost,
claiming Day had made a verbal guarantee that the land was free
of permafrost.361  The superior court dismissed their contract claim
because the statute of limitations had run, but the supreme court
reversed and remanded, holding that the statute of limitations did
not commence until discovery of permafrost.362  In their amended
complaint, the Baumans alleged breach of contract, but failed to
ask for relief.363  The supreme court held that the district court
erred in not granting the motion to amend the complaint because
Alaska Civil Rule 15(a)364 sets a liberal policy for amending plead-
ings not made with “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive.”365
D. Miscellaneous
In Plumber v. University of Alaska Anchorage,366 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a previously settled lawsuit in federal dis-
trict court bars a subsequent action in state court based on a dis-
pute between the same parties about the same cause of action.367
Applying the doctrine of res judicata, the court dismissed a griev-
ance against the University of Alaska even though the theories of
liability were different.368  Plumber challenged the denial of a salary
increase due to a prior unfavorable evaluation, which she had
challenged in federal court as retaliatory and for which she had re-
ceived a settlement award.369  Although “[i]t is true that res judicata
does not act as a bar when the conduct giving rise to the second
suit occurs after the conclusion of the first suit,”370 the basis for the
grievance remained the same in Plumber’s case and her settlement
358. See id. at 831.
359. 942 P.2d 1130 (Alaska 1997).
360. Id. at 1132 (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
361. See id. at 1131.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 15(a).
365. Bauman, 942 P.2d at 1132.
366. 936 P.2d 163 (Alaska 1997).
367. See id. at 166.
368. See id. at 167.
369. See id. at 164.
370. Id. at 167.
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was compensation for her entire injury.371  Plumber had a fair op-
portunity to litigate the issue in district court and her ignorance of
the effect of her settlement was immaterial in applying res judi-
cata.372
In Nome Commercial Co. v. National Bank of Alaska,373 the
supreme court allowed the National Bank of Alaska (“NBA”) to
file an interpleader when there was a dispute over whether the
NBA was liable for funds to two independent parties who each
claimed ownership of a bank account.374  The superior court held
that for NBA to maintain an interpleader action, “the stakeholder
[NBA] must not have incurred independent liability to any claim-
ant.”375  The supreme court rejected this reasoning, holding that
“Civil Rule 22 eliminates the requirement that the stakeholder not
be independently liable to a claimant.”376  The supreme court al-
lowed the interpleader because “Civil Rule 22 permits a stake-
holder to interplead funds whenever the stakeholder may be ex-
posed to ‘double or multiple liability’” as long as NBA reasonably
and in good faith believed that there were adverse claims to the
fund.377  Because it was not clear which party represented Nome
Commercial (and had authority over the funds), the interpleader
was allowed to protect the innocent stakeholder, NBA.378
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, Inc.,379 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a district court may not
issue a declaratory judgment to preempt a state court’s ruling on
issues of federal maritime law.380  The case involved the claims of
about 4,000 plaintiffs comprising “[n]umerous commercial fisher-
men, local business owners, state and local governments, and Na-
tive American corporations, among others” who brought claims
against Exxon for damages resulting from the 1989 Exxon Valdez
oil spill.381  Exxon filed for declaratory judgment that would bind
all parties, whether they brought their claim in federal or state
court.382  The district court had granted Exxon summary judgment
on certain issues, and Exxon’s declaratory action sought to bind
371. See id. at 168.
372. See id. at 167.
373. 948 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1997).
374. See id. at 450.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 451.
378. See id. at 450-51.
379. 120 F.3d 166 (9th Cir. 1997).
380. See id. at 169.
381. Id. at 167.
382. See id.
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the plaintiffs to those judgments.383  Because most of the plaintiffs
had become consolidated in a federal action, however, the court of
appeals viewed the declaratory action as directed at specific plain-
tiffs who had been removed to district court but may still be re-
manded to state court.384  The court held that the district court’s
grant of declaratory judgment was intended to preempt a potential
state court ruling, and therefore was an abuse of discretion, since
jurisdiction to review state court judgments lies exclusively in the
state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.385
In Buster v. Greisen,386 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that Buster’s state claim for misrepresentation by nondisclo-
sure was improperly removed to federal court.387  Buster had previ-
ously been found guilty of breaching a fiduciary duty pursuant to
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”),388 and
now alleged that he did not have notice that he was a fiduciary in
that action.389  The court found that ERISA did not preempt this
particular state law claim and the federal court’s ancillary jurisdic-
tion could not be applied to prevent a “retaliatory lawsuit.”390
However, the court of appeals did uphold the district court’s impo-
sition of Rule 11 sanctions for a “frivolous” filing, despite lack of
jurisdiction.391
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Due Process
In City of North Pole v. Zabek,392 the Alaska Supreme Court
held that a city employee did not get pre-termination due process
when she was fired without warning, but that her post-termination
appeal to the city personnel board cured the city’s failure to pro-
vide a pre-termination hearing and provided her due process.393
Zabek initially was informed of her dismissal by letter without a
hearing, but she appealed to the city personnel board, which af-
383. See id.
384. See id. at 168.
385. See id. at 169.
386. 104 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 1997).
387. See id. at 1187.
388. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001- 1461(1994).
389. See Thomas, Head & Greisen Employees Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114
(9th Cir. 1994).
390. Buster, 104 F.3d at 1189.
391. See id. at 1190.
392. 934 P.2d 1292 (Alaska 1997).
393. See id. at 1298.
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firmed the decision.394  The court held that public employees who
may be terminated only for just cause have a property interest in
continued employment that is protected by federal and state due
process limitations.395  The court stated that, “‘[a]t a minimum, the
employee must receive oral or written notice of the proposed dis-
charge, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an oppor-
tunity to present his position.’”396  The city argued that there was
no dispute over the dispositive facts, but the court found that this
did not make “a summary termination without the constitution-
ally-mandated pre-termination hearing acceptable.”397  However,
the court decided that the error was removed when Zabek was
given proper due process in her post-termination hearing, and
therefore her claim for back pay without mitigation was awarded
only for the time between her initial firing and her post-
termination hearing.398
In Bartlett v. State Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,399
the supreme court held that an agency does not violate a party’s
due process or equal protection rights in denying a permit and a
hearing to applicants who submit their applications for the permits
after the deadline where no material issue could be addressed in
the hearing.400  The Bartletts applied for fishing permits fourteen
years after the deadline for the permits had passed, claiming that
they had not filed earlier due to reliance on statements of an em-
ployee of the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (“CFEC”)
who told them they would not be eligible for the permits.401  The
court rejected the Bartletts’ argument and held that a statutorily
mandated end to the application process once the maximum num-
ber of permits had been issued effectively prevented CFEC from
issuing permits to the Bartletts, thus no material issue existed and
no hearing could be required in denying the permit.402
In State v. Hazelwood,403 the supreme court held that the mens
rea requirement for the crime of negligent discharge of oil could be
satisfied under a civil negligence standard without a denial of de-
fendant’s due process rights.404  Both standards require negligence,
394. See id. at 1295.
395. See id. at 1297.
396. Id. (quoting Storrs v. Municipality of Anchorage, 721 P.2d 1146, 1149
(1986)).
397. Id. at 1298.
398. See id. at 1298-1300.
399. 948 P.2d 987 (Alaska 1997).
400. See id. at 990.
401. See id. at 989-90.
402. See id. at 990.
403. 946 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1997).
404. See id. at 877.
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although “[c]riminal negligence requires a greater risk.”405  It basi-
cally “requires the jury to find negligence so gross as to merit not
just damages but also punishment,” but “there is still no require-
ment that the defendant actually be aware of the risk of harm.”406
The court relied on precedent to show “that a mental state of sim-
ple or ordinary negligence can support a criminal conviction.”407
The court concluded that for this type of crime “the negligence
standard is constitutionally permissible because it approximates
the aim of the due process guarantee: an assurance that criminal
penalties will be imposed only when the conduct at issue is some-
thing society can reasonably expect to deter.”408
In Butler v. Dunlap,409 the supreme court held that the highly
deferential standard of review of the Uniform Arbitration Act410
applied to determinations made by the Bar Association Fee Arbi-
tration Panel.411  Butler challenged the standard of review applied
by the superior court in upholding the Arbitration Panel’s decision
to award an attorney’s fee refund, claiming the appropriate stan-
dard was the arbitrary and capricious standard applied to manda-
tory arbitration.412  The supreme court held that Butler’s arguments
of denial of due process were foreclosed by Miller v. Purvis,413 in
which the court held that the relevant limitations on the scope of
judicial review were not a denial of due process.414
In George v. State,415 the court of appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of a statute requiring prisoners to pay a statutory filing
fee.416  In July 1995, Alaska law was amended to require indigent
prisoners to pay a filing fee “‘equal to 20[%] . . . of the average
monthly deposits made to the prisoner’s [prison] account . . . or the
average balance in that account,’” whichever was greater, so long
as it did not exceed the normal filing fee.417  George sought post-
conviction relief in the superior court, and appealed the fee,
claiming that it posed an unconstitutional burden.418
405. Id.
406. Id. at 878.
407. Id. at 879; see State v. Rice, 626 P.2d 104 (Alaska 1981); State v. Guest,
583 P.2d 836 (Alaska 1978).
408. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d at 884.
409. 931 P.2d 1036 (Alaska 1997).
410. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010-.180 (Michie 1996).
411. See Butler, 931 P.2d at 1040.
412. See id. at 1037.
413. 921 P.2d 610 (Alaska 1996).
414. See Butler, 931 P.2d at 1039-40.
415. 944 P.2d 1181 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
416. See id. at 1190-91.
417. Id. at 1182 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.010(d) (Michie 1996)).
418. See id.
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George first challenged the statute on procedural due process
grounds.419  The statute authorized courts to waive the filing fee if
the prisoner proved “‘exceptional circumstances.’”420  First, the
court found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, as it
was clear that the phrase “exceptional circumstances” referred to
circumstances other than imprisonment and indigency.421  The
court also rejected George’s argument that the statute required
prisoners to demonstrate the merit of their claim before they
would receive an exemption.422  Although the law did require the
prisoner to describe the nature of the action, it did not authorize
denial of an exemption because a prisoner’s claim appeared to lack
merit.423
George also attacked the validity of the statute on equal pro-
tection grounds, claiming an unconstitutional distinction between
indigent non-prisoners (eligible for a full fee waiver) and indigent
prisoners.424  The court found that the distinction between prison-
ers and non-prisoners was constitutional, recognizing the large im-
pact that prisoners’ lawsuits were having on the court system.425
The court noted that, in fact, the prospect of litigation had actually
become a recreational activity for prisoners.426  For indigent non-
prisoners, however, the litigation process represented a “significant
intrusion on the person’s life . . . generally requir[ing] the person to
spend hours away from their job, from their family, and from
chores, errands, and social recreation.”427  Placing a minimum filing
fee requirement on indigent prisoners simply required them to
make an economic decision about filing the lawsuit.428  Finally, the
court determined the filing fee did not effectively bar access to the
courts, as alternative payment provisions did exist and the required
fees were generally very modest.429
B. Double Jeopardy
In DeMario v. State,430 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a
subsequent increase of an imposed sentence due to a previous er-
419. See id. at 1183-89.
420. Id. at 1183 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 09.19.010(c)).
421. See id. at 1183.
422. See id. at 1185.
423. See id.
424. See id. at 1185-86.
425. See id. at 1187.
426. See id. at 1187-88.
427. Id. at 1188.
428. See id. at 1190.
429. See id.
430. 933 P.2d 558 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
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ror in sentencing did not violate the defendant’s right to protection
against double jeopardy, but that the defendant was entitled to a
new sentence hearing to reevaluate all the currently available in-
formation before imposing the increased sentence.431  DeMario
recognized that he had over a year’s time left to serve in prison.432
Due to a sentencing miscalculation during a probation revocation
hearing, DeMario was ordered to serve 227 days and was informed
by the judge that “as far as I can tell, this is it.”433  Five days later,
the error was discovered and the longer sentence was imposed.434
DeMario argued that the judge “had meaningfully imposed a law-
ful sentence . . . and that double jeopardy therefore barred any in-
crease.”435  The court disagreed and applied Criminal Rule 36,436
which can be used to correct errors in sentencing that arise from
oversight or omission of the record, to increase DeMario’s sen-
tence to the correct amount.437  However, the court of appeals
found that the lower court erred in presuming that DeMario’s ad-
mitted probation violation automatically warranted the imposition
of all previously suspended incarceration.438  The court ordered a
new sentence hearing to consider all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the offense, including the original offense, the offender,
and the offender’s intervening conduct.439
In Davis v. Municipality of Anchorage,440 the court of appeals
ruled that a civil in rem seizure of an automobile operated by an
intoxicated driver did not run afoul of the double jeopardy clauses
of the federal and Alaska Constitutions.441  Davis was arrested for
driving while intoxicated and refused to submit to a breath test.442
Under former Anchorage Municipal Code section 9.28.026, a vehi-
cle operated by an intoxicated driver or any driver who refused to
submit to a breath test was subject to forfeiture as a public nui-
sance.443  Davis argued that because seizure of the vehicle
amounted to punishment for his acts of driving while intoxicated
or refusing the breath test, the Municipality was barred from pur-
431. See id. at 562.
432. See id. at 560 (“With all due respect, I, you know . . . I’ve got over a year, I
don’t want to come back.”).
433. Id.
434. See id.
435. Id.
436. ALASKA R. CRIM P. 36.
437. See DeMario, 933 P.2d. at 561.
438. See id. at 562.
439. See id.
440. 945 P.2d 307 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
441. See id. at 308.
442. See id.
443. See id.
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suing criminal charges against him by the double jeopardy
clauses.444
Relying on precedent established by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the court of appeals held it was clear that forfeiture of property in
an in rem proceeding did not constitute punishment for double
jeopardy purposes.445  Using the analysis set forth by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,446
the court determined that the vehicle forfeitures under the statute
were in rem forfeitures and civil proceedings, “squarely aimed at
‘owners who [were] culpable for the criminal misuse of [their vehi-
cle],’ and that . . . forfeiture . . . was based on proof that the vehicle
was ‘hazardous in the hands of this owner because either he use[d]
it to commit crimes, or allow[ed] others to do so.’”447  The court de-
clined to interpret the Alaska double jeopardy clause differently
than the federal clause.448
In Erickson v. State,449 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant could lawfully be convicted of separate counts of sexual as-
sault for each separate, distinct form of penetration within a single
episode.450  Erickson was convicted of four counts of sexual assault
for actions that arose during a single episode but involved separate
forms of sexual penetration.451  The court upheld Erickson’s convic-
tion as being consistent with its decision in Yearty v. State452 and
declined to overrule that decision under standards governing when
violations of two separate criminal statutes are merged and treated
as one crime.453  The court held that in cases of a single criminal
statute being violated multiple times, no double jeopardy concern
arises.454
444. See id.
445. See id.
446. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).  The analysis asked first whether the legislature in-
tended proceedings under the forfeiture statute to be civil or criminal, and second
whether the forfeiture proceedings were so punitive as to demonstrate that they
were not truly civil in nature.
447. Davis, 945 P.2d at 308 (quoting United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135,
2150 (1996)).
448. See id. at 311.
449. 950 P.2d 580 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
450. See id. at 587.
451. See id. at 582.
452. 805 P.2d 987 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (holding that when a defendant
commits different types of penetration during a single instance of sexual assault,
the defendant may be convicted of seperate counts of assault for each form of
penetration).
453. See Erickson, 950 P.2d at 587.
454. See id. at 586-87.
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C. Right to Jury Trial
In Turney v. State,455 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
Alaska jury tampering statute, Alaska Statutes section 11.56.590,456
was not unconstitutionally overbroad or void for vagueness.457
Turney, a citizen not implicated in a trial, contacted jury members
during the trial, informed the jurors about the Fully Informed Jury
Association, and encouraged them to call a hotline telling them
“what their rights as jurors were.”458  A grand jury indicted Turney
for jury tampering under section 11.56.590.459  Turney first argued
that the statute was overbroad because “it criminaliz[ed] constitu-
tionally protected speech” where Turney was not directly at-
tempting to influence the decision of a jury, but was merely in-
forming them of their “rights.”460  The court held that the statutory
language prohibiting communication intended “to influence a juror
in his or her capacity as a juror in reaching a decision in a particu-
lar case”461 was specific and limited to communication affecting the
juror’s execution of job responsibilities, and therefore not constitu-
tionally protected speech.462  The statute sufficiently distinguished
between speech directed at jurors in their official capacity and
speech aimed at the general public.463
Turney then argued that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague because it permitted arbitrary enforcement and did not pro-
vide adequate notice of prohibited conduct.464  The court held that
it would not invalidate a statute “‘unless there is some history of
arbitrary or selective enforcement’” and that there was no evi-
dence of improper prosecutorial discretion regarding section
11.56.590.465  In dismissing Turney’s claim of inadequate notice, the
court stated that “persons of common intelligence would not have
to guess at [the statute’s] meaning and differ as to its applica-
tion.”466
455. 936 P.2d 533 (Alaska 1997).
456. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.690 (Michie 1996).
457. See Turney, 936 P.2d at 536-37.
458. Id.
459. See id. at 538.
460. Id. at 539.
461. Id. at 540.
462. See id. at 541.
463. See id. at 540.
464. See id. at 542.
465. Id. at 544 (quoting Holton v. State, 602 P.2d 1228, 1237 (Alaska 1979)).
466. Id. at 543 (citing Marks v. City of Anchorage, 500 P.2d 644, 650 (Alaska
1972) (holding that a breach of the peace statute was overbroad)).
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D. Miscellaneous
In Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District v. State,467 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that differences in funding laws be-
tween regional educational attendance area school districts
(“REAA”) and city and borough school districts did not violate
the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution.468  The
plaintiffs challenged Alaska Statutes sections 14.11.100(a) and
14.17.025(a) and (d).469  Section 14.11.100(a) provides for state re-
imbursement of payments made by boroughs and cities to retire
debts incurred for school construction.470  REAAs were not eligible
for reimbursement.471  Section 14.17.025(a) created a scheme to
calculate local contributions to schools, the lesser of a four mill
levy (a tax of four-tenths of 1%) on the full value of the taxable
real and personal property in the district, or 35% of the district’s
basic need for the preceding fiscal year, but part (d) stated they
were not required in an REAA.472
The supreme court declined to undertake any equal protec-
tion analysis of the claims based on an adverse effect on educa-
tional opportunity or an overall disparity in school construction
aid.473  The plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that arguably
showed their children were affected by the different funding
schemes or that the students and taxpayers had been disadvan-
taged by the school construction laws.474  Although the plaintiffs
also failed to show they paid higher taxes as a result of the local
contribution requirement, the court did discuss the basis for an
equal protection claim because the plaintiffs presented evidence
that their borough’s contribution requirement was equivalent to a
$5.69 million tax levy.475  The court ultimately rejected this claim as
well, finding (1) plaintiffs’ interests as taxpayers were not afforded
much weight under equal protection analysis,476 (2) the state’s ob-
jectives to “‘assure an equitable level of education opportunities’”
were legitimate,477 and (3) as REAA’s were constitutionally unable
to tax, REAA exemption from the local contribution requirement
467. 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1997).
468. See id. at 394.
469. See id. at 395; ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.11.100(a), 14.17.025(a), (d) (Michie
1996).
470. See ALASKA STAT. § 14.11.100(a).
471. See id.
472. See id. § 14.17.025(a), (d).
473. See Matanuska-Susitna Borough School District, 931 P.2d at 396, 397.
474. See id.
475. See id. at 398.
476. See id. at 399.
477. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 14.17.220 (Michie 1996)).
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bore a “‘fair and substantial relationship’” to the goal of equitable
educational opportunities.478
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Gallion,479 the supreme court
held that an action to ensure the financial solvency of a retirement
plan by diverting surplus assets from other independent retirement
plans violated the Alaska Constitution, and that attorney’s fees
cannot be based on excess assets available to a retirement fund and
not guaranteed to fund members.480  The Municipality of Anchor-
age (“MOA”) by ordinance sought to divert surplus money from
Plan I and Plan II of the Anchorage Police and Fire Retirement
System (“APFRS”) in order to ensure the financial stability of
Plan III, which had been determined to be underfunded.481  MOA
had a previous obligation to fund APFRS in order to ensure the
programs’ financial soundness.482  Gallion was a member of a class
of Plan I and II members that brought suit against MOA, asking
that the ordinance be declared null and void on the theory that
funds were diverted so as to impair or diminish the APFRS’s abil-
ity to enhance benefits for Plan I and II members.483
The superior court held that the proposed ordinance violated
section 7 of Alaska Constitution Article XII484 by impairing the
“accrued benefits” of the members of Plan I and Plan II.485  It also
awarded attorney’s fees based on a value of the hours billed by the
attorney of the class.486  The supreme court affirmed that the ordi-
nance did in fact violate the Alaska Constitution by putting the fi-
nancial integrity of Plan I and Plan II at risk in order to shore up
Plan III and lessen MOA’s obligation to APFRS.487  Because this
“accrued benefit” was not in the surplus amount of the funds, but
in the financial soundness of the system, the court also held that
attorney’s fees should be based on a calculation of actual hours
rather than money diverted back to the fund.488
In Mathis v. Sauser,489 the supreme court held that where a
478. See id. (quoting State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, 159 (Alaska 1991)).
479. 944 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1997).
480. See id.
481. See id. at 438-39.
482. See id. at 439.
483. See id.
484. “Article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution states: Membership in
employee retirement systems of the [s]tate or its political subdivisions shall consti-
tute a contractual relationship.  Accrued benefits of these systems shall not be
diminished or impaired.”  Id. at 440 n.5.
485. See id. at 440.
486. See id.
487. See id. at 444.
488. See id. at 446.
489. 942 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1997).
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prison rule forbidding the possession of computer printers by in-
mates is issued with the intent of curtailing inmates’ access to the
courts or prejudging the merits of their claims, no reasonable rela-
tionship between the rule and its ends may be found to support the
rule.490  Mathis was an inmate in possession of a computer printer
at the Spring Creek Correctional Center, where possession of a
printer was made improper by a new Standard Operating Proce-
dure (“SOP”) adopted by the facility in cooperation with the De-
partment of Corrections (“DOC”).491  Mathis subsequently filed a
grievance with the DOC “protesting the impending seizure of his
printer.”492  The DOC concluded that the SOP was valid as a re-
striction on the “amount and nature of property prisoners possess”
as well as preventing the “filing of meritless legal cases which re-
sult[] in the waste of significant staff time and state resources.”493
The supreme court reversed the summary judgment granted in fa-
vor of the DOC because it found a genuine issue of material fact
existed regarding whether the SOP was issued to interfere with the
inmates’ access to the courts.494  The court adopted the standard
espoused by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte Hull495 that
“prison officials cannot position themselves as ‘gatekeepers’ for
the courts” in determining which suits are “meritless.”496  On this
basis, the court declined to find as a matter of law that the policy
was supported by a permissible motive.497
In Valley Hospital Ass’n, Inc. v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice,498
the supreme court held that a “quasi-public” hospital may not have
a policy that restricts the availability of legal abortions without
violating state constitutional protections of the right to privacy.499
Valley View Hospital (“VVH”), a nonprofit organization and the
only hospital servicing the Matanuska-Susitna Valley, elected a
new Operating Board of Directors in 1992, which formulated a
policy against providing abortions at the hospital except in cases of
rape, incest, or where the life of the mother or fetus was at risk.500
The Mat-Su Coalition for Choice sued for a permanent injunction
against enforcing VVH’s policy.501  The supreme court noted that
490. See id. at 1122-23.
491. See id. at 1119.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. See id. at 1123.
495. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
496. Mathis, 942 P.2d at 1121.
497. See id. at 1123.
498. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
499. See id. at 971.
500. See id. at 965.
501. See id. at 965-66.
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the Alaska Constitution protects a person’s right to an abortion
more broadly than the U.S. Constitution.502  It asserted that a
woman’s choice of whether or not to have an abortion is a funda-
mental right protected by Article I, section 22 of the state constitu-
tion and may be constrained only when justified by a compelling
state interest.503  The court held that VVH qualified as a “quasi-
public” institution such that its conduct is viewed as “state action”
and subject to similar constitutional constraints.504  Because VVH
failed to demonstrate a compelling state interest for its restrictive
policy concerning abortions, the court determined that the policy
was constitutionally invalid.505  Further, the court ruled that Alaska
Statutes section 18.16.010(b)506 granting hospitals the right to deny
abortion services “‘for the reasons of moral conscience’” is uncon-
stitutional as applied to “quasi-public” institutions that are non-
sectarian.507  The court noted that the hospital’s statutory right
cannot overcome the constitutional right at issue.508
In Brandon v. Department of Corrections,509 the supreme court
held that the superior court had jurisdiction to hear a claim that a
prisoner’s constitutional right to rehabilitation had been violated
by the Department of Corrections’s (“DOC’s”) determination to
transfer the prisoner to an out-of-state prison.510  Although Alaska
Statutes section 22.10.010(d)511 did not give the superior court ju-
risdiction to hear Brandon’s appeal,512 the court concluded that an
administrative appeal may be appropriate if there is a fundamental
constitutional right at stake and the proceeding produced a record
capable of review.513  Recognizing that “visitation privileges are a
component of the constitutional right to rehabilitation,” the court
concluded that the DOC decision to transfer Brandon implicated
his fundamental constitutional right to rehabilitation.514  The court
also concluded that the transfer hearing constituted a reviewable
record because it was tape recorded in transcribable form and
there were written findings indicating the evidence upon which the
502. See id. at 967.
503. See id. at 969.
504. See id. at 970.
505. See id. at 971.
506. ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010(b) (Michie 1996).
507. Valley Hospital Ass’n, 948 P.2d at 971 (quoting ALASKA STAT. §
18.16.010(b)).
508. See id. at 972.
509. 938 P.2d 1029 (Alaska 1997).
510. See id. at 1030.
511. ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.010(d) (Michie 1996).
512. See Branon, 938 P.2d at 1031.
513. See id. at 1032.
514. Id.
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committee relied.515  Because Brandon’s claim implicated a funda-
mental constitutional right and the DOC’s transfer hearing pro-
duced a reviewable record, the court held that the superior court
had jurisdiction to determine whether Brandon’s transfer substan-
tially impaired his constitutional right to rehabilitation.516
In Amin v. State,517 the court of appeals held that retrospective
application of a sentence appeal statute did not violate the ex post
facto clause of the U.S. Constitution or the Alaska Constitution.518
Alaska Statutes section 12.55.120(a)519 provides, in part, that a de-
fendant cannot appeal a sentence that was imposed in accordance
with a plea agreement that provided for a specific sentence or a
sentence equal to or less than the specified maximum sentence for
the offense.520  The legislature specifically worded this restriction to
apply retroactively.521  The court of appeals concluded that section
12.55.120(a) is merely a procedural change altering the procedure
by which appellate review can be obtained and requiring some de-
fendants to file a petition for review instead of an appeal.522  Be-
cause the new law does not alter the definition of the criminal con-
duct or increase the penalty of the crime, and because Amin had
an available method to petition for review, the court of appeals
concluded that retroactive application of section 12.55.120(a) to
Amin, whose crime pre-dated the effective date of the statute, did
not violate either constitution.523
In Bobby v. State,524 the court of appeals held that the ex post
facto clause does not prohibit the state from enforcing Alaska’s sex
offender registration law.525  Bobby argued that “because he com-
mitted his crime before the sex offender registration law took ef-
fect, the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions
prohibit the state from divulging this information to the public.”526
The court rejected this argument because Bobby had never liti-
gated this claim in superior court and had failed to preserve the
claim when he pleaded no contest to the charge.527  The court dis-
515. See id. at 1033.
516. See id.
517. 939 P.2d 413 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
518. See id. at 414.
519. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120(a) (Michie 1996).
520. See id.
521. See 1995 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 39, § 41.
522. See Amin, 939 P.2d at 417.
523. See id.
524. 950 P.2d 135 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
525. See id. at 140; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010 (a), .100(2)-(3) (Michie
1996) (codifying sex offender registration law).
526. Bobby, 950 P.2d at 139.
527. See id.
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tinguished his argument from a pure ex post facto claim because he
was prosecuted for second-degree assault, not for violating the sex
offender registration law.528
The court also rejected Bobby’s claim that he did not get a
speedy trial under Criminal Rule 45,529 after he withdrew his plea
of no contest to avoid the sex offender registration law.530  The
court rejected the idea that “Rule 45 should be calculated based on
mental states, decisions, or events unknown to the trial court”531
and held “that it was irrelevant, for Rule 45 purposes, what de-
layed the filing of Bobby’s plea-withdrawal motion.”532
In Gibson v. State, 533 the court of appeals held that a statute
prohibiting the possession of firearms by intoxicated persons in
their own homes or on their own property did not violate the state
constitutional rights to keep and bear arms and to privacy.534  Gib-
son pleaded no contest to the charge of possession of a firearm on
the person while impaired by intoxicating liquor,535 but argued on
appeal that applying the statute to persons possessing firearms
while intoxicated in their own homes or on their residential prop-
erty was unconstitutional.536  The court rejected the argument on
two grounds.  First, it found that based on the legislative history of
the article of the constitution in question, the provision was not in-
tended to eliminate government regulation of possession and use
of firearms.537  Instead, the government retained the authority to
enforce prohibitions when there is a risk the firearms will be used
in a criminal and dangerous fashion.538  The history indicated the
provision was not intended to overturn or invalidate state laws re-
stricting access to or possession of firearms by people under the in-
fluence of alcohol.539  Second, the court found that as the potential
for harm resulting from the possession and use of firearms while
intoxicated was well documented in the case law, the statute bore a
close and substantial relationship to the state’s legitimate interest
in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.540
528. See id at 140.
529. ALASKA R. CRIM P. 45.
530. See Bobby, 950 P.2d at 138.
531. Id.
532. Id at 139.
533. 930 P.2d 1300 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
534. See id. at 1302-03.
535. See id. at 1300.
536. See id. at 1301.
537. See id.
538. See id.
539. See id. at 1302.
540. See id.
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In Morgan v. State,541 the court of appeals ruled that a con-
victed felon who knowingly resides in a house where there is a
firearm violates a state criminal statute regardless of whether the
convict was aware of the law and despite the state’s constitutional
guarantee of the right to bear arms.542  In 1991, Morgan was living
with his wife and her two children while on probation from  convic-
tion for the felony of third degree assault.543  Morgan was subse-
quently convicted of violating Alaska Statutes section
11.61.200(a)(10),544 which forbids convicted felons from residing in
a dwelling with the knowledge that the dwelling contains a con-
cealable firearm.545  The court of appeals rejected Morgan’s argu-
ments that the statute is unconstitutional because it punishes felons
who are unaware of the statute and because it infringes upon the
right to bear arms.546  The court held that knowledge of the stat-
ute’s existence is not an element of the crime, that Morgan’s situa-
tion did not fall into the narrow area of the “mistake of law” de-
fense because he had not relied on an authoritative interpretation
of the law, and that his parole officer did not have a duty to inform
him of the statute.547
In Bay View, Inc. v. AHTNA, Inc.,548 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that a Fifth Amendment takings claim challenging
the constitutionality of an amendment to the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”)549 was premature given the compensa-
tory procedures available under the Tucker Act.550  The Ninth Cir-
cuit also concluded that even if the enactment was determined to
be a Fifth Amendment taking, the Act had been rationally deter-
mined to be for public use and so did not require compensation.551
In 1984, Senator Ted Stevens was responsible for carving out an
exception to the Federal Deficit Reduction Act exempting its ap-
plication to Alaska Native corporations and allowing these corpo-
rations to bypass the Act’s prohibition on selling Net Operating
Losses (“NOLs”).552  The selling of NOLs by Alaska Native corpo-
541. 943 P.2d 1208 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
542. See id.
543. See id. at 1210.
544. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.200(a)(10) (Michie 1996).
545. See id.
546. See Morgan, 943 P.2d. at 1210-11.
547. See id. at 1211-12.  The court noted, “[E]ven if Morgan’s probation officer
had affirmatively told him that it was all right to reside in a dwelling where a con-
cealable firearm was kept, this would not be a defense.”  Id.
548. 105 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997).
549. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629 (1994).
550. See Bay View, 105 F.3d at 1285; 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
551. See Bay View, 105 F.3d at 1286.
552. See id. at 1283.
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rations generated around $425 million dollars for the corporations
that took advantage of the exemption.553  Although ANCSA re-
quired the sharing of resource-based revenue amongst the Native
corporations, ten of the regional corporations agreed not to share
in the revenue generated by selling NOLs.554  Dissatisfied share-
holders of these ten corporations filed a class action lawsuit.555  In
1995, Congress amended ANCSA, retroactively precluding any
claim that the dissatisfied shareholders may have had in the NOLs
revenue.556
These shareholders then filed this suit arguing that the 1995
amendment was an unconstitutional taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.557  Because the court had “no jurisdiction to address
the merits of takings claims where Congress has provided a means
for paying compensation for any taking that might have occurred”
and because the shareholders had not availed themselves of the
compensation process provided for in the Tucker Act, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the shareholders’ Fifth Amendment claim
was premature.558  Finding that Congress had a rational reason for
deciding that the ANSCA amendment was for public use, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the shareholders’ argument that there was a
Fifth Amendment violation on this ground. 559
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
1. Search and Seizure.  In Van Sandt v. Brown,560 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that a police officer is not entitled to qualified
immunity for conducting a warrantless search of a person’s house
looking for an escaped convict where no specific evidence existed
to indicate that the fleeing convict had entered the house.561  Van
Sandt sued in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for a warrantless search of
his trailer made by Brown, an Alaska State Trooper, who was
looking for two escaped inmates from the nearby Spring Creek
Correctional Center.562  Brown had no specific evidence indicating
553. See id. at 1284.
554. See id.
555. See id.
556. See id.
557. See id.
558. Id. at 1285.
559. See id. at 1286.
560. 944 P.2d 449 (Alaska 1997).
561. See id.
562. See id.
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that the escapees might be in the trailer.563  The superior court
granted Brown’s motion for a directed verdict based on a defense
of qualified immunity as an officer of the law.564  The supreme
court noted that qualified immunity is available to a law
enforcement officer only if “a reasonable officer could have
believed the search to be lawful.”565
In State v. Landon,566 the court of appeals decided that it was
reasonable to search all of the defendant’s personal items at the
time the defendant reported to serve a prison sentence, even
though some of those items might have been placed in storage
rather than worn into prison.567  In searching Landon’s belongings,
prison officials discovered packages of marijuana secreted in hol-
lowed out compartments in the soles of his shoes.568  Landon ar-
gued that the search was illegal, because the prison authorities had
no right to search Landon’s shoes until he affirmatively wore them
into the prison; the search occurred while there remained a possi-
bility that Landon would place the shoes into storage.569  The court
noted that prison officials have a legitimate interest in ensuring
that weapons, contraband, and other prohibited items remain un-
available to the prison population.570  As prisoners have a right to
inspect or retrieve their stored personal belongings while incarcer-
ated, it is reasonably necessary for prison officials to search all of
the personal belongings of an extended term prisoner in order to
prevent the possible matriculation of contraband into the prison
community.571  The court distinguished the supreme court decision
in Reeves v. State572 on the ground that prison officials have a lim-
ited interest in searching personal belongings where an arrestee is
detained only temporarily.573
In Davis v. State,574 the court of appeals held that the arctic en-
try of a residence was part of the “premises” for purposes of a gen-
eral warrant and that “the time of service” of a search warrant
should be interpreted to include the entire time it takes for the po-
lice to execute a warrant, as opposed to the particular instant the
563. See id. at 451.
564. See id.
565. Id. at 452.
566. 936 P.2d 177 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
567. See id. at 180.
568. See id. at 178.
569. See id.
570. See id. at 179.
571. See id.
572. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979) (holding that arrestee retained privacy inter-
est in personal belongings where sentence involved temporary jail time).
573. See Landon, 936 P.2d at 178-79.
574. 938 P.2d 1076 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
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police serve the warrant.575  The warrant authorized the police to
search “any persons on the premises at the time of service of the
search warrant for evidence of possession and/or distribution of
controlled substances.”576  The defendants argued that they were
improperly searched because they did not enter the premises and
arrived after the search began.577  The court of appeals concluded
that the police were properly authorized to search the defendants
because they voluntarily walked into the arctic entry during the
execution of the warrant and the “premises” of a dwelling
“includes an attached enclosed or screened-in porch.”578  Addition-
ally, taking what it referred to as a “‘common sense approach,’”579
the court of appeals concluded that the police were properly
authorized to search the defendants even though they arrived after
the search had begun.580  The court held that distinguishing be-
tween “the act of ‘serving’ a search warrant (an act that occurs at a
particular instant) and the act of ‘executing’ the warrant (that is,
the ensuing search of the premises, which might take hours)” was
not useful for the purposes of determining the scope of the general
warrant.581
In Rynearson v. State,582 the court of appeals ruled that a suffi-
ciently corroborated anonymous tip was enough to establish prob-
able cause for a search and seizure.583  The state troopers received
an anonymous tip that Rynearson would be arriving at Anchorage
Airport with drugs.584  The tip specified the date, time, airline,
flight number, her appearance, and her luggage.585  Based on the
tip, the troopers confronted Rynearson at the airport, and she ad-
mitted to carrying prescription Valium; she was eventually con-
victed of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled sub-
stance.586  The court of appeals applied the test established in
Aguilar v. Texas587 and Spinelli v. United States,588  which required
the state to prove that the hearsay informant obtained the infor-
575. See id. at 1078.
576. Id. at 1077.
577. See id. at 1076.
578. Id. at 1078.
579. Id. at 1079 (quoting State v. Morris, 668 P.2d 857, 864 n.2 (Alaska 1983)).
580. See id.
581. Id. at 1078.
582. 950 P.2d 147 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
583. See id. at 149.
584. See id.
585. See id.
586. See id.
587. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
588. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
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mation in a reliable way and was trustworthy.589  The court deter-
mined the first prong of the test was satisfied because the level of
detail in the hearsay was sufficient to support the inference that
the informant had personal knowledge.590  As for the second prong,
the mere fact that the informant wished to remain anonymous was
not enough to qualify her as a citizen informant.591  However, the
fact that material details of the tip were confirmed by the subse-
quent police investigation, “‘in a way that len[t] substantial credi-
bility to the report of illegality,’” was sufficient to establish reli-
ability.592
In Mackelwich v. State,593 the court of appeals held that an
Alaska fish and game violation search and seizure statute does not
apply to consensual searches.594  Alaska Statutes section 16.05.180595
specifies that before an officer conducts a warrantless search, a
statement explaining the reason for the search must have been
submitted to the person in control of the property.596  The Alaska
State Troopers had received an anonymous tip that Mackelwich
had poached a moose and was possibly involved with drugs.597  The
troopers received permission from Mackelwich to search the prop-
erty and, during the search, found a strange building that smelled
of marijuana.598  The troopers left the property, applied for a search
warrant, and on the second search found evidence that Mackelwich
was cultivating marijuana.599  Mackelwich was convicted of fourth-
degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.600  On appeal,
Mackelwich argued that the search warrant for his property was
invalid because it was based on the trooper’s observation of the
building, and even though he had consented to the search, the
troopers failed to provide him with a written statement of the rea-
son for the search.601
The court of appeals found that section 16.05.180 was in-
tended to expand the authority of law enforcement officers to con-
589. See Rynearson, 950 P.2d at 150.
590. See id.
591. See id. at 150-51.
592. Id. at 152 (quoting Lloyd v. State, 914 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Alaska Ct. App.
1946)).
593. 950 P.2d 152 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
594. See id. at 153.
595. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.180 (Michie 1996).
596. See id.
597. See Mackelwich, 950 P.2d at 153.
598. See id.
599. See id.
600. See id.
601. See id. at 153-54.
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duct warrantless searches.602  The court reviewed the history of the
statute and concluded that, based on several factors, the proce-
dural requirements were meant by the legislature to be applied
only to those warrantless searches whose legality rested solely on
the statute, and did not fit any other recognized exception to the
warrant requirement.603  As consent searches are lawful without
any reference to section 16.05.180, the court concluded that the
procedural requirements of section 16.05.180 did not apply to the
search of Mackelwich’s property.604
2. Miscellaneous.  In State v. Summerville,605 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that amendments to Criminal Rule 16
providing for reciprocal discovery violated the state constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination.606  The reciprocal discovery
rule was a non-severable provision of Chapter 95 of the 1996
Alaska Session Laws, and, in part, compelled the production of the
names and statements of non-alibi witnesses.607  Scott v. State,608 the
controlling decision, held that testimonial, incriminating, and
compelled evidence violated the Alaska constitutional protection
against self-incrimination.609  The supreme court found that the
reciprocal discovery amendment in Chapter 95 compelled
discovery of testimonial and incriminating evidence and, therefore,
was unconstitutional.610  In making its decision, the court explicitly
refused to overrule Scott.611
In Cockerham v. State,612 the supreme court held that a denial
of the defendant’s motion for an in camera review of alleged juve-
nile records of a prosecution witness was not a denial of his federal
or state constitutional right to confront a witness or of his due
process rights.613  Cockerham wanted to examine the alleged rec-
ords to show that the witness had “committed a crime involving
dishonesty” and to damage her credibility during cross-
examination.614  Cockerham argued that the denial of in camera re-
view “effectively deprived him of his constitutional right of con-
602. See id. at 158.
603. See id.
604. See id. at 156.
605. 948 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1997).
606. See id.
607. See id. at 470; 1996 Alaska Sess. Laws, ch. 95.
608. 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974).
609. See id.
610. See Summerville, 948 P.2d at 469-70.
611. See id.
612. 933 P.2d 537 (Alaska 1997).
613. See id. at 541, 544.
614. Id. at 538.
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frontation.”615  The court denied this claim by referring to Pennsyl-
vania v. Ritchie,616 which noted that “[t]he ability to question ad-
verse witnesses . . . does not include the power to require the pre-
trial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in
contradicting unfavorable testimony.”617  The court recognized
Cockerham’s “right to a fair trial in accordance with due process”
and that “Article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution requires
that in order for the guarantee of due process to be meaningful, it
must at times encompass discovery rights.”618  However, the court
ultimately denied his appeal because Cockerham did not make a
sufficient showing that the information he sought would contain
relevant impeachment evidence, did not cross-examine the witness
about her credibility, and was in effect simply conducting what the
court deemed a “fishing expedition.”619
In Beaver v. State,620 the court of appeals held that the defen-
dant’s voluntary admission to several sex crimes while institution-
alized and undergoing sex offender therapy did not violate his
privilege against self-incrimination as guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.621  The court noted that “the privilege against self-
incrimination is normally lost if a person fails to assert it”622 and
that Beaver in no way was compelled or coerced to give up the
protection of the privilege because the sex offender therapy was
“completely voluntary.”623  In fact, “participants were also affirma-
tively warned that, because of the risk of future prosecution, they
should not speak about specific dates, times, location, events,
and/or [the] identities of victims in their counseling sessions.”624
Because Beaver was not forced to give up any incriminatory in-
formation regarding past crimes, “the privilege against self-
incrimination did not bar the superior court from relying on that
information when the court sentenced Beaver for a new crime.”625
The court also held that the same logic would apply to any state-
ments that Beaver made about committing future crimes.626
615. Id. at 540.
616. 480 U.S. 39, 52-53 (1987).
617. Cockerham, 933 P.2d at 540-41.
618. Id. at 542-43 (citing ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)(v), 32.1(d)(1)B)).
619. Id. at 543-44.
620. 933 P.2d 1178 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
621. See id. at 1179.
622. Id. at 1181.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 1183.
625. Id.
626. See id. at 1184 (“With respect to Beaver’s statement concerning his in-
tended future conduct (his assessment that he would likely reoffend, and his
statement that he had already selected his next victim), Beaver has even less of a
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In Bachlet v. State,627 the court of appeals held that a statute
defining when a public servant commits the crime of receiving a
bribe was not constitutionally overbroad or vague.628  Basing this
conclusion on both legislative history and similar bribery statutes
in other jurisdictions, the court rejected Bachlet’s argument that
Alaska Statutes section 11.56.110(a)(2)629 was overly broad because
it did not include an element of “corrupt intent” and concluded
that the culpable mental state of the statute is “knowledge.”630
Batchlet, an assistant public defender, had demanded marijuana,
expensive meals, and vacations from a client “in exchange” for
working on his case.631  The court rejected Bachlet’s argument that
the ambiguity of the terms “public servant,” “benefit,” and
“agreement or understanding” render the statute unconstitution-
ally vague and found that Bachlet’s conduct comported with the
“core conduct” prohibited by the bribery statute.632  The court con-
cluded that the statute “clearly provided” Bachlet, an assistant
public defender, with adequate notice of the unlawfulness of her
conduct.633
The court also held that the newly enacted wiretapping stat-
ute, Alaska Statute section 12.37634 did not modify the
“longstanding rule” in Alaska that it is lawful for the police to in-
tercept private communications with the consent of one of the par-
ticipants and judicial authorization (i.e., “Glass Warrant”).635  The
court found that section 12.37 is merely an exception to Alaska
Statutes section 42.20.300,636 the general statutory prohibition on
eavesdropping, and since the eavesdropping that was authorized by
one of the parties fell outside the scope of section 42.20.300, the
communication intercepted by the police of Bachlet and her client
that was authorized by the client was not controlled by section
                                                                                                                                
Fifth Amendment claim.”).
627. 941 P.2d 200 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
628. See id at 204, 206.
629. ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.110(a)(2) (Michie 1996) (providing that the crime
of receiving a bribe is committed by a public servant “if the public servant accepts
or agrees to accept a benefit upon an agreement or understanding that the public
servant’s . . . opinion, judgment, [or] action, . . . will be influenced”).
630. See Bachlet, 941 P.2d at 204.
631. See id. at 202.
632. Id. at 206.
633. Id.
634. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.37.010-.900 (Michie 1996) (providing that it is lawful
for police to intercept judicially authorized private conversations if the intercep-
tion may provide assistance in a murder, kidnapping, or felony drug offense).
635. See Bachlet, 941 P.2d at 208; see also State v. Glass, 538 P.2d 872 (Alaska
1978).
636. ALASKA STAT. § 42.20.300(b) (Michie 1996) (providing when publication
or use of communications is authorized).
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12.37.637
In State v. Schwin,638 the court of appeals held that a defendant
was not entitled to transactional immunity from state prosecution
for murder, even if the evidence showed that federal prosecutors
granted the defendant use and derivative use immunity in a federal
drug conspiracy prosecution at the request of state officials.639
Federal officials granted Schwin use and derivative use immunity
and certain sentencing concessions in return for a plea of guilty to
the federal conspiracy charge and testimony against his co-
conspirator.640  Relying on the Alaska Constitution’s privilege
against self-incrimination and State v. Gonzalez,641 Schwin argued
that the federal immunity given to him by the federal officials
should be treated as transactional immunity which would protect
him from state prosecution for murder.642  Reversing the trial court,
the court of appeals concluded that Alaska’s broad constitutional
privilege does not apply to Schwin’s federal testimony.643  Distin-
guishing Schwin’s case from Gonzalez, the court concluded that
the federal officials acted independently of the Alaska state offi-
cials and that Alaska’s constitutional requirement of transactional
immunity does not extend to cases where there is only minimal
state action.644
In Covington v. State,645 the court of appeals held that proce-
dural due process rights of a parolee were not violated when the
final parole revocation hearing was delayed by the parolee himself
and the parolee was not prejudiced by it.646  Because the delay of
Covington’s final revocation hearing was a result of his efforts to
block extradition from Tennessee to Alaska, the court concluded
that the delay did not violate due process.647  The court also held
that the substantive due process clause of the Alaska Constitution
was not violated where the parole of a sex offender is revoked for
non-participation in mandatory treatment even though the reason
for the non-participation is the parolee’s failure to admit to com-
mitting any crimes.648  The court concluded that Covington’s refusal
to admit the commission of any crime could be interpreted as will-
637. See Bachlet, 941 P.2d at 208.
638. 938 P.2d 1101 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
639. See id. at 1106.
640. See id. at 1102.
641. 853 P.2d 526 (Alaska 1993).
642. See Schwin, 938 P.2d at 1103.
643. See id. at 1105.
644. See id. at 1106.
645. 938 P.2d 1085 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
646. See id. at 1088.
647. See id.
648. See id. at 1090.
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ful refusal to participate in treatment.649
B. General Criminal Law
1. Criminal Procedure.  In State v. Shewfelt,650 the Alaska
Supreme Court held that where a jury was allowed to hear again
recorded testimony during deliberations, no improper procedures
were used to play back the recording, and there was little risk of
negative psychological effect of not having the defendant present
when the testimony was played, the error in not notifying the
defendant of the jury’s request to hear the recorded testimony is
harmless.651  Shewfelt was convicted of first-degree sexual assault.652
During deliberations, without Shewfelt’s knowledge, the jury
requested and was allowed to hear again both Shewfelt and the
victim’s entire testimony.653  Because Shewfelt was not notified of
the playback, the superior court granted Shewfelt’s motion for a
new trial.654  Relying on an earlier case,655 the supreme court held
that it was harmless error not to notify Shewfelt of the playback
and reversed.656  The court found that the parties had stipulated
that no improper communications with the jury occurred during
the playback.657  It also found that the absence of Shewfelt at the
time the playback occurred would have had no negative
psychological effect on the jury.658  The court therefore concluded
that not notifying Shewfelt of the playback was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and did not warrant granting a new trial.659
In Saltz v. Department of Public Safety, Driver Improvement
Bureau,660 the supreme court held that a police officer who pro-
vided the Yellow Pages but did not read the “attorneys” section
aloud for someone who could not read did not violate the rights of
the person arrested for driving while intoxicated to consult with
counsel before deciding whether to submit to a breathalyzer test.661
Saltz was arrested for driving under the influence after driving his
649. See id.
650. 948 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1997).
651. See id. at 472.
652. See id. at 470.
653. See id. at 470-71.
654. See id. at 471.
655. See State v. Hannagan, 559 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1977).
656. See Shewfelt, 948 P.2d at 471-72.
657. See id. at 472-73.
658. See id. at 473.
659. See id.
660. 942 P.2d 1151 (Alaska 1997).
661. See id. at 1154.
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truck into a ditch and failing field sobriety tests.662  After being
taken to the police station, the arresting officer advised Saltz of his
Miranda rights and provided him with a phone and the Yellow
Pages, but did not offer to read the telephone listings, even though
Saltz indicated that he was unable to read them without his glasses,
which he had left in his truck.663  The court held that a person’s
statutory right to a “reasonable opportunity” to consult with an at-
torney before deciding whether or not to submit to a breathalyzer
test did not include greater assistance than that given by the ar-
resting officer.664
In Aningayou v. State,665 the court of appeals held that a con-
fession was admissible where it was given voluntarily by a potential
witness in a criminal investigation, but that failure to inform of Mi-
randa rights in a timely manner can serve as a basis for suppression
where a reasonable person in the interviewee’s situation would
reasonably believe that he or she was not free to leave or break off
questioning.666  Aningayou was questioned in regards to an inci-
dence of sexual assault based on information that he possessed a
“Sonics” baseball cap similar to the one identified by the victim.667
Johnson, the state trooper investigating the crime, questioned
Aningayou twice during the course of his investigation.668  During
the second interview, Aningayou was questioned in a room acces-
sible to the public, and was not restrained, but was not specifically
informed that he could leave at any time.669  Johnson warned Anin-
gayou that if he did not cooperate or tell the truth, he could go to
jail.670  Aningayou responded by saying, “It’s me.”671  Johnson sub-
sequently informed Aningayou of his Miranda rights, received a
detailed, recorded confession from Aningayou, and then arrested
him.672  The court of appeals held that sufficient evidence existed to
support the state’s burden of proof in showing that Aningayou’s
confession was voluntary.673  However, the court also found that a
reasonable person in Aningayou’s position would not feel free to
break off questioning at any time.674  The court therefore remanded
662. See id. at 1151.
663. See id. at 1152.
664. See id. at 1154.
665. 949 P.2d 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
666. See id. at 967.
667. See id. at 965-66.
668. See id. at 965.
669. See id.
670. See id.
671. Id. at 966.
672. See id.
673. See id. at 967.
674. See id. at 968.
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the case to determine which of Aningayou’s statements were
tainted by failing to inform Aningayou of his Miranda rights at the
appropriate time.675
In Hoffman v. State,676 the court of appeals held that it was
harmless error when the trial court communicated to the jury out-
side the presence of the defendant and his counsel, and the trial
court did not err when it admitted evidence of an assault that oc-
curred prior to the crimes for which the defendant was convicted.677
During the jury deliberations, a request was made to rehear certain
testimony.678  The judge told the jury that they would be allowed to
rehear testimony as soon as a courtroom could be arranged and
told them the approximate length of the testimony.679  Before lis-
tening to any of the playbacks, the jury issued a guilty verdict on
all counts.680  The court did admit that the trial judge “erred when
she communicated with the jury,” but ruled that the error was
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,” even though it was a
“waiver of an important constitutional right.”681
Evidence of the prior assault was allowed to “show Hoffman’s
state of mind at the time of the attack.”682  The court used a two-
step analysis to determine whether  this “other acts evidence” was
admissible.683  The court determined that it was admissible because
it was relevant apart from merely tending to show Hoffman’s pro-
pensity to engage in similar misconduct and that this relevance
outweighed the prejudicial impact the violent assault may have on
the jury.684
In Minch v. State,685 the court of appeals held that the defen-
dant’s right to a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 45686 was not
violated where his attorney requested various continuances re-
sulting in more than a two-year delay between the serving of the
summons and the trial.687  Minch also appealed his conviction based
on prejudice he suffered when the judge did not grant a challenge
for cause to a prospective juror who admitted he would weigh the
675. See id.
676. 950 P.2d 141 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
677. See id. at 142.
678. See id. at 144.
679. Id.
680. See id.
681. Id. at 145-46; see Dixon v. State, 605 P.2d 882, 884 (Alaska 1980)
(recognizing this constitutional right).
682. Id. at 146.
683. Id.
684. See id. at 146-47.
685. 934 P.2d 764 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
686. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45.
687. See Minch, 934 P.2d at 767.
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testimony given by a police officer more heavily than testimony
from other people.688  The court held that it was error for the judge
not to have granted Minch’s challenge for cause, but found the er-
ror to be harmless because Minch used one of his peremptory
challenges to remove this juror, and there was “nothing in the rec-
ord to support the assumption that Minch would have used an-
other peremptory challenge if he had had one.”689
In Garcia v. State,690 the court of appeals consolidated the ap-
peals and the dismissal of DWI charges in three cases, and held
that the reinstatement of charges against the defendants restarted
the speedy trial calculation for purposes of Alaska Criminal Rule
45.691  Garcia, Morange, and Rutan all challenged their DWI
charges asserting that the revocation of their licenses constituted a
“punishment” and that any additional prosecution based on the
charge of DWI would violate the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy.692  The district court ruled for the defendants and
dismissed their charges; the state appealed the dismissals.693  Be-
cause the court of appeals was considering the same double jeop-
ardy issue in another group of consolidated cases (State v. Zer-
kel694), the state’s appeal was held in abeyance pending the decision
of Zerkel.695  The court of appeals in Zerkel held that the suspen-
sion and revocation of a driver’s license in a DWI case did not con-
stitute a “punishment” for purposes of double jeopardy.696 When
the supreme court denied the petition for rehearing in Zerkel, the
court of appeals issued an order to adjudicate all of the cases held
in abeyance, and therefore, the district court properly reassumed
jurisdiction.697
The primary issue on appeal was whether Alaska Criminal
Rule 45, which guarantees defendants a speedy trial, was vio-
lated.698  Upholding the defendants’ convictions, the court of ap-
peals concluded that Rule 45 was not violated because the Rule 45
calculation restarted on the day the district court resumed  jurisdic-
tion.699  The court of appeals rejected the defendants’ argument
that the Rule 45 calculation should be evaluated under Sundberg v.
688. See id. at 764.
689. Id. at 769.
690. 947 P.2d 1363 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
691. See id. at 1363; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 45.
692. See Garcia, 947 P.2d. at 1364.
693. See id.
694. 900 P.2d 744 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
695. See Garcia, 947 P.2d at 1364.
696. See id.
697. See id. at 1364-65.
698. See id. at 1365.
699. See id. at 1366.
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State,700 concluding that a rule analogous to Rule 45(c)(2), not
Sundberg, should govern because subsection (c)(2) of the rule was
not in existence when Sundberg was decided.701  Applying a rule
analogous to Rule 45(c)(2), the court of appeals concluded that the
supreme court intended for the Rule 45 calculation to restart
“when a prosecution is reinstituted after criminal charges have
been dismissed on defendant’s motion,” which in this case was the
day after the Zerkel rehearing was denied.702
In Wells v. State,703 the court of appeals held that a defendant
may not plead no contest to a criminal charge but at the same time
reserve an issue for appeal if that issue is not dispositive of the en-
tire case.704  Wells was charged with felony driving while intoxi-
cated (“DWI”) and driving while his license was suspended
(“DWLS”).705  Wells pleaded no contest to the DWLS charge and
filed a motion to suppress evidence in the DWI case.706  When the
motion to suppress was denied, Wells attempted to reserve his
right to appeal the suppression motion by changing his plea in the
DWI case from not guilty to no contest.707  As part of this change,
Wells withdrew his no contest plea to the DWLS charge and the
prosecutor dismissed it.708  The court of appeals concluded that this
plea agreement was not a proper Cooksey709 plea and, thus, did not
reserve for Wells a right to appeal the denial of his motion to sup-
press.710  The rule established in Cooksey “allows a defendant to
plead no contest but at the same time reserve an issue for appeal”
provided that the reserved issue is dispositive of the entire case.711
The subject matter in the motion to suppress evidence applied to
the DWI case only and would not have been dispositive of the
DWLS case against Wells.712  Because there was a clear inference
that the DWLS charge against Wells was dismissed for the purpose
of making the motion to suppress evidence dispositive, the plea
700. 667 P.2d 1268 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (holding that Rule 45 should be
tolled, rather than started anew, when a defendant’s case is returned to the trial
court after being delayed, during a state’s appeal of an evidentiary hearing).
701. See Garcia, 947 P.2d at 1365.
702. Id. at 1366.
703. 945 P.2d 1248 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
704. See id. at 1249.
705. See id.
706. See id.
707. See id.
708. See id.
709. See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974).
710. See Wells, 945 P.2d at 1249.
711. Id. at 1249.
712. See id. at 1249-50.
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was not valid.713
In Riney v. State,714 the court of appeals held that the police did
not violate the defendant’s right to receive prompt judicial review
of the government’s justification for his arrest, despite the fact that
he was detained for two hours and questioned before he was taken
to the courthouse.715  Riney’s claim that “the police had planted the
cocaine on him” during an alleged search and seizure following his
arrest was dismissed.716  The court of appeals relied on the superior
court’s factual determination that the cocaine was found on Riney
prior to his arrival at the police station, even though “the evidence
[was] conflicting on this point.”717  The court held that as long as
probable cause existed for the arrest, a “post-arrest interrogation
of an arrestee [did] not constitute ‘unnecessary delay’ for purposes
of Alaska Criminal Rule 5(a)(1).”718  The court noted that the out-
come would have been different had Riney been detained solely to
gather evidence to justify his arrest.719  The court reasoned that a
two-hour interrogation and delay before going to the courthouse
was not used to extract an involuntary confession, and that the
Fourth Amendment and Rule 5(a)(1) do “not bar routine post-
arrest questioning of a suspect.”720
In Hillman v. Municipality of Anchorage,721 the court of ap-
peals affirmed its jurisdiction to hear an appeal of a DWI convic-
tion.722  Hillman was ordered to serve sixty days of an unsuspended
sentence for his third DWI conviction.723  The court of appeals re-
jected the Municipality’s argument that the court of appeals lacked
jurisdiction under Alaska Statutes section 22.07.020(c),724 which
provides, in part, that “[t]he court of appeals has jurisdiction to re-
view . . . (2) the final decision of the district court on a sentence
imposed by it if the sentence exceeds 120 days of unsuspended in-
carceration for a misdemeanor offense.”725  Because Hillman re-
ceived only sixty days of unsuspended incarceration, the Munici-
pality argued that section 22.07.020(c) prevented the court of
713. See id. at 1250.
714. 935 P.2d 828 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
715. See id. at 830.
716. Id.
717. Id. at 831.
718. Id. at 837; see ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1).
719. See Riney, 935 P.2d at 834.
720. Id. at 836.
721. 941 P.2d 211 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
722. See id. at 212.
723. See id. at 217.
724. See id. at 215; ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020(c) (Michie 1996).
725. ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.020(c).
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appeals from hearing Hillman’s appeal.726  The court, however, in-
terpreted section 22.07.020(c) as prohibiting it from reviewing only
“sentence appeals” for less than 120 days in which the defendant
concedes the legality of his or her sentence but argues that the
harshness of the sentence is an abuse of discretion.727  Concluding
that it had jurisdiction over Hillman’s appeal because the legality
of the sentence was at issue, the court of appeals stated that “[t]his
court retains the right to review an illegal sentence, regardless of
how much (or how little) imprisonment is imposed on the defen-
dant.”728
In Peters v. State,729 the court of appeals ruled that it had juris-
diction to hear the appeal of a defendant convicted of two counts
of a misdemeanor and sentenced to consecutive 120-day terms of
imprisonment, so long as the aggregate unsuspended prison terms
exceeded 120 days.730  Peters pled no contest to two counts of con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor for sexual acts he commit-
ted with a fourteen-year-old and a fifteen-year-old.731  Subse-
quently, the trial court sentenced Peters to two consecutive terms
of 360 days imprisonment, with 240 days suspended.732  Peters ap-
pealed, and the state argued that the appellate court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case because Peters was not sentenced to
more than 120 days imprisonment for any one misdemeanor.733
The court of appeals resolved the apparent ambiguity in Alaska
Statutes section 22.07.020(c),734 by holding that the sentence in ag-
gregate must exceed 120 days.735  The court cited the principle that
ambiguity in the criminal law should be resolved in favor of a de-
fendant, and interpreted the statute to accord with other sentenc-
ing statutes which clearly give defendants sentenced to “aggregate
terms exceeding 120 days of unsuspended incarceration” the right
to appeal.736
In United States v. Hall,737 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the testimony of an informant with a criminal record was
insufficient to support a search warrant for the defendant’s trailer,
726. See Hillman, 941 P.2d at 212.
727. See id. at 212.
728. Id.
729. 943 P.2d 418 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
730. See id. at 421.
731. See id. at 419.
732. See id.
733. See id.
734. ALASKA STAT. § 22.07.202(c) (Michie 1996).
735. See Peters, 943 P.2d at 421.
736. Id. at 420; see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 (Michie 1996); ALASKA R.
APP. P. 215(a).
737. 113 F.3d 157 (9th Cir. 1997).
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where the informant’s prior convictions bearing on his credibility
were not disclosed to the magistrate, and the informant merely tes-
tified that the defendant was his cocaine source.738  After he was ar-
rested for cocaine possession, the informant, Dang, told state
troopers that his supplier was Hall.739  Dang and a trooper ap-
peared before a magistrate where both gave live testimony under
oath.740  In his testimony, the trooper discussed Dang’s prior crimi-
nal record, but omitted that Dang had a criminal conviction for
making a false report five years previously.741  The magistrate is-
sued a search warrant for the defendant’s trailer, the trailer was
searched, and Hall was charged after troopers found cocaine, co-
caine sales equipment, large quantities of cash, and other evidence
of narcotics dealing.742  Upon holding a hearing pursuant to Franks
v. Delaware,743 the magistrate found that the trooper “‘either inten-
tionally or recklessly’ withheld information bearing on Dang’s
credibility,” including the 1990 conviction for falsely reporting a
crime.744  The district judge considered the magistrate’s reports and
adopted his recommendations to suppress the evidence found in
the search, reasoning that “the magistrate would probably not have
issued a search warrant had he known the truth” regarding Dang’s
prior record.745
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit attempted to ascertain “whether
a common sense determination would establish probable cause to
believe that Hall had the objects of the search in his trailer, if the
[informant’s prior conviction for making a false report] had been
provided.”746  The court found that the information given by Dang
to the state trooper was insufficient to amount to probable cause
because Dang was not worthy of belief, stating that “[a] known liar
is less worthy of belief than an individual about whom nothing is
known.”747  The court also rejected the government’s argument that
738. See id. at 161.
739. See id. at 157.
740. See id. at 158.
741. See id.
742. See id.
743. 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978) (holding that if a defendant establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the reckless disregard of the concealment of material
information, and that if the concealed information were provided the resulting
evidence would be insufficient to establish probable cause, Athe search warrant
must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if
probable cause were lacking@).
744. Hall, 113 F.3d at 158.
745. Id.
746. Id. at 159 (citing United States v. Mendonsa, 989 F.2d 366, 368 (9th Cir.
1993)).
747. Id. (citing Mendonsa, 989 F.2d at 369).  The court explained that corrobo-
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Dang’s self-inculpatory statement to police lent credibility to the
information he provided, reasoning that once a person is caught
red-handed by the police, “his statement that another person is
more important to his criminal enterprise than he gains little
credibility from its inculpatory aspect.”748
2. Evidence.  In McIntyre v. State,749 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that the superior court’s preclusion of an inquiry into
a witness’s possible bias based on a claim that the witness and a
party had a romantic relationship was an abuse of discretion.750
McIntyre was convicted of fourth-degree assault on his wife.751
During the trial, he was unable to cross-examine a female neighbor
on a possible romantic relationship between the neighbor and
McIntyre’s wife, the existence of which may have suggested a bias
in the witness’s testimony in favor of McIntyre’s wife.752
Although the court has “broad discretion to exclude relevant
evidence of a witness’s bias under Alaska Evidence Rule 403 if the
probative force of that evidence is outweighed by the danger of un-
fair prejudice,”753 the supreme court ruled that the possible bias
had significant probative value and that “the bias of a witness to-
ward a party is always relevant to the jury’s consideration of the
case.”754  Since there was a good-faith factual basis to the inquiry
based on personal observation, McIntyre’s conviction was re-
versed, even though the “evidence of same-sex romantic relation-
ships may tend to prejudice or inflame the jury.”755
In Russell v. State,756 the court of appeals upheld the defen-
dant’s conviction of first-degree assault of his wife and rejected his
claim that the lower court had improperly admitted evidence that
his wife suffered from battered woman syndrome.757  Russell had
asked the superior court to bar evidence of prior physical abuse
because “such evidence would do nothing more than paint him as
                                                                                                                                
ration of innocent facts does not adequately corroborate an anonymous tip, par-
ticularly when the informant is known to have previously made a false report to
police.
748. Id.
749. 934 P.2d 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
750. See id.
751. See id. at 771.
752. See id. at 772.
753. Id. at 772-73 (citing Beltz v. State, 895 P.2d 513, 518 (Alaska Ct. App.
1995); Johnson v. State, 889 P.2d 1076, 1080-81 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); Kameroff
v. State, 926 P.2d 1174, 1179 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992)).
754. Id. at 773.
755. Id. at 773-74.
756. 934 P.2d 1335 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
757. See id. at 1342-44.
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an abusive husband.”758  The court held that the evidence was
properly admitted to help “explain why one person might fear an-
other person or might submit to another person’s will.”759  The
court also held that the lower court had not erred in allowing the
prosecution’s expert, Dr. Ernest Meloche, to testify not only about
the characteristics of battered woman syndrome, but also “about
his diagnosis of [the wife] as a battered woman.”760  The court con-
cluded that this “profile” testimony was relevant because the de-
fense had described the victim’s actions as “inconsistent with her
allegation of rape,” and the prosecution was therefore “entitled to
introduce evidence explaining how [the wife’s] behavior was not
necessarily inconsistent with the [s]tate’s allegation of sexual as-
sault.”761
In State v. Titus,762 the court of appeals reversed a successful
new trial motion based on jurors’ testimony that they discussed
matters outside of evidence because this testimony was beyond the
scope of a post-verdict examination of the jurors’ deliberations.763
After Titus was convicted of first-degree sexual assault,764 three dif-
ferent jurors testified that their personal knowledge of Titus’s
drinking may have factored into the deliberations, even though the
trial record contained no mention of this drinking.765  As a result,
the superior court granted a new trial.766
The court of appeals held that the jury’s verdict could be over-
turned only if “the jurors’ knowledge of Titus’s reputation and be-
havior constituted an extraneous influence on their delibera-
tions.”767  In support of this view, the court quoted the U.S.
Senate’s discussion of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b): “‘[i]n the
interest of protecting the jury system and the citizens who make it
work, [R]ule 606 should not permit any inquiry into the internal
deliberations of the jurors.’”768  Because “a juror’s pre-existing
knowledge is not ‘extraneous’ information,” the court concluded
that Alaska Evidence Rule 606(b)769 barred the superior court from
considering the jurors’ testimony and, therefore, a reversal of the
758. Id. at 1340.
759. Id. at 1341.
760. Id. at 1343.
761. Id.
762. 933 P.2d 1165 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
763. See id. at 1165-66.
764. See id. at 1166.
765. See id. at 1167-68.
766. See id.
767. Id. at 1169.
768. Id. at 1170 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7060).
769. ALASKA R. EVID. 606(b).
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lower court’s ruling was warranted.770
In Lamont v. State,771 the court of appeals reversed separate
convictions of third-degree assault and second-degree sexual as-
sault against the defendant because he was not allowed to instruct
the jury on his claim of self-defense, and because prior inadmissi-
ble evidence of prior assaultive behavior toward a former girl-
friend was used against him.772  Lamont was convicted of third-
degree assault for pointing a gun at a police officer.773  At the time,
he allegedly thought he was going to be robbed by the officer and
felt that he was too intoxicated to defend himself.774  However, the
trial court ruled that a self-defense instruction to the jury was un-
available since a robbery was not actually imminent.775  The court
of appeals held that “Lamont was not required to show that a rob-
bery was actually imminent, but merely that he reasonably be-
lieved one to be imminent.”776  The court also noted that it is for
the jury to determine if the evidence is able to support a claim of
self-defense, not the court.777
The second-degree sexual assault conviction was overturned
because evidence of a defendant’s prior misconduct is admissible
only “to establish ‘opportunity, intent, . . . or absence of mistake or
accident.’”778  The court ruled that Lamont never claimed mistake
or accident and that the complete dissimilarity between the past
and present acts made the “past acts inadmissible to show in-
tent.”779  The court also rejected the state’s claim of curative admis-
sibility, ruling that Lamont’s attorney never “‘opened the door’” to
that line of questioning.780
In Allen v. State,781 the court of appeals reversed the defen-
dant’s conviction because the evidence of particular instances of
the defendant’s past violent behavior was not admissible in a
criminal case.782  During an altercation, Allen stabbed another man
who eventually died, and Allen was convicted of second-degree
murder.783  At his trial, Allen asserted that he had been acting in
770. Titus, 933 P.2d at 1166.
771. 934 P.2d 774 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
772. See id. at 776.
773. See id.
774. See id.
775. See id. at 778.
776. Id.
777. See id. at 777.
778. Id. at 780 (quoting ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1)).
779. Id.
780. Id.
781. 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
782. See id. at 1239.
783. See id. at 1234-35.
YIR 07/17/98  9:39 AM
1998] YEAR IN REVIEW 125
self-defense.784  To rebut Allen’s claim that the other man was the
first aggressor, the state introduced evidence to prove Allen’s
character for violence, specifically, that he had been convicted of
assault and that he had previously assaulted a woman with a sword
or machete.785  The court held that, according to Evidence Rule
404(a)(2),786 evidence of Allen’s character was admissible to rebut
his claim that he was not the initial aggressor.787  The court also re-
jected Allen’s argument that he was disadvantaged by the amend-
ment to Rule 404(a)(2) that allowed the evidence to be admitted
and that went into effect after he allegedly committed his crime.788
The court in part relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s elucidation of
the argument in Collins v. Youngblood789  that the ex post facto
clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits only the retrospective ap-
plication of laws that “‘alter the definition of crimes or increases
the punishment for criminal acts.’”790  The court found that Rule
404(a)(2) did neither of these things.791  Yet, although the state was
authorized to introduce evidence of Allen’s character, it was not
allowed to introduce evidence of his specific acts of violence.792
Evidence Rule 405(b)793 allowed introduction of such specific in-
stances, but since this was a criminal case involving claims of self-
defense, Evidence Rules 404(a)(2) and 405 allowed only reputa-
tion and opinion evidence to provide evidence of the character of
the defendant.794
In Marino v. State,795 the court of appeals held that blood and
urine specimens solicited for a murder investigation by police
could not be used by the state as evidence of two drug charges
when the police had specifically promised the defendant immunity
from prosecution for any drug offenses.796  Although Marino con-
sented to the tests and even signed a form that “specifically stated
that the samples could be tested for evidence of ‘drug abuse,’” the
court held that given the verbal assurances Marino had received
from police, the “[s]tate exceeded the scope of Marino’s con-
784. See id. at 1235.
785. See id.
786. ALASKA R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
787. See Allen, 945 P.2d at 1236.
788. See id.
789. 497 U.S. 37 (1990).
790. Allen, 945 P.2d at 1237 (quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 43).
791. See id.
792. See id. at 1239.
793. ALASKA R. EVID. 405(b).
794. See Allen, 945 P.2d at 1239.
795. 934 P.2d 1321 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
796. See id. at 1332-33.
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sent.”797  The court found that holding Marino to the consent
form’s fine print would be “unconscionable.”798
In Brodine v. State,799 the court of appeals held that the results
of three different DNA tests were properly admitted by the trial
court.800  The court concluded that the admission of the PCR DQ-
Alpha DNA testing was supported by the finding in Harmon v.
State801 that PCR DNA typing was a generally accepted scientific
technique pursuant to the Frye v. United States test.802  As for the
new polymarker and the D1S80 tests, the court concluded that the
state’s expert testimony and supporting scientific papers justified
the trial court’s determination that these techniques were also gen-
erally accepted by the relevant scientific community and therefore,
correctly admitted.803  Based on a review of the record, the court
concluded that any error the trial court committed by admitting
DNA test results without any accompanying population frequency
estimates as statistical analysis was harmless error.804
In Shadle v. Municipality of Anchorage,805 the court of appeals
held that where a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence is de-
nied, but the record upon which the trial court based its decision is
lost or destroyed, and cannot be reconstructed, the defendant is
denied the opportunity for meaningful appellate review, and the
denial of defendant’s motion for suppression must be reversed.806
Shadle was arrested for driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) and was
given a breath test which showed his blood alcohol level to be .227
percent.807  Shadle signed a waiver to forego independent chemical
testing, but during trial he argued that because of a severe hearing
impairment, he did not understand what he was signing, and
moved to suppress the breath test.808  The district judge ruled,
based mainly on audio recordings of Shadle’s processing for DWI,
that Shadle knowingly waived the independent test.809  Subsequent
797. Id. at 1332.
798. Id. at 1333.
799. 936 P.2d 545 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
800. See id. at 549-52.
801. 908 P.2d 434 (Alaska App. 1995).
802. See Brodine, 936 P.2d at 549; see also Frye v. United States, 293 F.3d 1013
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring a showing that new scientific methods are generally
accepted by the relevant scientific community before they are admitted as evi-
dence).
803. See Brodine, 936 P.2d at 550-51.
804. See id. at 551.
805. 941 P.2d 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
806. See id. at 905.
807. See id. at 904.
808. See id at 905.
809. See id.
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to the district judge’s decision to deny Shadle’s motion for sup-
pression, the audio tape was either lost or inadvertently de-
stroyed.810  The court held that because the record could not be re-
constructed in such a way as to afford meaningful appellate review,
the district judge’s order denying Shadle’s motion to suppress must
be reversed.811
3. Sentencing.  In Foxglove v. State,812 the Alaska Court of
Appeals found a composite sentence imposed for separate
incidents of causing injury and death with a snowmobile while
intoxicated was not disproportionate to other sentences imposed
on defendants convicted of vehicular homicide.813  Driving his
snowmobile while intoxicated, Foxglove struck and seriously
injured a twelve-year-old boy, and one half-hour later, drove
through a crowd of people gathered around a bonfire killing one
child and injuring four other people.814  Foxglove was convicted of
one count of manslaughter and five counts of first-degree assault.815
He received a composite sentence of twenty-five years
imprisonment with six years suspended.816  Foxglove appealed,
contending that his sentence was disproportionate to sentences
imposed on other defendants convicted of vehicular homicide.817
The court of appeals evaluated Foxglove’s assertion, examin-
ing “the degree of [his] recklessness, the consequences of his con-
duct, his age, his record of criminal conduct, and his record of al-
cohol abuse.”818  The court found Foxglove’s conduct was
aggravated because he ignored warnings not to drive and purpose-
fully ran over his victims.819  The court also found that although
Foxglove may have killed only one person, he inflicted serious,
long-term injuries on the others.820  The court affirmed the concur-
rent terms for the four assaults, determining that the nineteen-year
sentence adequately addressed the consequences of Foxglove’s ac-
tion.821  The court also rejected Foxglove’s argument that the first
assault should merge for sentencing purposes with the punishment
810. See id.
811. See id.
812. 929 P.2d 669 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
813. See id. at 670.
814. See id.
815. See id.
816. See id.
817. See id. at 671.
818. Id.
819. See id. at 671-72.
820. See id. at 672.
821. See id.
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received for later killing or injuring someone else.822
In Sorenson v. State,823 the court of appeals held that under the
Austin rule,824 the superior court erred by sentencing a first time
felon to a sentence that exceeded the two-year presumptive term
that would have applied had the defendant been a second time of-
fender.825  The Austin rule states that a first-time felony offender
should generally receive a sentence that is more favorable than the
presumptive term for a second-time felony offender who has been
convicted of the same class of crime.826  The court of appeals con-
cluded that the trial court erred by sentencing Sorenson to a five-
year sentence with three years suspended for a first time felony
conviction for negligent homicide where the state alleged no ag-
gravating factors or extraordinary circumstances and the presump-
tive second-time felony term is two years.827  Remanding the case
to the trial court for resentencing, the court noted that if the state
decided to propose aggravating factors or extraordinary circum-
stances that were not previously advanced, they must give Soren-
son advance notice and an opportunity to respond.828
In Wilson v. State,829 the court of appeals affirmed the De-
partment of Corrections’s (“DOC’s”) ability to aggregate sen-
tences to determine a prisoner’s appropriate release date.830  Ac-
cording to Alaska Statutes section 33.20,831 inmates with sentences
of more than three days are entitled to a “good time” reduction in
sentence for following the rules in their correctional facility.832
Wilson argued that the DOC should not have aggregated his mis-
demeanor and felony sentences to determine good time.833  The
court rejected this argument, finding that the statutory phrases
“term or terms of imprisonment” and “one or more terms of im-
prisonment” indicated a prisoner’s terms of imprisonment were to
be aggregated.834  The court also found that the parole administra-
tion statute made no distinction between felony and misdemeanor
convictions and instead focused on the total length of the inmate’s
822. See id.
823. 938 P.2d 1084 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
824. See Austin v. State, 627 P.2d 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1981).
825. See Sorenson, 938 P.2d at 1085.
826. See id. at 1084 n.1 (citing Austin, 627 P.2d at 657-58).
827. See id.
828. See id. at 1085.
829. 944 P.2d 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
830. See id.
831. ALASKA STAT. § 33.20 (Michie 1996).
832. See Wilson, 944 P.2d at 1192.
833. See id.
834. See id; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 33.20.040, .16.900(8) (Michie 1996).
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sentence.835
In Landon v. State,836 the court of appeals sustained a convic-
tion for running a marijuana growing operation, but remanded the
case for resentencing because the defendant was incorrectly la-
beled as a statutory aggravator.837  Landon was deemed a statutory
aggravator by the superior court for attempting to obtain substan-
tial pecuniary gain while facing only a slight risk of prosecution
and punishment, and for committing an offense that was one of a
series of criminal activities from which Landon derived a major
portion of his income.838  The court agreed that the pecuniary gain
was substantial, but determined that there was a high risk of prose-
cution and punishment because many marijuana growers are
caught and prosecuted each year.839  The court also determined that
the record did not show that a single operation amounted to a con-
tinuing series of criminal offenses and that Landon’s operation was
the major source of his income.840
In State v. McKinney,841 the court of appeals held that a defen-
dant’s post-offense conduct was properly considered as a non-
statutory mitigating factor in a sexual offense case.842  The court of
appeals concluded that McKinney’s admission of culpability to his
family and to state troopers concerning the sexual abuse of his
daughter, his assurances to his daughter that she was blameless,
and his willingness to attend therapy and obtain counseling consti-
tuted post-offense conduct that was properly considered as a non-
statutory mitigating factor in his sentencing.843  Rejecting the state’s
argument that McKinney’s conduct was “simply a facet of his po-
tential for rehabilitation,” the court remarked that the conduct
“had significant potential to ameliorate the impact of the sexual
abuse” and “to enhance [the victim’s] prospects for emotional re-
covery” and thus should be considered apart from the defendant’s
potential for rehabilitation.844
In Ting v. Municipality of Anchorage,845 the court of appeals
affirmed a composite sentence of 330 days previously suspended
and a consecutive term of 365 days for a subsequent conviction for
835. See Wilson, 944 P.2d at 1192; see also ALASKA STAT. § 33.16 (Michie
1996).
836. 941 P.2d 186 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
837. See id. at 188.
838. See id. at 193.
839. See id.
840. See id. at 194.
841. 946 P.2d 456 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
842. See id. at 458.
843. See id. at 457.
844. Id. at 458.
845. 929 P.2d 673 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
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a “worst offender” child abuser.846  In 1993, Ting had been sen-
tenced to 360 days, 330 suspended, after pleading no contest to a
misdemeanor assault for striking his stepdaughter.847  Over two
years later, while still on probation, Ting again assaulted his step-
daughter.848  The superior court revoked Ting’s probation, ordered
him to serve the suspended sentence, and imposed a consecutive
term for the second assault.849  The judge found Ting to be a con-
tinuing danger to the stepdaughter and rejected Ting’s argument
that he had demonstrated an ability to rehabilitate himself, finding
that even assuming Ting’s attendance and participation in rehabili-
tative programs had been satisfactory, it was clear from the record
of repeated assaults that these attempts had been unsuccessful.850
The court of appeals determined that the sentencing record re-
flected a “careful consideration of all the necessary sentencing ob-
jectives,” and that the court did not err in imposing the composite
sentence.851
In Ison v. State,852 the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s refusal to apply two mitigating factors when setting the de-
fendant’s sentence for driving while intoxicated.853  Ison argued that
the mitigating factor construed in section 12.55.125(d)(9)854 should
have been applied because “‘the conduct constituting [his] offense
was among the least serious conduct included in the definition of
the offense.’”855  The court of appeals rejected this argument be-
cause Ison’s description of his conduct failed to include his past
convictions for driving with a suspended license and his physical
resistance of arresting officers.856
In the alternative, Ison argued that the sentencing judge
should have applied section 12.55.125(d)(13),857 which provides, in
part, that a felony offense should be mitigated if the present of-
fense combined with any previous offenses “‘establish that the
harm caused by the defendant’s conduct is consistently minor and
inconsistent with the imposition of a substantial period of impris-
onment.’”858  Reiterating its interpretation of the statute in Jordan
846. See id. at 675.
847. See id. at 673.
848. See id. at 674.
849. See id.
850. See id. at 675.
851. Id.
852. 941 P.2d 195 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
853. See id. at 197-98.
854. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(9) (Michie 1996).
855. Ison, 941 P.2d at 197 (quoting  § 12.55.125(d)(9)).
856. See id at 198-99.
857. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(d)(13).
858. See Ison, 941 P.2d at 197 (quoting § 12.55.125(d)(13)).
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v. State,859 the court affirmed the superior court’s determination
that section 12.55.125(d)(13) did not apply to Ison’s situation.860
The court explicitly reserved judgment on the issue of whether it is
possible for a defendant to show that the “harm caused by [his or
her] conduct is consistently minor,” qualifying under mitigator
(d)(13), if they have failed to qualify under mitigator (d)(9) by
showing that the present offense “was among the least serious
conduct included in the definition of the offense.”861
In State v. Winters,862 the court of appeals held that the plain
meaning of a minimum sentencing statute imposing punishment
for previous convictions for DWI includes convictions only within
the preceding five years.863  Winters and Goodmanson were both
convicted of DWI, an offense that each had been previously con-
victed of three times.864  Although each had three prior convictions,
only two of the convictions had occurred within the past five
years.865  The sentencing statute provides that “only convictions oc-
curring within five years preceding the date of the present offense
may be included” for mandatory sentencing, and sets the punish-
ment at $5,000 and no less than “120 days if the person has been
previously convicted twice” or “240 days if the person has been
previously convicted three times.”866  The superior court sentenced
the defendants to 210 days of imprisonment, and the state ap-
pealed the sentences.867  The court of appeals held that the statute’s
plain meaning supported the view that only convictions within the
past five years should be included in the sentencing, and that if the
statute was ambiguous, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor
of the criminal defendant.868
In Ross v. State,869 the court of appeals held that the existence
of prior DWI convictions is an element of the crime of felony DWI
under Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(n),870 rather than merely a
factor that enhances sentencing.871  Ross was charged with DWI in
October 1995 and previously had been convicted of DWI in 1991
859. 895 P.2d 994 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995).
860. See Ison, 941 P.2d at 198.
861. Id.
862. 944 P.2d 54 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
863. See id.
864. See id.
865. See id. at 55.
866. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(n) (Michie 1996).
867. See Winters, 944 P.2d at 55.
868. See id. at 56.
869. 950 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
870. ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(n) (Michie 1996).
871. See Ross, 950 P.2d at 591.
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and again in 1993.872  Ross argued at trial that his prior convictions
were not an element of the offense, but were only relevant to sen-
tencing in the event he was found guilty.873  In affirming the district
court’s admission of Ross’s two prior DWI convictions as an ele-
ment of the offense, the court of appeals construed Alaska Statutes
section 28.35.030(n) as creating an aggravated felony-level offense
for repeat offenders, separate from the traditional misdemeanor
offense codified in Alaska Statutes section 28.35.030(a).874  The
court thereby answered the question left open in State v. Winters,875
which held that sections 28.35.030(b) and 28.35.030(n) constitute
separate and independent sentencing provisions, by explicitly
stating that section 28.35.030(a) and section 28.35.030(n) codify
separate offenses.876  The court held that the state must therefore
prove each essential element of the offense to the trier of fact, in-
cluding proving the existence of the defendant’s prior convictions
beyond a reasonable doubt.877
4. Miscellaneous.  In Arnett v. State,878 the Alaska Court of
Appeals held that the defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective
and that the defendant could not knowingly and willfully abscond
during trial and then attempt to escape the consequences by
blaming his counsel for any wrongdoing.879  Under State v. Jones,880
the court found that the law presumes that counsel is competent
and that any decisions made by counsel are motivated by tactical
considerations.881  Because Arnett failed to show that the decisions
of his counsel not to call certain witnesses were motivated by
something other than tactical considerations, the court of appeals
concluded that Arnett did not rebut the presumption of
competence and, thus, failed to show that his counsel was
ineffective.882  The court also rejected Arnett’s argument that his
counsel acted incompetently when she encouraged and assisted
him in absconding from his trial.883  Without deciding whether
Arnett’s counsel actually advised or assisted him in absconding,
the court concluded that even if Arnett’s assertions regarding his
872. See id. at 589.
873. See id.
874. See id. at 590; see also ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.030(a) (Michie 1996).
875. 944 P.2d 54 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
876. See Ross, 950 P.2d at 590.
877. See id.
878. 938 P.2d 1079 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
879. See id. at 1080, 1082.
880. 759 P.2d 558 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
881. See Arnett, 938 P.2d at 1080 (citing Jones, 759 P.2d at 569).
882. See id. at 1081.
883. See id. at 1083.
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counsel were true, “Arnett has shown no grounds for claiming
prejudice stemming from his attorney’s incompetence” and “[t]o
grant relief in this case would permit Arnett ‘to reap a windfall
new trial on account of his own [crime].’”884
In Tallent v. State,885 the court of appeals upheld the defen-
dant’s second-degree theft conviction and concluded that Alaska
Statutes section 11.46.130(a)(6) “defined a separate method of
committing the substantive crime of second-degree theft, and that
a defendant’s prior convictions [were] an element of that crime.”886
Section 11.46.130(a)(6)887 provided that if a defendant had been
convicted of theft twice within the past five years, then a theft of
between $50 and $500 constituted a second-degree theft as op-
posed to third-degree, the normal degree for that dollar range.888
Tallent argued that the trial court erred by refusing to withhold
evidence of his prior convictions from the jury on the condition
that he stipulate to them.889  Rejecting Tallent’s argument, the
court concluded that, despite some contrary legislative history, the
newly enacted statutory provisions “were not merely penalty pro-
visions.”890  Rather, the defendant’s prior convictions were an es-
sential element of the crime and the state was required to prove
them beyond a reasonable doubt.891
In State v. Burden,892 the court of appeals held that a “go-
between” in a cocaine sale could be indicted for delivery of co-
caine, because the “procuring agency” defense does not apply to
the offense of “delivery,” though the defense might be available
for the offense of “sale.”893  Burden had successfully argued before
the trial court that he could not be prosecuted for acting as a go-
between in a drug transaction because Alaska Statutes section
11.71.03(a)(1)894 provides that persons may not be found guilty as
an accomplice for offenses in which their actions are an inevitable
incidence of the crime (i.e., the “procuring agent” defense).895  The
court held that the state legislature’s modification of the terms of
the criminal statute from “sale” to “delivery” evidenced intent to
foreclose the “procuring agent” defense, regardless of whether the
884. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McNeil, 487 A.2d 802, 807 (1985)).
885. 951 P.2d 857 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).
886. Id. at 861.
887. ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.130(a)(6) (Michie 1996).
888. See Tallent, 951 P.2d at 860.
889. See id. at 859-60.
890. Id. at 860.
891. See id. at 861.
892. 948 P.2d 991 (Alaska 1997).
893. See id. at 994.
894. ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.03(a)(1) (Michie 1996).
895. See Burden, 948 P.2d at 994.
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defendant acted as an agent for the buyer or the seller.896
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Workers’ Compensation
1. Claims Procedure.  In Brown v. Alaska Workers’
Compensation Board, 897 the Alaska Supreme Court rejected a
workers’ compensation claim based on the aggravation of a
preexisting condition caused by a work-related injury.898  Before
being employed by the University of Alaska in its power plant,
Brown was diagnosed as suffering from a degenerative condition
of the cervical spine.899  During his employment, Brown claimed
that he injured his neck when an ash rake fell on his neck, and
never returned to work after his injury.900  The University disputed
all of Brown’s allegations and ceased paying disability
compensation after approximately two months.901  The Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board appointed an independent medical
examiner who determined that although Brown did suffer an
injury at work, it aggravated his preexisting condition only
temporarily and any impairment after the date the University
stopped payment was due to his preexisting condition.902
The supreme court upheld the Board’s decision.903  It rejected
Brown’s argument that the Board was compelled to adopt the
opinion of the medical examiner, reflecting that no part of Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.095(k) required the Board to rely on the ex-
aminer’s report.904  The court also held that the Board acted consis-
tently with the statutory definition of medical stability when it de-
termined Brown was suffering no effects attributable to the
accident when the University ceased payment, and did not make
an error of fact when it relied on two physicians’ testimony that
Brown was not disabled by the accident.905  Lastly, because there
was substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that
Brown’s continuing degenerative condition was due to the pre-
existing condition, the supreme court rejected Brown’s claim that
896. See id. at 991.
897. 931 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1997).
898. See id. at 425.
899. See id. at 422.
900. See id.
901. See id.
902. See id. at 422-23.
903. See id at 425.
904. See id. at 423-24; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(k) (Michie 1996).
905. See Brown, 931 P.2d at 423-24.
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he was still entitled to benefits because of his pre-existing condi-
tion.906
In Dafermo v. Municipality of Anchorage,907 the supreme court
held that a claimant’s failure to provide notice of a work-related
eye problem to an employer within thirty days of receiving a physi-
cian=s letter diagnosing the defect was excused because the injury
was a latent defect and therefore the notice was timely if filed
within two years of diagnosis.908  The court also found that the de-
lay did not prejudice the employer.909  Because doctors had initially
failed to diagnose Dafermo=s injury, the court found that the in-
jury was latent and the two-year statute of limitations was sus-
pended until the nature of the injury was discovered.910  Also, the
court held that no substantial evidence supported a finding that the
employer was prejudiced by the failure to give notice within thirty
days because Dafermo had talked to his supervisors about his
problem, thereby giving his employer knowledge of the injury.911
Also, the objectives of the notice requirement, such as immediate
medical treatment of the injury and early investigation of the rele-
vant facts, were not impeded by Dafermo=s failure to give notice
because Dafermo=s eye problems had started years earlier.912  Be-
cause Dafermo’s employer had knowledge of the injury and was
not prejudiced, the exception to the notification requirement
found in Alaska Statutes section 23.30.100(d)(1) was satisfied.913
In Wells v. Swalling Construction Co.,914 the supreme court
held that the “last injurious exposure” rule for workers’ compensa-
tion claims does not apply to successive injuries sustained by the
employee in the same job.915  Wells suffered two injuries, one each
to his right and left knee, in 1986 and 1989, respectively, while
working for Swalling.916  In 1986, Wells received surgery on his
right knee.917  In 1989, Wells was examined, but not treated for the
injury to the left knee, but needed to have his right knee totally re-
906. See id. at 425.
907. 941 P.2d 114 (Alaska 1997).
908. See id. at 119.
909. See id. at 118-19.
910. See id. at 119; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.105 (Michie 1996) (tolling
the two-year limitations period for worker=s compensation claims in the case of
an employee=s latent injury).
911. See Dafermo, 941 P.2d at 118-19.
912. See id.
913. See id. at 119; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.100(d)(1) (Michie 1996).
914. 944 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1997).
915. See id. at 37.
916. See id. at 36.
917. See id.
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placed because it had not healed properly from the earlier injury.918
Swalling paid Wells $885.20 per week during the period that Wells
missed work after his first injury, but paid him only $562.49 per
week after the second injury.919  Wells filed a claim for adjustment
with the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, and the Board
ruled that under the “last injurious exposure rule,” Swalling must
pay Wells at the same rate of compensation as after the 1986 in-
jury, since his disability was caused by the earlier injury and not
the 1989 injury.920  The supreme court reversed the Board’s deci-
sion, ruling that the Board had misapplied the “last injurious expo-
sure rule.”921  The supreme court found that the “last injurious ex-
posure” rule was designed as a way to determine liability when
successive employers or insurers disputed the claims for different
injuries.922  Since that was not the case for Wells’ injuries, the court
ruled that the “last injurious exposure” rule did not apply.923
In Lindekugel v. Fluor Alaska, Inc.,924 the supreme court held
that an oral stipulation dismissing a workers’ compensation claim
was an agreement in regard to the claim and therefore void when a
memorandum of that agreement was not filed with the Workers’
Compensation Board as required by Alaska Statutes section
23.30.210(b).925  Lindekugel waived a compromise and release
against Fluor that was to provide all future medical benefits for
him, and entered into a new agreement with his current employer
that did not provide future medical benefits.926  The waiver and
new agreement were never reduced to writing.927  The Board dis-
approved of the new agreement because it “was not in
Lindekugel’s best interest” and “encouraged Lindekugel to pursue
a claim against Fluor for medical expenses.”928  Because section
23.30.210(b) explicitly states that an “agreement is void for any
purpose”929 and the “legislature intended that no legal conse-
quences should flow from an agreement covered by subsection
.210(b) which does not meet its requirements,” the court rejected
Fluor’s argument that the oral stipulation was voidable, and not
918. See id.
919. See id.
920. See id.
921. See id.
922. See id. at 37.
923. See id.
924. 934 P.2d 1307 (Alaska 1997).
925. See id. at 1311-12; ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.210(b) (Michie 1996).
926. See Lindekugel, 934 P.2d at 1308.
927. See id. at 1307-08.
928. Id. at 1308-09.
929. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.210(b).
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void on its face.930
In Cogger v. Anchor House,931 the supreme court held that the
thirty-day period for notifying an employer of a workers’ compen-
sation claim began to run when the employee visited the emer-
gency room and incurred medical costs.932  Although Cogger did
not comply with the formal notice requirement, the court re-
manded the case because Anchor House had actual knowledge of
the injury and did not suffer prejudice from the delay.933  The court
held that informing co-workers did not provide actual knowledge
to the employer, but the fact that Anchor House did have actual
knowledge of Cogger’s back condition within days of the expira-
tion of the thirty-day time limit was sufficient to trigger Alaska
Statutes section 23.30.100(d)(1).934
In Williams v. Department of Revenue,935 the supreme court
held that Alaska Statutes section 23.30.100936 does not time-bar an
employee’s claim for work-related injuries if the employer had
knowledge of the injuries and had not been prejudiced by the em-
ployee’s failure to give notice.937  Because the Child Support En-
forcement Division (“CSED”), Williams’s employer, was informed
by a doctor that Williams’s injuries were related to work and be-
cause there was no indication that CSED’s lack of formal notice of
the injuries interfered with its ability to investigate Williams’s
claim, the court held that Williams’s claim was not time-barred.938
Concluding that Williams failed to establish that her work-related
mental injuries were “extraordinary and unusual in comparison to
pressures and tensions experienced by individuals in a comparable
work environment,”939 the court held that the Workers’ Compensa-
tion Board did not err when it denied Williams’s mental injury
claim.940  However, the court concluded that the trial court erred
when it dismissed Williams’s physical injury claim.941  The court
noted that in order to rebut the presumption that the injuries were
work-related, the employer must either offer affirmative evidence
to show that the injury was not work-related or eliminate all possi-
930. Lindekugel, 934 P.2d at 1311.
931. 936 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1997).
932. See id. at 160.
933. See id. at 160-62.
934. See id. at 161-62; ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.100(d)(1) (Michie 1996).
935. 938 P.2d 1065 (Alaska 1997).
936. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.100 (Michie 1996).
937. See Williams, 938 P.2d at 1070.
938. See id. at 1071.
939. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395(17).
940. See Williams, 938 P.2d at 1072.
941. See id. at 1072.
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bilities that the injury was work-related.942  Because the doctor’s
testimony showed that Williams’s job was the predominant cause
of her physical ailments, the court concluded that CSED failed to
successfully rebut the presumption of compensability either af-
firmatively or negatively.943  As a result, the court remanded the
case to the trial court to calculate damages for Williams’s claim
that her employment had aggravated a pre-existing physical condi-
tion.944
In Blanas v. Brower Co.,945 the supreme court concluded that
an employee established a genuine fact issue regarding whether a
compromise and release (“C&R”) was the product of fraud and
therefore warranted further proceedings.946  Blanas entered into
the C&R with Brower Co., his employer, to resolve his workers’
compensation claim.947  Subsequently, Blanas petitioned the Work-
ers’ Compensation Board to reopen and modify the C&R when he
learned that the physical demands of the job required of him by
the C&R exceeded his post-injury physical capacity.948  Blanas’s
fraud claim was based on an assertion that his employer fraudu-
lently induced him to consent to the C&R despite the knowledge
that Blanas was physically incapable of performing the specified
job.949  The Board concluded that it possessed the authority to set
aside the fraudulent C&R, but held that the conduct alleged by
Blanas did not constitute fraudulent behavior.950  Although the su-
preme court agreed with the Board regarding the Board’s author-
ity to set aside the C&R,951 it reversed and remanded on the issue
of whether the C&R was obtained fraudulently.952  The court also
ruled that the Board erred in applying the one-year limitation
found in Civil Rule 60(b)(3)953 because it did not apply to a petition
to put aside a fraudulently obtained C&R.954
In Twiggs v. Municipality of Anchorage,955 the supreme court
held that, for purposes of a workers’ compensation claim, a sub-
stantial increase in a worker’s post-injury income was not disposi-
942. See id. at 1073.
943. See id.
944. See id. at 1076.
945. 938 P.2d 1056 (Alaska 1997).
946. See id. at 1064-65.
947. See id. at 1058.
948. See id.
949. See id. at 1059.
950. See id. at 1061.
951. See id. at 1061-62.
952. See id. at 1064-65.
953. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).
954. See Blanas, 938 P.2d at 1063.
955. 938 P.2d 1046 (Alaska 1997).
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tive of whether his lost promotion from employment as a volunteer
policeman with the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) de-
creased his earning capacity.956  The court stated that
“incorporating a lost promotion into the lost earning capacity
equation is a natural extension of our previous cases.”957  However,
the court concluded that Twiggs’s recovery should be limited by
another provision of the Alaska’s Workers’ Compensation Act
(“AWCA”),958 which was in force at the time of the injury.959  The
AWCA provided, in part, that “if the employee is injured while
performing duties as a volunteer . . . policeman, . . . the gross
weekly earnings for calculating compensation shall be the mini-
mum earnings paid a full-time . . . policeman, . . . employed in the
political subdivision where the injury occurred . . . .”960  Because
Twiggs was injured while working as a volunteer policeman, the
court concluded that this provision set Twiggs’s gross weekly
earnings at the minimum gross weekly earnings paid a full-time
Anchorage policeman and rejected Twiggs’s argument that his
employment and gross weekly earnings with the FAA should be
part of his recovery calculation.961
2. Benefits.  In Kolkman v. Greens Creek Mining Co.,962 the
Alaska Supreme Court reversed a decision denying workers’
compensation benefits to an employee based on a failure to give
timely notice of injury to his employer when the employer was
aware that the employee suffered a heart attack and when the
employee did not know that it was a work-related injury until over
a year had passed.963  The employer appealed an adverse decision
originally awarding benefits, alleging that Kolkman had failed to
serve notice within thirty days of the injury.964  Based on this
956. See id. at 1048.
957. Id. at 1049 (referring to Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist. v. Cider,
736 P.2d 770, 772-773 (Alaska 1987) (holding that lost earning capacity is “not
limited to an examination of those losses that appear immediately after claimant’s
injury stabilizes”); Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182, 186 (Alaska
1978) (holding that a post-injury increase in earnings does not necessarily pre-
clude a finding of lost earning capacity)).
958. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.220(a)(4) (Michie 1996).
959. See Twiggs, 938 P.2d at 1094.
960. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.220(a)(4)(9).
961. See Twiggs, 938 P.2d at 1049-50.
962. 936 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1997).
963. See id. at 154-55.
964. See id. at 153; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.100(d)(1) (statutory provi-
sion stating that “[f]ailure to give notice does not bar a claim under this chapter []
if the employer, an agent of the employer in charge of the business in the place
where the injury occurred, or the carrier had knowledge of the injury or death
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appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found the claim
time-barred and the superior court affirmed this decision.965
The supreme court determined that Kolkman’s failure to give
notice of his injury within thirty days should be excused because
his employer knew of the heart attack and was not prejudiced by
the delay, both of which are necessary to fall within the exception
of the notice requirement.966  The court also partially overruled a
previous case that inferred the additional requirement of knowl-
edge of the work-relatedness of the injury by the employer.967
Since a year passed before Kolkman learned of the work-
relatedness of his heart attack and the delay in notification did not
prejudice his employer, the case was remanded to the Board to
reach the issue of how much Kolkman should be compensated.968
In Morgan v. Lucky Strike Bingo,969 the supreme court held
that the Workers’ Compensation Board did not err in affirming the
reemployment benefits administrator’s (“RBA’s”) determination
that the claimant was not eligible for reemployment benefits.970
The court also held that Alaska Statutes section 23.30.041(e)971 re-
quired the RBA to use the Department of Labor’s Selected Char-
acteristics of Occupations Defined in the Dictionary of Occupa-
tional Titles (“SCODDOT”) in determining whether a claimant is
eligible for reemployment benefits.972  Although there was evi-
dence that Morgan could not perform all the duties of her actual
job which required prolonged “neck-bending,” the court upheld
the Board’s decision to deny benefits because the physical re-
quirement of “neck-bending” is not expressly listed in the
SCODDOT description of a manager/accountant.973  The court re-
jected Morgan’s argument that “neck-bending” was an implicit
lesser-included part of the physical requirements of a sedentary
job.974
In Grove v. Alaska Construction and Erectors,975 the supreme
court held that substantial evidence supported that the claimant
                                                                                                                                
and the board determines that the employer or carrier has not been prejudiced by
the failure to give notice”).
965. See Kolkman, 936 P.2d at 153.
966. See id. at 154-56.
967. See id. at 155 (partially overruling State v. Moore 706 P.2d 311 (Alaska
1985)).
968. See id. at 156.
969. 938 P.2d 1050 (Alaska 1997).
970. See id. at 1054.
971. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.041(e) (Michie 1996).
972. See Morgan, 938 P.2d at 1055.
973. See id.
974. See id.
975. 948 P.2d 454 (Alaska 1997).
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was medically stable as of a certain date such that he was not enti-
tled to receive temporary total disability payments.976  Because
Grove’s physician failed to submit a treatment plan to the Work-
ers’ Compensation Board, Grove’s employer, Alaska Construction
and Erectors (“ACE”), was not required to compensate Grove for
treatment above and beyond the frequency standard as defined by
Alaska Administrative Code 45.082(f).977  The supreme court also
concluded that ACE’s original decision to controvert Grove’s in-
jury claim was not relevant to the issue of whether the frequency
standards should apply.978  Affirming the Board’s determination,
the court concluded that various reports submitted by Grove’s
physician regarding treatment did not meet the definition of a
treatment plan as required by Alaska Statutes section
23.30.095(c).979  Grove argued that the Board erred in denying him
temporary total disability benefits for a time period in which he
claimed that he was unable to work, even though his doctor had
released him.980  Rejecting Grove’s argument, the supreme court
concluded that the Board’s reliance on the testimony and reports
of Grove’s own doctor regarding whether Grove could work dur-
ing the relevant time period was proper.981  The supreme court also
upheld the Board’s finding that Grove was medically stable as of
April 1993 and thus was entitled to no further temporary total dis-
ability benefits.982
B. Grievance Claims
In Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n v. Munici-
pality of Anchorage,983 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
Employee Relations Board (“ERB”) and the trial court were
authorized and required to determine whether a filed grievance
was subject to mandatory arbitration.984  The Anchorage Police
Department Employees Association (“APDEA”)  filed a griev-
ance pursuant to Article V, section 2(N) of the collective bargain-
ing agreement (“CBA”) between APDEA and the Municipality of
976. See id. at 459-60.
977. See id. at 457; ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 45.082(g) (1996) (requiring
employer to pay for treatments exceeding treatment standards in (f) only if a writ-
ten treatment plan was submitted to the employer).
978. See Grove, 948 P.2d at 457.
979. See id. at 458; ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.095(c) (Michie 1996).
980. See Grove, 948 P.2d at 458.
981. See id. at 458-59.
982. See id. at 459.
983. 938 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1997).
984. See id. at 1029.
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Anchorage.985  The grievance challenged the Municipality’s imple-
mentation of a transfer policy whereby “warrants section person-
nel were to be transferred to patrol on a rotational basis.”986  Arti-
cle V, section 2(N) of the CBA provided, in part, that “‘[i]f the
Department implements a change in a current policy or procedure
over which the Employer has a mandatory obligation to bargain
. . . the designated Association Representative may grieve such
change.’”987  Thus, the issue of arbitrability, the court concluded,
depended on whether officer assignments were a mandatory sub-
ject for bargaining.988  The court found that Article IV, Section 14
of the CBA was the only provision that discussed officer assign-
ments and transfers.989  This section stated that “‘an employee may
be involuntarily transferred for non-disciplinary reasons to a dif-
ferent job assignment within a division . . . (1) based upon the
needs of the Department’” and “‘[a]ny involuntary transfer shall
be subject to review under the grievance and arbitration provisions
of the contract.’”990  Because APDEA did not invoke any argument
based on Article IV, section 14, the court determined that the
transfer policy did not constitute a mandatory subject for bargain-
ing.991
In State v. Beard,992 the supreme court held that where an em-
ployee alleges an ongoing pattern of harassment resulting in resig-
nation, the employee must first attempt to grieve the involuntary
termination, even if the union had previously been unresponsive to
the employee’s complaints.993  Beard resigned from the Depart-
ment of Transportation (“DOT”) after having filed five separate
grievances through his union representative.994  After resigning,
Beard brought suit against the state and his supervisors alleging
constructive discharge and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.995  The supreme court held that Beard was not excused for
failing to exhaust his administrative remedies because Beard’s
claim could never be grieved by the union due to Beard’s failure to
grieve his departure.996  The court further held on the same grounds
that the unexcused failure to exhaust administrative remedies also
985. See id.
986. Id. at 1028.
987. Id.
988. See id.
989. See id. at 1029.
990. Id.
991. See id.
992. 948 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1997).
993. See id. at 1382.
994. See id. at 1377-78.
995. See id. at 1377.
996. See id. at 1382.
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applied to Beard’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress against the individual named defendants.997
In Brogdon v. City of Klawock,998 the supreme court held that
a decision of a grievance committee not appealed by either party
was dispositive of the grievance.999  Brogdon filed a grievance in re-
sponse to being dismissed as Officer-in-Charge with the Klawock
Public Safety Department for alleged criminal behavior.1000  The
city grievance committee recommended that an investigation be
conducted by the Alaska State Troopers and if Brogdon was found
not guilty of criminal behavior, he would be reinstated, but if
found guilty, the termination would stand.1001  Although the trooper
investigation found no evidence of criminal misconduct, the city
refused to honor Brogdon’s request for reinstatement.1002
The supreme court held that the decision of the city grievance
committee and the findings of the state trooper were “sufficiently
clear” and thus “capable of being enforced.” 1003  Therefore, under
the committee decision, Brodgon should have been reinstated.1004
The court also held that evidence acquired after the investigation
concluded could be admitted to support supplemental justifications
for termination but found that after-the-fact evidence should be
viewed with skepticism.1005  The court noted that admission is justi-
fied because an employer should not be required to reinstate an
employee when the employer later discovers grave misconduct that
the employee might have been able to conceal had the employee
not been terminated.1006
C.  Miscellaneous
In Ramsey v. City of Sand Point,1007 the Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed a summary judgment ruling against a former police
chief’s claim of wrongful termination.1008  When Ramsey was hired
as police chief by the City of Sand Point, he negotiated for an addi-
tional clause in his contract that authorized the city to terminate
997. See id. at 1384.
998. 930 P.2d 989 (Alaska 1997).
999. See id. at 991.
1000. See id. at 989.
1001. See id. at 990.
1002. See id.
1003. Id.
1004. See id. at 991
1005. See id. at 992.
1006. See id.
1007. 936 P.2d 126 (Alaska 1997).
1008. See id. at 135.
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him without cause, in exchange for six months’ severance pay.1009
The court held that this clause nullified the effect of the municipal
ordinance that permitted the removal of the police chief only for
“just cause.”1010  The city was still required to give the chief thirty
days written notice if he was to be terminated for cause.1011
The court held that the addition of the removal clause by
Ramsey in exchange for six months’ pay effectively waived the
protection afforded him by Sand Point Municipal Ordinance
03.70.020 because the statute was not enacted for the protection of
the public generally, and therefore was waivable.1012  The city
awarded Ramsey seven months’ pay in order to remove the preju-
dice resulting from the lack of a thirty day notice and to ensure
that Ramsey’s property and liberty interests were unaffected.1013
Ramsey’s claim of lack of good faith was also dismissed because
“[t]he covenant of good faith cannot be interpreted to prohibit
what is expressly permitted by Ramsey’s contract with the City.”1014
In Stalnaker v. M.L.D.,1015 the supreme court held that the
Public Employees’ Retirement Board (“PERB”) and the trial
court erred by focusing on the proposed reasons for a termination,
instead of the cause of such termination.1016  The court concluded
that the termination of M.L.D. as police chief by the City of King
Cove was “because of  a . . . disability” as it is defined in Alaska
Statutes sections 39.35.410(a) and 39.35.400(a).1017  M.L.D. was di-
agnosed with major depression and suicidal ideation and was hos-
pitalized six days before he was fired.1018  Because he was termi-
nated as a result of unauthorized absences from work due to his
hospitalization, the court concluded that M.L.D. was terminated
because of his disability.1019  The court rejected the City’s argument,
similar to discrimination cases, that the employer’s motive should
1009. See id. at 128.
1010. See id.
1011. See id.
1012. See id. at 130-31.
1013. See id. at 131-32.
1014. See id. at 133.
1015. 939 P.2d 407 (Alaska 1997).
1016. See id. at 411-12.
1017. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.410(a) (Michie 1996) (providing, in part,
that “[a]n employee is eligible for occupational disability benefit if employment is
terminated because of a . . . permanent occupational disability . . . before the em-
ployee’s normal retirement”); ALASKA STAT. § 39.35.400(a) (providing, in part,
that “[a]n employee is eligible for nonoccupational disability benefit if . . . em-
ployment is terminated because of a . . . permanent nonoccupational disability . . .
before the employee’s normal retirement”).
1018. See M.L.D., 939 P.2d at 412.
1019. See id.
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be the focus of the PERB’s inquiry, because that would be incon-
sistent with the goal of the Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“PERS”).1020  The court concluded that PERS was designed to
compensate individuals no longer able to perform their jobs, not to
prevent employers from firing individuals because of their disabil-
ity.1021  Because motive was not the focus of the inquiry, the fact
that the City was not aware of M.L.D.’s hospitalization at the time
they terminated him was irrelevant.1022  Although the court held
that the evidence was sufficient to show that M.L.D. was termi-
nated because of his disability, the case was remanded to deter-
mine whether the disability was occupational or non-
occupational.1023
In Lowery v. McMurdie,1024 the supreme court held it was er-
roneous to offset the amount of money a claim worker owed his
employer by wages owed by the employer to a crew member.1025
McMurdie hired Lowery to work a gold claim, and Lowery, pursu-
ant to that authority, hired DeBerry and others as a crew.1026  After
relations soured, McMurdie secured an injunction to keep Lowery
and the others off the claim, and the superior court determined
that seventy-six ounces of gold were unaccounted for by Lowery,
valued at $26,000.1027  The court entered judgment against Lowery
for $12,027, the value of the gold offset by unpaid wages due Low-
ery and DeBerry, out-of-pocket expenses paid for by Lowery, and
equipment rented by Lowery.1028  Lowery and DeBerry appealed,
claiming the superior court erred in failing to award them a statu-
tory penalty for unpaid wages, and DeBerry further claimed the
court erred in failing to award him unpaid wages against McMur-
die.1029
The supreme court reviewed Alaska Statutes section
23.05.140(d),1030 which provides for statutory penalties for unpaid
wages.1031  The court determined that the statutory penalties were
not intended to be mandatory,1032 but based on the superior court’s
1020. See id at 413.
1021. See id.
1022. See id. at 412-13.
1023. See id. at 413.
1024. 944 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1997).
1025. See id. at 53.
1026. See id. at 51.
1027. See id.
1028. See id.
1029. See id.
1030. ALASKA STAT. § 23.05.140(d) (Michie 1996).
1031. See Lowery, 944 P.2d at 52.
1032. See id.; see also Klondike Indus. Corp. v. Gibson, 741 P.2d 1161, 1171
(Alaska 1987) (any penalty awarded under Alaska Statutes section 23.05.140(d)
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“unarticulated understanding of the ‘facts or circumstances of this
case,’” the supreme court did not have any findings to determine if
the superior court’s decision not to award penalties was an abuse
of discretion, and so remanded for this determination.1033  The su-
preme court held that McMurdie was ultimately responsible for
DeBerry’s unpaid wages, and that the judgment against Lowery
should not have been offset by that amount.1034
In Alaska Housing Finance Corp. v. Salvucci,1035 the supreme
court held that the Alaska Whistleblower Act1036 could be applied
to the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (“AHFC”) but AFHC
could not be held responsible for punitive damages.1037  After being
fired from AHFC without any explanation, Salvucci was denied
both a grievance hearing and an appeal of the decision.1038  Salvucci
filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and viola-
tion of the Whistleblower Act.1039  The supreme court upheld the
jury’s verdict that AHFC committed a breach of contract, because
Salvucci reasonably believed personnel rules, which stated he
would be given a reason for termination and would be afforded the
protections of progressive disciplinary procedures, applied to
him.1040  The court also held that AHFC was covered under the
Whistleblower Act as a “public body.”1041  AHFC contended that
“a written report to an employer and a report protected under the
Alaska Whistleblower Act are two distinct reports, with distinct
legal consequences.”1042  However, the court determined that such
an interpretation would shield the employer by providing the em-
ployee no protection from the separate report.1043  The court de-
clined to award punitive damages, however, noting that the Act did
not expressly authorize punitive damages against the state, and the
legislative history reflected an intent that punitive damages would
be available only against individual, not government, defen-
dants.1044
In Quinn v. Alaska State Employees Ass’n/American Federa-
                                                                                                                                
was within the discretion of the trial court).
1033. Lowery, 944 P.2d at 52.
1034. See id. at 53.
1035. 950 P.2d 1116 (Alaska 1997).
1036. ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.90.100-.150 (Michie 1996).
1037. See Salvucci, 950 P.2d at 1122, 1126.
1038. See id. at 1118-19.
1039. See id. at 1119.
1040. See id. at 1120-21.
1041. See id. at 1122.
1042. Id.
1043. See id.
1044. See id. at 1126.
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tion of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 52,1045 the
supreme court allowed an employee to seek unpaid overtime from
his employer under Alaska Statutes section 23.05.140(b)1046 or un-
der a breach of contract theory even if the statute of limitations
under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (“AWHA”)1047 had
passed.1048  Quinn had sued his employer, the Alaska State Em-
ployees Association, for unpaid overtime and penalties under
Alaska Statutes section 23.05.140(b) and AWHA.1049  The court ini-
tially determined that the three-year statute of limitations in the
Fair Labor Standards Act1050 did not conflict with AWHA’s two-
year limitation because the statutes apply to different causes of ac-
tion and therefore “are not in tension with one another.”1051  The
court then held that Quinn’s section 23.05.140(b) claim offered a
form of relief because he filed for unpaid overtime within the req-
uisite two years and three days after his termination.1052  However,
his section 23.05.140(b) claim did not revive that part of his
AWHA claim “forever barred” by section 23.10.130.1053  Finally,
the court held that Quinn could use the six-year statute of limita-
tions for contracts under Alaska Statutes section 09.10.050(1) be-
cause he alleged a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.1054
The court noted that unpaid liquidated damages under AWHA
were still barred by that Act’s specific statute of limitations.1055
In Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc.,1056 the supreme
court held that great deference should be applied in reviewing an
arbitrator’s decision and enforcing an arbitration ruling.1057  Ebasco
challenged the award, based, in part, on a denial of its motion to
postpone the arbitration hearing.1058  The court under Alaska Stat-
utes section 09.43.120(a)(3)1059 applied an extremely deferential re-
view of the arbitrator’s decision and upheld the ruling.1060  The
court was also called upon to enforce a pre-award and post-award
1045. 944 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1997).
1046. ALASKA STAT. § 23.05.140(b) (Michie 1996).
1047. Id. §§ 23.10.050-.150.
1048. See Quinn, 944 P.2d at 473.
1049. See id. at 470.
1050. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
1051. Quinn, 944 P.2d at 471.
1052. See id. at 472.
1053. See id.
1054. See id. at 472-73.
1055. See id. at 472.
1056. 932 P.2d 1312 (Alaska 1997).
1057. See id. at 1313.
1058. See id. at 1314.
1059. ALASKA STAT. § 09.43.120(a)(3) (Michie 1996).
1060. See Ebasco Constructors, 932 P.2d at 1315-17.
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interest judgment against Ebasco.1061  The court declined to involve
itself with the pre-award interest because it “would be inconsistent
with the policy of allowing the arbitrator to determine all arbitra-
ble aspects of a dispute,” but affirmed the superior court’s award
of interest after the arbitration award because determining interest
from the date of the award “will not enmesh the court in the com-
plications which the award of pre-award interest may entail.”1062
In Bouse v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co.,1063 the supreme
court determined that the “final determination” provision of
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.1551064 applies to a determination
made by the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, but not to de-
cisions made by courts on appeal.1065  The court construed the stat-
ute based on the principle that each part should be “‘construed in
connection with every other so as to produce a harmonious
whole.’”1066  Since every other section of the statute referred exclu-
sively to actions before the Board, and nothing in the legislative
history regarding final determinations referred to anything other
than those made by the Board, the court held that section
23.30.155 does “not control the award of attorney’s fees incurred in
proceedings before the superior court or this court.”1067
In Patterson v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
959,1068 a duty of fair representation case, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the thirty-day period for removal from state to
federal court did not begin to run until the employee had obtained
relief from automatic stay in the union’s bankruptcy proceed-
ings.1069  Patterson, an employee of Matanuska Maid Dairy, filed a
suit against his union, Local 959, alleging a breach of its duty of fair
representation in state court.1070  Patterson’s state court action was
stayed as a result of the union’s involvement in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.1071  The circuit court rejected Patterson’s argument that
the union’s notice of removal was untimely, reasoning that the no-
1061. See id. at 1317-18.
1062. Id. at 1318.
1063. 932 P.2d 222 (Alaska 1997).
1064. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.155 (Michie 1996).  The statute provides, in part,
that when a “final determination of liability is made, any reimbursement required
. . . and all costs and attorneys’ fees incurred by the prevailing employer, shall be
made within 14 days of the determination.”  Id. § 23.30.155(d).
1065. See Bouse, 932 P.2d at 228.
1066. Id. at 277 (quoting Keane v. Local Boundary Comm’n, 893 P.2d 1239,
1247 (Alaska 1995)).
1067. Id. at 228.
1068. 121 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1997).
1069. See id. at 1349.
1070. See id. at 1348.
1071. See id.
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tice was filed within thirty days of the date that Patterson obtained
relief from the automatic stay.1072  The court affirmed summary
judgment of Patterson’s duty of fair representation claim, stating
that the court may not second guess a union’s reasonable decision
not to pursue a potential defense in arbitration proceedings.1073
In Knight v. Kenai Peninsula Borough School District,1074 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that letters sent by two
unions to nonunion members requesting that they pay a represen-
tation or agency fee for collective bargaining benefits were defi-
cient because the letters did not provide a reasonable explanation
of the basis for the fee as required by Chicago Teachers Union v.
Hudson.1075  The court also concluded that the nonmembers were
not provided with sufficient information regarding the union’s ex-
penditures to be able to determine whether they should object to
the union’s charges.1076  The court held that nonmembers are not
required to exhaust union remedies before challenging union
charges in federal court.1077  Reversing the decision of the district
court, the Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate time for a union
to review the sufficiency of their Hudson notice was at the time of
mailing and not at the time the union seeks to take action against a
nonmember for failure to pay the agency fee.1078
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Child Custody
In O.R. v. State,1079 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the
termination of parental rights on the basis of abandonment.1080  The
baby had been hospitalized after her birth because she tested posi-
tive for cocaine and her parents had visited her only a few times
over the next year.1081  The court applied the two-prong test for
physical abandonment, finding “‘(1) that the parent’s conduct im-
plied a conscious disregard for parental obligations and (2) that the
parent’s conscious disregard led to the destruction of the relation-
ship between the parent and the parent’s children.’”1082  In this case,
1072. See id. at 1349.
1073. See id. at 1349-50.
1074. 131 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1997).
1075. See id. at 812-15; Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
1076. See Knight, 131 F.3d at 813-15.
1077. See id. at 816.
1078. See id at 817.
1079. 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997).
1080. See id. at 1312.
1081. See id. at 1306-07.
1082. Id. at 1307-08 (quoting A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 820 (Alaska 1995)).
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the court found first that the parents’ repeated failure to visit the
child reflected a “conscious disregard for their parental obliga-
tions,”1083 and second, that the lack of attachment or bond between
the child and the parents demonstrated that the parents’ conduct
had destroyed the parent-child relationship.1084  The supreme court
also found that the harmful conduct of the mother was likely to
continue if her parental rights were not terminated because of her
repeated substance abuse problems and failure to seek treat-
ment.1085
Despite these rulings, the court remanded the issue for the
trial court to consider whether the child had a relative willing to
care for her.1086  Although the Department of Health and Social
Services argued a finding of physical abandonment was a suffi-
ciently independent basis to apply the Child In Need of Aid stat-
ute,1087 the court interpreted that section to mean that physical
abandonment was one example of the failure or lack of willingness
to provide care that was the focus of the statute.1088  The record was
insufficient to indicate whether the court adequately considered
the possibility that the child had relatives willing to care for her.1089
In A.M. v. State,1090 the supreme court upheld the termination
of parental rights on the ground of inability to care for the chil-
dren.1091 The court revisited a prior decision,1092 which had been par-
tially overruled, in which the court terminated the parental rights
on the ground of abandonment.1093  The supreme court held that
the trial court was not foreclosed from considering alternative
grounds from those specified by the supreme court, so long as
those alternative grounds were not inconsistent with the supreme
court’s mandate.1094  The court affirmed the superior court’s finding
that the children qualified as children in need of aid on alternative
grounds as specified in Alaska Statutes sections 47.10.010(a)(3),
(4), and (5).1095  The supreme court rejected A.M.’s argument that
he was denied due process because he did not receive notice that
1083. Id. at 1308.
1084. See id. at 1309.
1085. See id. at 1311-12.
1086. See id. at 1311.
1087. See id. at 1309; see also ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(2) (Michie 1996).
1088. See O.R., 932 P.2d at 1309.
1089. See id. at 1311.
1090. 945 P.2d 296 (Alaska 1997).
1091. See id. at 299.
1092. See A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815 (Alaska 1995).
1093. See id.
1094. See A.M., 945 P.2d at 301.
1095. See id. at 301-02; ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(3)-(5) (Michie 1996).
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these subsections would be litigated.1096  Alternatively, the court
found that he had ample notice because those grounds were al-
leged in the state’s petition and were addressed in evidence at the
original trial.1097  The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s
findings of fact, having already explicitly stated in the first A.M.
opinion that the record supported the findings that A.M. had
“‘consciously disregarded his parental obligations’”1098 and his his-
tory of substance and physical abuse.1099  Finally, the court deter-
mined that A.M.’s failure to complete remedial programs provided
under the Indian Child Welfare Act1100 did not prevent the state
from satisfying its duty to make remedial efforts.1101
In R.J.M. v. State,1102 the supreme court held that parental
rights could not be terminated based upon a showing of emotional
neglect because Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(6)1103 requires
“substantial physical neglect or abuse.”1104  After studying the stat-
ute’s language and legislative intent, the court decided that the
word “or” meant that parental rights could be terminated only
upon “physical neglect” or “physical abuse” under the statute.1105
However, the court did remand the case for consideration under
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.010(a)(2)(A) because the court was
not bound to accept the parent’s stated willingness to care for their
children when their actions showed a continual neglect of their
children and a resistance to remedial efforts designed to help
them.1106  The court held that a “parent’s stated willingness is not
dispositive” in determining if parental rights should cease when
“both parents had consistently failed to provide for the emotional,
mental, and social needs of their children.”1107
In Conger v. Conger,1108 the supreme court held that it was ex-
cusable neglect for a mother to miscalculate the expiration date of
an extension of time to file a motion to appeal a custody.1109  Cherry
and Terry Conger had agreed to permit Cherry to have a fifteen-
day extension to file her opposition to Terry’s motion to modify
1096. See A.M., 945 P.2d at 302.
1097. See id.
1098. Id. at 303 (quoting A.M. v. State, 891 P.2d 815, 820 (Alaska 1995)).
1099. See id.
1100. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
1101. See A.M., 945 P.2d at 304.
1102. 946 P.2d 855 (Alaska 1997).
1103. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.010(a)(6) (Michie 1996).
1104. R.J.M., 946 P.2d at 857.
1105. See id. at 862-67.
1106. See id. at 869.
1107. Id. at 868 (citing O.R. v. State, 932 P.2d 1303 (Alaska 1997)).
1108. 950 P.2d 119 (Alaska 1997).
1109. See id. at 122.
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custody.1110  Because Cherry’s counsel wrongly assumed that the fif-
teen-day extension did not begin until the day the extension order
was stamped and filed, Cherry filed her motion nine days late.1111
The supreme court, however, concluded that the trial court abused
its discretion by refusing to grant Cherry’s Rule 60(b) motion to
set aside the order modifying custody because Cherry was an out-
of-state party who promptly retained counsel in Fairbanks and
who otherwise participated promptly in the proceedings.1112  The
supreme court noted that “[r]esolution of a custody dispute should
not reach its final conclusion in a manner that effectively precludes
one party from presenting his or her case.”1113
In Hernandez v. Freeman,1114 the supreme court held that the
trial court abused its discretion by granting a motion to modify a
child custody order without first conducting a hearing.1115  The
court concluded that by refusing either to grant Hernandez a con-
tinuance when he requested additional time to find an attorney or
to inform him of the deadline for filing an opposing motion, the
trial court essentially deprived Hernandez of his right to contest
fully the motion to modify child custody.1116
In Duffus v. Duffus,1117 the supreme court held that the fact
that the mother’s boyfriend was a past sex offender did not entitle
the father to a post-divorce custody modification for his two
daughters.1118  The court considered all the criteria under Alaska
Statutes section 25.24.150(c),1119 and made complete findings hold-
ing that the sex offender boyfriend was not a “threat to the chil-
dren’s physical or emotional well-being.”1120
In Nelson v. Jones,1121 the supreme court determined that the
trial court had not constructively terminated parental rights by de-
nying visitation rights when the parent failed to comply with the
trial court’s conditions for visitation.1122  During Paul Nelson’s di-
vorce from Loretto Jones, the parties stipulated that Nelson had
sexually abused their daughter during the marriage.1123  Conse-
1110. See id. at 120.
1111. See id. at 121.
1112. See id. at 122; see also ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b).
1113. Conger, 950 P.2d at 122.
1114. 938 P.2d 1017 (Alaska 1997).
1115. See id. at 1018.
1116. See id.
1117. 932 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1997).
1118. See id. at 780.
1119. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (Michie 1996).
1120. See Duffus, 932 P.2d at 780.
1121. 944 P.2d 476 (Alaska 1997).
1122. See id. at 480.
1123. See id. at 478.
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quently, the trial court ruled that Nelson could have only super-
vised visitation conditioned upon his participation in a sex-
offender treatment program.1124  Nelson’s doctor terminated his
treatment when Nelson failed to admit he had committed abuse,
and Nelson violated court orders by “initiating or encouraging
physical contact” between himself and his daughter.1125  The trial
court terminated Nelson’s visiting rights and Nelson appealed,
charging the “cumulative effect of the superior court’s orders is a
termination of his parental rights.”1126
The supreme court affirmed the lower court decision, ruling
that although conditioning Nelson’s visitation on his admitting the
abuse was quite severe, the court did not abuse its discretion.1127
Nelson was not allowed to raise the issue of visitation conditioned
on participation in a sex-offender treatment program, as that issue
had already been litigated in an earlier appeal.1128  Additionally,
Nelson was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, as there were no
facts in dispute with regard to the child’s desire to see Nelson, and
no factual issues that could be fully explored in a hearing.1129  Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the superior court specifically con-
sidered the child’s best interests in deciding the case, and commit-
ted no error.1130
In B.J. v. J.D.,1131 the supreme court held that a court may
award physical custody to a person who is not the child’s biological
parent out of concern for the welfare of the child.1132  J.D. sued B.J.
for custody of V.J., B.J.’s daughter.1133  J.D. and B.J. had had an in-
timate relationship and lived together periodically from 1986 to
1993.1134  Although V.J. was born in 1989, J.D. was not her biologi-
cal father.1135  Prior to the lawsuit, V.J. had been living with her
mother in Hawaii, but had recently been sent by her mother to
Fairbanks to live indefinitely with J.D.1136  The court ruled that ju-
risdiction in this case was proper under the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act1137 because neither Alaska nor Hawaii was V.J.’s
1124. See id.
1125. Id.
1126. Id.
1127. See id. at 480.
1128. See id. at 479.
1129. See id. at 480.
1130. See id. at 481.
1131. 950 P.2d 113 (Alaska 1997).
1132. See id. at 118.
1133. See id. at 114.
1134. See id.
1135. See id.
1136. See id.
1137. ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020(a) (Michie 1996).
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home state at the time of filing, and it was in the best interests of
the child for Alaska to resolve the custody dispute.1138  The court
then affirmed the findings of the superior court that J.D. should be
awarded custody of V.J., despite not being her natural parent, be-
cause V.J.’s “welfare would be in jeopardy if the mother [had] cus-
tody,” due to evidence that sexual abuse had occurred while in
B.J.’s custody and the “awkward, unnatural, and unaffectionate”
relationship between V.J. and B.J.1139  The court of appeals held
that its decision was consistent with the holding in Turner v. Pan-
nick1140 that the award of custody to a natural parent should be re-
fused “‘when the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent
receive custody.’”1141
B. Child Support
In Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion v. Campbell,1142 the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that volun-
tary purchases of clothing for children by a non-custodial parent
could not be applied as credit for delinquent child support pay-
ments.1143  Relying on Young v. Williams,1144 the court concluded
that the general rule states that direct payments by a non-custodial
parent to children may not be credited against a child support obli-
gation.1145  Allowing credit for such a payment would condone uni-
lateral modification of child support orders and interfere with the
rights of the custodial parent.1146  Although Campbell, the non-
custodial parent, presented a strong argument that the father was
wasting the money she provided and was not buying the children
the clothing they needed, the court held that her possible remedy
for the father’s transgressions consisted of a motion to modify the
allowable form of payment or a motion to change custody.1147
However, the noncustodial parent cannot be allowed to make deci-
sions that are by law entrusted to the custodial parent.1148
1138. See B.J., 950 P.2d at 116.
1139. Id. at 117.
1140. 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975).
1141. B.J., 950 P.2d at 117 (quoting Turner, 540 P.2d at 1055).  The complete
holding of Turner stated that custody to a natural parent should be refused only
where the biological parent is unfit, the biological parent has abandoned the
child, or the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive custody.
1142. 931 P.2d 416 (Alaska 1997).
1143. See id. at 420.
1144. 583 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1978).
1145. See Campbell,  931 P.2d at 419.
1146. See id. at 419-20.
1147. See id.
1148. See id.
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In Vokacek v. Vokacek,1149 the supreme court credited $5,000
toward a husband’s delinquent child support because he trans-
ferred ownership of a homesite entry permit to his ex-wife.1150  The
court determined that both the inclusion of language regarding
“child support arrearages” in the stipulation awarding the property
to the ex-wife and the fact that the stipulation was prepared by the
ex-wife’s attorneys were “highly suggestive” that the property
award was meant to reduce the child support due to the ex-wife
from the husband.1151  Although the husband’s interest in the land
expired before the stipulation,1152 it was still credited based on
“extrinsic evidence regarding the parties’ intent and their reason-
able expectations at the time the stipulation was entered.”1153
In Bunn v. House,1154 the supreme court held that only a
“material change in circumstances” could warrant a modification
of a child support award, and that changing the method of calcu-
lating support is not such a change.1155  House had proposed a new
method for collecting child support from Bunn that would increase
payments by 151%.1156  Two judges had previously considered
Bunn’s child support payments, and had reduced Bunn’s monthly
obligation to House from $675.90 to $154.00 a month.1157 House’s
new proposal was thus accepted by the trial court because Bunn’s
payments had been so dramatically reduced, and  “the ‘15[%]
threshold requirement for the court to presume a material change
of circumstances’ under Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1)” was met.1158  The su-
preme court decided, however, that changing the collection for-
mula to calculate a greater than 15% difference did not trigger a
presumption of a “material change of circumstance.”1159  A change
in legal theory or, as in this case, a change in a child support cal-
culation method is not a material change in circumstances that will
warrant a change in child support.1160
In Aga v. Aga, 1161 the supreme court held that the trial court
erred in refusing to modify a husband’s child support obligation,
even though the husband had agreed to pay more in the settlement
1149. 933 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1997).
1150. See id. at  546-47.
1151. Id. at 547.
1152. See id. at 545.
1153. Id. at 547.
1154. 934 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1997).
1155. See id. at 758-59.
1156. See id. at 754.
1157. See id.
1158. Id. (quoting ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(h)(1)).
1159. Id. at 757.
1160. See id. at 758.
1161. 941 P.2d 1260 (Alaska 1997).
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agreement and had received a greater property value in the prop-
erty division.1162  In 1990, the superior court entered a divorce de-
cree incorporating a separation agreement in which August Aga,
the father, agreed to pay $945 per month in child support.1163
August later moved to modify the child support obligation, arguing
that it represented from 47% to 104% of his income from 1991 to
1994.1164  The trial court had calculated August’s obligation on the
basis of his 1989 salary, which was unusually high.1165  The trial
court denied August’s motion, noting that August had received
“$36,300 more in net value as a result of the property division and
debt allocation,” and that this benefit was sufficient consideration
for the unusually high child support obligation in the separation
agreement.1166  The supreme court noted that under Alaska Stat-
utes section 25.24.1701167 and Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1),1168 modifications
may be made in child support obligations if there is more or less
than a 15% change in financial circumstances from the original or-
der, even if the child support obligation is based not on income,
but on an agreement signed by the parties.1169  The court further
held that the trial court could not base its decision on an unequal
property division, as “property division has no relevancy to child
support modification issues.”1170
In Acevedo v. Burley,1171 the supreme court held that a father
was not entitled to modification of his child support obligation
when he had stipulated to an appropriate amount given the range
of his income and failed to demonstrate a material change from
that stipulation.1172  Acevedo was a self-employed taxi driver, who
agreed to a stipulation that his annual net income was between
$10,000 and $20,000 during his divorce for purposes of determining
his child support payments.1173  After the divorce, he regularly fell
behind in payments, and his arrearage exceeded $7,000.1174
Acevedo attempted to modify his obligation, asserting that he had
experienced a “significant and material change in circumstances”
1162. See id. at 1260.
1163. See id.
1164. See id.
1165. See id.
1166. Id. at 1261.
1167. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170 (Michie 1996).
1168. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(h)(1).
1169. See Aga, 941 P.2d.at 1261-62 (citing Dewey v. Dewey, 886 P.2d 623
(Alaska 1994)).
1170. Id.
1171. 944 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997).
1172. See id. at 476.
1173. See id. at 474.
1174. See id. at 475.
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in that his income had fallen by at least 15%, and that his income
was below the Federal Poverty Level Guidelines.1175  The court de-
termined that the facts and circumstances which formed the basis
of the stipulation had not substantially changed.1176  Acevedo’s re-
ported income did not appear to have changed since he signed the
stipulation, and although his income at that time appeared too low
to support his current payments, he did not argue that the stipula-
tion was based on an erroneous assessment of his income.1177
Therefore, he was not entitled to a modification.1178
In Crayton v. Crayton,1179 the supreme court established that
despite the absence of a child support order, a mother had a statu-
tory and common law duty to provide child support while custody
was being transferred to the father.1180  During divorce proceedings,
the court appointed a guardian ad litem (“GAL”), but both parties
agreed the children would move to Kansas City, Kansas, with their
mother, Shannon Riordan.1181  Less than a month after moving, the
GAL recommended and the court ordered that the children be re-
turned to Anchorage to live with their father, Wayne Crayton.1182
The children returned to Kansas City about a year later.1183  Soon
after the children left to return to Kansas City, Crayton moved for
reimbursement of the expenditures he made while supporting the
children, and moved to offset his child support obligations by the
amount of reimbursement.1184
The supreme court relied on Mathews v. Mathews,1185 holding
that “[w]hether a support order exist[ed] or not, ‘[a] parent is obli-
gated both by statute and at common law to support his or her
children.’”1186  Riordan, as the noncustodial parent, was required to
help provide for her children, regardless of any defects in the sup-
port order.1187  The supreme court remanded the issue for calcula-
tion of Riordan’s obligation in accordance with Civil Rule 90.3.1188
The court also held that the superior court should take into ac-
count a gift received by Riordan from her father when calculating
1175. Id.
1176. See id. at 476.
1177. See id.
1178. See id.
1179. 944 P.2d 487 (Alaska 1997).
1180. See id. at 489.
1181. See id. at 488.
1182. See id. at 489.
1183. See id.
1184. See id.
1185. 739 P.2d 1298 (Alaska 1987).
1186. Crayton, 944 P.2d at 489 (quoting Mathews, 739 P.2d at 1299).
1187. See id.
1188. See id.; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3.
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her income,1189 even though under normal circumstances a one-time
gift would not be included in calculating a child support obliga-
tion.1190  However, because no future payments were at issue and
the superior court would determine Riordan’s income only “in ret-
rospect” for the period when the children lived with Crayton, it
was fair to determine reimbursement on the actual resources avail-
able to Riordan during that period.1191
In Byars v. Byars,1192 the supreme court held that the failure of
the mother to use registered mail to notify the father of their
child’s address was not a material breach of the agreement and
therefore did not relieve him of child support obligations.1193  De-
spite twice renegotiating the child support agreement, Lonnie
Byars again fell behind in his obligations in July 1989, and his for-
mer wife, Avril Ogilvie, moved to reduce the child support arrear-
ages to judgment.1194  Under the terms of the agreement, Ogilvie
was required to notify Byars via registered mail of the child’s ad-
dress and phone number by July 15, 1989 and July 15, 1990.1195
Byars contended that his obligations were excused by Ogilvie’s
failure to notify him pursuant to the agreement by July 15, 1989.1196
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Ogilvie’s
non-registered letter to Byars’s attorney dated July 10, 1989 consti-
tuted a good faith effort to satisfy the agreement and demon-
strated substantial compliance with the terms of the agreement.1197
The requirement that Ogilvie use registered mail was not a mate-
rial element of the agreement, as the primary purpose was to sat-
isfy her claim against Byars for past due child support.1198  In fact,
Byars had actual notice of his child’s location, and possessed her
phone number at the time the 1989 payment was due.1199  There-
fore, Byars’s failure to complete payment in 1989 was a breach of
the agreement, relieving Ogilvie of the obligation to send address
notification in 1990.1200
1189. See Crayton, 944 P.2d at 490.
1190. See Nass v. Seaton, 904 P.2d 412, 416 (Alaska 1995) (holding that trial
court should not consider gifts when “determining the level of the obligor’s ad-
justed gross income for purposes of calculating a child support obligation”).
1191. See Crayton, 944 P.2d at 490.
1192. 945 P.2d 792 (Alaska 1997).
1193. See id. at 794.
1194. See id. at 793.
1195. See id.
1196. See id.
1197. See id. at 794.
1198. See id.
1199. See id.
1200. See id.
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In Gallant v. Gallant,1201 the supreme court held that the supe-
rior court erred in reducing a child support obligation by 100%.1202
John Gallant and Shannon Weed were divorced in 1991, with three
children.1203  They agreed John would have custody of two children,
with Shannon’s sister taking custody of the oldest.1204  The parties
failed to resolve other issues, including child support.1205  After the
initial trial, John appealed, and the supreme court remanded the
case for further findings.1206  On remand, the superior court reduced
Weed’s child support obligation by 100%.1207
The supreme court determined this to be error.1208  The Alaska
Civil Rules provide for up to a 50% reduction in child support
payments during extended visits of more than twenty-seven days,
and further reductions only for good cause specified by the trial
court in writing.1209  The children visited Weed for longer than
twenty-seven days, but the superior court offered no explanation
for its reduction of her payment by 100%, and the supreme court
determined that those payments should have been reduced by only
50%.1210  Likewise, Weed’s payments made while one child was
being treated in a medical facility should not have been reduced by
100%, although her insurance covered the medical expenses.1211
Because a hospital stay would have less impact on Shannon than
actually paying for room and board while the children visited her,
she “should not ordinarily be entitled to a reduction of a full 50%
of her child support obligation,” and the superior court erred in
awarding such an amount.1212
In Flannery v. Flannery,1213 the supreme court held that it was
error for the lower court to use a three-year average to determine
income for a child support obligation when the obligor had re-
quested recalculation based on a material change in circum-
stances.1214  Michael Flannery sought modification based on a sub-
stantial decrease in his monthly income.1215  The court held that
1201. 945 P.2d 795 (Alaska 1997).
1202. See id. at 800.
1203. See id. at 797.
1204. See id. at 798.
1205. See id.
1206. See id.
1207. See id.
1208. See id. at 798-99.
1209. See ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90(a)(3), 90.3(c)(1), & commentary IV.B.
1210. See Gallant, 945 P.2d at 798.
1211. See id. at 799.
1212. Id.
1213. 950 P.2d 126 (Alaska 1997).
1214. See id. at 128.
1215. See id. at 132.
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because the parties used Civil Rule 90.31216 in constructing the
original child support agreement, Michael could invoke the Rule
to seek a change based on a claim of material change of circum-
stances.1217  Because Michael “promptly appl[ied] for a modifica-
tion of child support when [the] material change in circumstances
occur[red],” the superior court erred in not considering the date of
filing onward as the relevant period of changed circumstances.1218
In Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion ex rel. P.M. v. Mitchell,1219 the supreme court held that al-
though a putative father was entitled to reimbursement for child
support paid under a vacated default judgment of paternity, he was
not entitled to reimbursement for funds passed along to the
mother before judgment was entered and collections ended.1220  In
1987, Enoch Mitchell was named at birth as the father of Peter
Marks.1221  In November 1989, Mitchell and Peter’s mother signed
an Aid to Families with Dependent Children paternity statement
declaring Mitchell was not Peter’s father, but the document was
not received by the Alaska Child Support Enforcement Division
(“CSED”) until 1993.1222  In March 1990, CSED filed a complaint
requiring Mitchell to provide child support; Mitchell did not an-
swer or appear, and a default judgment was filed against him.1223  In
May 1994, the court granted Mitchell’s motion to recover all funds
collected from him pursuant to that judgment.1224  CSED appealed,
claiming that although it was not erroneous to set aside the default
judgment, the judgment was valid and CSED should not be re-
quired to reimburse Mitchell for any funds collected pursuant to a
valid court order.1225
The supreme court analyzed the case by deciding the question
of what should have happened after the default judgment was set
aside.1226  The court refused to address whether Mitchell had
waived any claim for reimbursement because this issue was not
properly raised in the lower court, was potentially dependent on
new and unresolved facts, was not closely related to CSED’s ar-
guments below, and could not have been gleaned from the pro-
1216. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3.
1217. See Flannery, 950 P.2d at 131.
1218. Id.
1219. 930 P.2d 1284 (Alaska 1997).
1220. See id. at 1285.
1221. See id. at 1286.
1222. See id.
1223. See id.
1224. See id. at 1286-87.
1225. See id. at 1287.
1226. See id.
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ceedings.1227  The court also held it was not plain error for the supe-
rior court to fail to raise the waiver issue sua sponte or to condition
vacation of the default judgment on relinquishment of the reim-
bursement claim.1228  The court required the state to return pro-
ceeds collected from the judgment because to retain them would
constitute unjust enrichment.1229  However, Mitchell was not enti-
tled to the return of funds that were passed along to Peter’s mother
because he could have raised the paternity issue when he was first
sued by CSED and prevented the state from disbursing those
amounts to Peter’s mother.1230
In Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion v. Wetherelt,1231 the supreme court refused to refund the child
support paid by a father before he conclusively established his non-
paternity.1232  Wetherelt was married to Victoria Lake at the time
of Roberta Wetherelt’s birth, which, in Alaska, established a pre-
sumption of paternity.1233  The marriage was dissolved in 1983, and
both parties indicated on the application for dissolution that there
were no minor children born of the marriage or adopted.1234  The
supreme court held that this dissolution decree was not a showing
of clear and convincing evidence required to disestablish pater-
nity.1235  Wetherelt did not conclusively disestablish his paternity
until 1994.1236  The supreme court reversed the lower court’s ruling
that the Child Support Enforcement Division (“CSED”) abused its
discretion by enforcing Wetherelt’s support obligations, finding
CSED did not have the statutory authority to disestablish pater-
nity.1237  CSED informed Wetherelt that only he could take the
steps to disestablish his paternity.1238  Finally, the court found
CSED was not unjustly enriched by retaining the child support
payments.1239  Wetherelt failed to establish two elements of the
unjust enrichment test, namely that the payments were “‘a benefit
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff . . . and acceptance
and retention by the defendant of such benefit under such circum-
stances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without
1227. See id. at 1288.
1228. See id. at 1288-89.
1229. See id. at 1289.
1230. See id. at 1290.
1231. 931 P.2d 383 (Alaska 1997).
1232. See id. at 391.
1233. See id. at 385.
1234. See id.
1235. See id. at 388.
1236. See id. at 383.
1237. See id. at 389.
1238. See id.
1239. See id. at 390.
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paying the value thereof.’”1240  The money collected by CSED was
reimbursement for payments already made to support a child for
which Wetherelt was legally responsible.1241
In Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Divi-
sion ex rel. Valdez v. Valdez,1242 the supreme court held that the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (“URESA”)1243
does not provide that court orders entered in another state will su-
persede child support orders entered as part of an original divorce
decree.1244  The Child Support Enforcement Division’s (“CSED”)
URESA petition in California for payment of child support in ar-
rears from Alfonso Valdez resulted in an order from the California
court requiring $250 per month for support and $25 toward ar-
rears.1245  An Alaska superior court subsequently held that the U.S.
Constitution’s full faith and credit clause required that Alfonso
Valdez not pay more than $250 in child support for the period after
the California court’s order made pursuant to URESA.1246  The su-
preme court reversed, using California law to conclude that
URESA allows for multiple support orders while leaving original
orders fully enforceable.1247  The supreme court also remanded on
the question of whether CSED could collect on arrears prior to
June 1, 1984.1248  It held that a ten-year statute of limitations and the
doctrine of laches do not apply to child support, but do allow Al-
fonso to argue that estoppel and waiver preclude CSED from col-
lecting more than $250 per month, an amount which CSED ac-
cepted as Alfonso’s legal monthly obligation.1249
In Pacana v. Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforce-
ment Division,1250 the supreme court held that it was reversible er-
ror for the superior court to deny credit against child support obli-
gations for Social Security benefits paid on a father’s behalf to his
children.1251  Pacana was ordered to pay a total of $750 in child sup-
port for his three children, effective May 4, 1987.1252  In 1990,
Pacana became disabled and was subsequently awarded Social Se-
1240. Id. (quoting Darling v. Standard Alaska Prod., 818 P.2d 677, 680 (Alaska
1991)).
1241. See id. at 390-91.
1242. 941 P.2d 144 (Alaska 1997).
1243. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.010-.270 (1996 & Supp. 1997).
1244. See Valdez, 941 P.2d at 149-50.
1245. See id. at 147-48.
1246. See id at 147.
1247. See id. at 149.
1248. See id. at 153-54.
1249. See id. at 152-53.
1250. 941 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1997).
1251. See id. at 1267.
1252. See id. at 1264.
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curity benefits which became his primary income.1253  Pacana did
not meet his child support obligations, and the Alaska Child Sup-
port Enforcement Division (“CSED”) garnished his disability
benefits.1254  Because of Pacana’s disability, his children became eli-
gible for and received Social Security children’s insurance benefits
(“CIB”) payments from 1991 to 1995.1255  In October 1995, CSED
sent Pacana notice that he was $57,374.39 in arrears for child sup-
port, but they did not credit the $26,544 his children had received
in CIB payments.1256  Pacana motioned in superior court to modify
the child support order and credit the CIB payments.1257  The supe-
rior court reduced Pacana’s ongoing child support by the amount
of the CIB benefits, but refused to credit the CIB payments toward
the amount that Pacana owed in arrears.1258  Deciding this as a case
of first impression,1259 the supreme court elected to follow the
“majority rule” that CIB payments could be credited against child
support arrearage.1260  The court acknowledged that Alaska Civil
Rule 90.3(h)(2)1261 prohibits the retroactive modification of a child
support arrearage, but interpreted this rule as only restricting
modification in the amount of the child support awarded, and not
in the correction of mistaken arrearage.1262  The court also noted
policy reasons for not insisting on additional support from a dis-
abled Social Security beneficiary who is less likely to be able to
meet child support obligations due to health and financial difficul-
ties.1263
In Flanigin v. Department of Revenue, Child Support En-
forcement Division,1264 the supreme court held that the Child Sup-
port Enforcement Division (“CSED”) has the general authority to
order the payment of support arrearages that have accrued prior to
the service of a “Notice and Finding of Financial Responsibility”
(“NFFR”), despite a contrary CSED policy interpretation.1265
Flanigin, who signed an “acknowledgment of paternity” in Norway
regarding Benjamin Egdetveit, argued that the CSED of Alaska
1253. See id.
1254. See id.
1255. See id.
1256. See id.
1257. See id.
1258. See id.
1259. See id.
1260. See id. at 1265-66.
1261. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(h)(2).
1262. See Pacana, 941 P.2d at 1266.
1263. See id. at 1266-67 (citing Weaks v. Weaks, 821 S.W.2d 503, 506-507 (Mo.
1991)).
1264. 946 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1997).
1265. See id. at 446.
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lacked authority to require him to pay child support arrearages for
the time period prior to the service of an NFFR when no support
order was in existence.1266  The supreme court concluded that
Alaska Statutes section 25.27.140(a),1267 which authorizes the ad-
ministrative establishment of child support orders, Alaska Statutes
section 25.27.160(a),1268 which describes how an administrative case
is initiated, Alaska Statutes section 25.27.900(3),1269 which defines
the term “duty of support,” and Alaska Statutes section
25.27.170(d),1270 which defines the issues that the hearing officer
shall decide in a formal hearing, all “plainly authorize[d] CSED to
enter orders establishing child support arrearages that . . . accrued
prior to service of an NFFR even though no prior support order
ha[d] been entered.”1271  The supreme court rejected Flanigin’s ar-
gument regarding a contradictory CSED policy because the policy
was not validly adopted and was not a reasonable interpretation of
the aforementioned statutes.1272
In Agen v. Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforce-
ment Division,1273 the supreme court held that a parent’s consent to
adoption did not abrogate responsibility for child support obliga-
tions.1274  Agen signed a consent releasing his rights as a parent, but
the state continued to provide child support assistance paid to the
child’s mother.1275  The court found that had it ruled otherwise,
“irresponsible non-custodial parents readily would sign such con-
sent forms, leaving custodial parents or the [s]tate with the burden
of supporting the children.”1276  The court noted that the parental
duty of support terminates only when the child is adopted and, as a
consequence of the adoption, another person assumes support ob-
ligations.1277
In Yerrington v. Yerrington,1278 the supreme court held that
Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1)1279 required modification of a divorced
mother’s child support payments after her income had dropped
1266. See id. at 448.
1267. ALASKA STAT. § 25.27.140(a) (Michie 1996).
1268. Id. § 25.27.160(a).
1269. Id. § 25.27.900(3).
1270. Id. § 25.27.170(d).
1271. Flanigin, 946 P.2d at 448.
1272. See id. at 450.
1273. 945 P.2d 1215 (Alaska 1997).
1274. See id. at 1218.
1275. See id. at 1216-17.
1276. Id. at 1218.
1277. See id.
1278. 933 P.2d 555 (Alaska 1997).
1279. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(h)(1).
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more than $36,000 in one year.1280  Civil Rule 90.3(h)(1) allows a
modification of a child support award if there has been a material
change in circumstances, and a material change is presumed when
support as calculated under the Rule varies “more than 15[%]
greater or less than the outstanding support order.”1281  The court
recommended that the mother’s child support order be based on
an “income-averaging approach” because her income fluctuated
based on the dividends she received from her Native corporation
stock.1282
C. Marital Property
In Cox v. Cox,1283 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the
value of a marital checking account should be determined at the
time of divorce and not separation.1284  The superior court had
awarded Vicki Cox the checking account, worth $2,555 at the time
of separation.1285  At the time of the divorce, however, the checking
account was empty, so the superior court instructed C.B. Cox to
pay $2,555 to Vicki.1286  The supreme court held that the appropri-
ate time to value the account was at the time of the divorce, not
the separation, and that the superior court should order reim-
bursement.1287  The supreme court then determined that the refi-
nancing proceeds of a house held separately by C.B. but trans-
ferred to the marital estate at the time of refinancing were not
marital property, and both the proceeds and anything purchased
with the proceeds should be considered as C.B.’s separate assets.1288
Third, the supreme court rejected C.B.’s argument that the trial
court failed to take into consideration the expenditure of marital
funds for nonmarital purposes.1289  The court recognized that the
division of assets did recognize such equitable factors as this but
did not find the need to deviate from a fifty-fifty distribution of
marital assets which the trial court had found fair.1290  Fourth, the
supreme court found that treating a $14,000 deduction from fair
value of a house as marital but $6,000 recovered from insurance as
C.B.’s separate property was inconsistent and ordered the $6,000
1280. See Yerrington, 933 P.2d at 556-57.
1281. Id. at 557.
1282. See id.
1283. 931 P.2d 1041 (Alaska 1997).
1284. See id. at 1043.
1285. See id. at 1042.
1286. See id.
1287. See id. at 1043.
1288. See id.
1289. See id. at 1044.
1290. See id.
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to be included among C.B.’s assets.1291  Finally, the supreme court
upheld the validity of requiring a cash settlement as opposed to
transference of title, but instructed the lower court on remand to
address the issues of whether equality could be achieved through
transfer of title and whether the payment could be made without
incurring hardship.1292
In Harrelson v. Harrelson,1293 the supreme court held that it is
permissible to consider marriage-like relationships when dividing
marital assets and before setting spousal support.1294  Barbara and
Kenneth (a.k.a. Larry) Harrelson were legally married for the last
thirty-four months of a twelve-year relationship.1295  They had been
presenting themselves as husband and wife for eight years, includ-
ing owning property together and filing joint tax returns.1296  Larry’s
annual income during much of that time was approximately nine
times that of Barbara’s.1297  The superior court determined that, due
to the unequal earning power of the two parties, Barbara was enti-
tled to a greater portion of the marital assets and an award of
spousal support.1298  The supreme court remanded this finding be-
cause the lower court made the division based on its clearly erro-
neous finding that the parties had been married for eight years.1299
Although Alaska law does not recognize common law marriage,1300
the superior court could consider the eight-year marriage-like rela-
tionship when making its division of assets.1301  The supreme court
also held Larry was entitled to a reduction in the spousal award
since Barbara was incurring no housing costs and the trial court
had partially justified its award with the calculation of such costs.1302
In Jones v. Jones,1303 the supreme court held that a trial court
may not punish a party to a divorce for illegal behavior such as
gambling by awarding that party a smaller share of marital assets
in a property division.1304  Johnie and Marian Jones were divorced
on June 30, 1995, after 32 years of marriage.1305  At trial, the only
1291. See id.
1292. See id. at 1045.
1293. 932 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1997).
1294. See id. at 251.
1295. See id. at 249.
1296. See id.
1297. See id.
1298. See id.
1299. See id. at 250-01.
1300. See id. at 250.
1301. See id. at 251.
1302. See id. at 255.
1303. 942 P.2d 1133 (Alaska 1997).
1304. See id. at 1135.
1305. See id.
YIR 07/17/98  9:39 AM
1998] YEAR IN REVIEW 167
issue was the division of property.1306  While finding several re-
versible errors regarding the identification and valuation of marital
property,1307 the supreme court also held that the trial court had
made an unequal division of property based on erroneous grounds,
and thus remanded for a proper division of the marital property.1308
The supreme court held that there was insufficient evidence to
show that Johnie’s gambling losses significantly wasted marital as-
sets to the extent of causing the disparate property division.1309
Furthermore, it found that the issue of misconduct, based solely on
Johnie’s gambling, did not apply to this case because the gambling
did not evince serious economic misconduct, and the trial court
apparently had unduly sanctioned Johnie for this behavior.1310
In Johns v. Johns,1311 the supreme court affirmed an equitable
division of property on a fifty-fifty basis, even though it required a
lump sum payment of $60,000 by the husband to his wife to offset
assets received by the husband.1312  Against the husband’s argu-
ment, the court held that a fishing boat, acquired through using
substantial assets of the husband, was marital property because it
was acquired during the marriage.1313  The court also held that an
Individual Fishing Quota acquired during the marriage was marital
property and subject to division, as were permanent limited entry
fishing permits, although they presently had no resale value.1314
The husband’s final claim of economic hardship caused by the
$60,000 cash judgment was also rejected by the court which noted
that he could “‘sell some of the assets or . . . take out a significant
loan.’”1315
In Wahl v. Wahl,1316 the supreme court held that a divorce
agreement, which entitled the wife to one-third of the husband’s
retirement benefits, applied to the entire value of the retirement
plan at the date of retirement.1317  The court rejected the husband’s
argument that the divorce agreement gave his wife one-third of the
retirement benefits that were earned during the marriage, and
followed the “plain language of the contract.”1318  Concluding that
1306. See id.
1307. See id. at 1136-37.
1308. See id. at 1137-39.
1309. See id. at 1138.
1310. See id. at 1140.
1311. 945 P.2d 1222 (Alaska 1997).
1312. See id. at 1224.
1313. See id. at 1225.
1314. See id. at 1226-27.
1315. Id. at 1228.
1316. 945 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1997).
1317. See id. at 1231.
1318. Id. (concluding that the husband had completed 2/3 of his working career
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the decree enforcement was within the superior court’s inherent
power, the court upheld the superior court’s decision to award a
survivor annuity to the wife and to provide that the parties’ chil-
dren would receive the wife’s share of retirement benefits if she
predeceased the husband.1319
In Brown v. Brown,1320 the supreme court held that a post-trial
agreement regarding the characterization of property in a property
division proceeding was binding.1321  Kevin Brown argued that
Trade Construction, a corporation of which Wendy Brown was the
sole shareholder, should be characterized as a marital asset and
that an agreement he had entered into with Wendy regarding the
corporation did not contradict his characterization of the prop-
erty.1322  The supreme court rejected Kevin’s argument, concluding
that the binding agreement he made with Wendy relinquished any
rights he may have had to the corporation.1323  However, the su-
preme court vacated and remanded the trial court’s property divi-
sion because (1) the trial court “clearly failed to begin with the
presumption that an equal division of marital property is the most
equitable,” (2) the court failed to adequately consider all appro-
priate factors when determining Kevin’s earning capacity, and (3)
the court’s use of Kevin’s salaried position with health benefits as a
justification for property division was overly broad.1324
In Beard v. Beard,1325 the supreme court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the wife substantial
attorney’s fees because of the husband’s greater earning power and
secure financial situation in comparison to the wife’s.1326  Earl
Beard argued that the trial court’s award of partial attorney’s fees
to Annette Beard was improper because of Annette’s “vexatious
litigation conduct,”1327 including failing to respond timely to plead-
ings, violating court orders, and refusing to vacate the family resi-
dence.1328  Although the supreme court concurred with Earl’s claim
of vexatious conduct, the supreme court concluded that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Annette’s award of
                                                                                                                                
and that the wife was entitled to 1/2 of that amount, leaving her with 1/3 of the
entire retirement package).
1319. See id. at 1232.
1320. 947 P.2d 307 (Alaska 1997).
1321. See id. at 310.
1322. See id. at 309.
1323. See id. at 310.
1324. Id. at 313-14.
1325. 947 P.2d 831 (Alaska 1997).
1326. See id. at 834.
1327. Id.
1328. See id. at 835.
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attorney’s fees instead of denying them altogether.1329
D. Miscellaneous
In Batey v. Batey,1330 the Alaska Supreme Court held that there
was no putative marriage between two parties even though the
couple “held themselves out as husband and wife for over twenty
years” because there was no good faith belief by either party in the
validity of the marriage.1331  The couple, Michael and Earline, were
“married” in Nevada in 1971, although at the time Earline knew
the ceremony was invalid because Michael’s divorce from his first
wife was not finalized.1332  Michael’s divorce from his first wife was
finalized seven months later.1333
Michael filed for divorce from Earline in 1993,1334 and later al-
leged that the “marriage was void.”1335  Earline did not dispute Mi-
chael’s claim, but argued that this was a putative marriage under
Alaska Statutes section 25.05.051.1336  The court disagreed because
“[t]he essential basis of a putative marriage is a good faith belief by
at least one of the parties in the validity of the marriage.”1337  Since
both parties knew that Michael was married “at the inception of
the putative marriage[,] . . . Earline lacked a good faith belief in
the validity of the marriage at its inception, [and] she cannot [now]
take advantage of the protections afforded a putative spouse in
[Alaska Statutes section] 25.05.051.”1338
In Lowe v. Lowe,1339 the supreme court held that a party to a
divorce settlement may make a timely motion for relief from
judgment of the settlement based on certain unfulfilled oral
agreements made earlier by the parties.1340  In July of 1984, Linda
and Tommy Lowe filed for dissolution of their marriage.1341  At the
same time, Linda quitclaimed her interest in the marital home.1342
In the couple’s motion for dissolution, there was no mention of the
home or of Tommy’s military retirement benefits.1343  In May 1989,
1329. See id.
1330. 933 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1997).
1331. Id. at 552.
1332. See id.
1333. See id.
1334. See id.
1335. Id.
1336. See id.; ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.051 (Michie 1996).
1337. Batey, 933 P.2d at 553.
1338. Id. at 553-54.
1339. 944 P.2d 29 (Alaska 1997).
1340. See id. at 29-30.
1341. See id.
1342. See id.
1343. See id.
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Linda moved for relief from judgment of the property settlement,
asking for a share of Tommy’s retirement benefits.1344  The superior
court found that the original property settlement had been implic-
itly based on an oral agreement between the parties that Tommy
would sell the home and give half the proceeds to Linda, a promise
which was never carried out.1345  On this basis, the superior court
ruled that Linda did not unreasonably delay in filing for relief from
judgment, pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 60(b).1346  The supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s ruling, finding that Linda had
reasonably relied on Tommy’s assurances that he would sell the
marital home and give her the proceeds.1347
In Pierce v. Pierce,1348 the supreme court held that a term in-
serted into a divorce settlement by one party during the drafting of
the agreement and not specifically agreed upon by the other party,
may be deleted even after the agreement has been signed.1349
While drafting the settlement agreement, Donald Pierce inserted a
50% child support credit for extended visits of his children lasting
over twenty-seven days, even though this had not been agreed
upon by the parties.1350  The drafted agreement was then forwarded
to Roxanne Pierce, Donald’s wife, without calling attention to the
change in the agreement.1351  Even though the child support credit
included in the agreement is permitted under Civil Rule
90.3(a)(3),1352 the court held that the rule is discretionary and must
be negotiated as a part of the settlement.1353  The court further held
that the trial court could set aside the judgment entered on the
agreement sua sponte based on Civil Rule 60(b)(3).1354
IX. INSURANCE LAW
In Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehicles v.
Fernandes,1355 the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the suspension
1344. See id.
1345. See id. at 30-31.
1346. See id. at 30; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b).
1347. See Lowe, 944 P.2d at 32.
1348. 949 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1997).
1349. See id. at 500.
1350. See id. at 499.
1351. See id.
1352. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3).
1353. See Pierce, 949 P.2d at 500.
1354. See id.  Civil Rule 60(b)(3) provides that relief from judgment may be
granted in cases of “fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an ad-
verse party.”  Id.  Roxanne Pierce had argued that relief should be granted based
on Rule 60(a) involving clerical errors.
1355. 946 P.2d 1259 (Alaska 1997).
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of a driver’s license and held that the driver’s post-accident con-
duct, including personal indemnification of all parties who suffered
damage in the accident and purchasing automobile liability insur-
ance soon after the accident, did not excuse his pre-accident failure
to comply with the Alaska Mandatory Motor Vehicle Insurance
Act (“mandatory insurance laws”).1356  The court found that Fer-
nandes did not meet two of the three required conditions for ex-
emption from the mandatory insurance laws.1357  Fernandes failed
to satisfy the condition that the property damage be less than
$1000 and the condition that his failure to maintain insurance was
due to circumstances beyond his control.1358  The supreme court
also rejected Fernandes’s argument that he substantially complied
with the mandatory insurance laws by determining that Fernandes
did not provide the level of protection required by the laws and he
demonstrated no justification for his failure to hold insurance at
the time of the accident.1359  Because Fernandes could not show
that he had continuously maintained the ability to pay a judgment
of $125,000, the supreme court determined that he did not comply
with the self-insurance provisions of the mandatory insurance
laws.1360
In University of Alaska v. Tumeo,1361 the supreme court held
that unmarried employees did not have to pay back any health in-
surance benefits received by their domestic partners because
Alaska Statutes section 18.80.220(a)(1),1362 part of the Alaska Hu-
man Rights Act, “bar[red] discrimination in employment on the
basis of marital status” at the time it was initially passed.1363  This
statute, however, had been recently amended to allow employers
to provide different benefits to employees who had spouses or
children than what it provided to other employees.1364  The court
initially held that the recent amendments did not render the con-
troversy moot because the issues of whether the University could
seek refunds for previous payments and whether the superior
court’s award of attorney’s fees to the parties discriminated against
required an interpretation of the pre-amended statute.1365  The
University admitted that it discriminated against employees who
1356. See id. at 1262; ALASKA STAT. § 28.22 (Michie 1996).
1357. See Fernandes, 946 P.2d at 1261.
1358. See id.
1359. See id.
1360. See id.
1361. 933 P.2d 1147 (Alaska 1997).
1362. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 1996).
1363. Tumeo, 933 P.2d at 1148.
1364. See id. at 1151.
1365. See id. at 1151-52.
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wished coverage for their unmarried partners, but it “argue[d] that
such discrimination does not violate the [Alaska] Human Rights
Act.”1366  After a careful examination of the plain language of the
Human Rights Act as it was initially passed, the court held that the
Act did not intend to allow this type of discrimination, and there-
fore the University was not entitled to any refunds based on a
misinterpretation of the original statute.1367
In Jones v. Horace Mann Insurance Co.,1368 the supreme court
held that the liability coverage of a homeowner’s insurance policy
did not cover a snow machine accident because it occurred away
from the insured’s premises.1369  The snow machine accident oc-
curred approximately four-tenths of a mile from the insured’s
home on a public road that served as the access road to a drive that
abuts the insured’s property.1370  Given the wording of the policy,1371
the court concluded that an interpretation that the public road was
covered under the insurance policy “would be contrary to the in-
tent and reasonable expectations of both the insurer and the in-
sured.”1372  Jones also argued that the snow machine accident was
covered under the insured’s policy because it was a motorized ve-
hicle used mainly to service the insured’s premises and the geo-
graphic limitation in the policy did not apply to such vehicles.1373  In
rejecting Jones’s argument, the court concluded that the snow ma-
chine did not constitute a service vehicle for purposes of the policy
because the insured used the snow machine to service their prem-
ises only on a few isolated instances and primarily used the ma-
chine for recreation.1374  The court also rejected Jones’s argument
that Horace Mann waived its right to defend coverage under the
service vehicle provision.1375  Even though Horace Mann failed to
inform Jones of all the bases for its denial of coverage, a general
denial letter sent by Horace Mann to Jones twenty-seven days af-
ter the accident was sufficient notice to enable Jones to challenge
the denial of coverage.1376  Because it was determined that the acci-
1366. Id. at 1150.
1367. See id. at 1156.
1368. 937 P.2d 1360 (Alaska 1997).
1369. See id. at 1362.
1370. See id. at 1361.
1371. According to the policy between the homeowner and Horace Mann, the
insured premises included “‘premises used by [homeowner] in connection with
the described location’” and “‘all access ways immediately adjoining the insured
premises.’” Id. at 1362 (quoting insurance policy).
1372. Id. at 1364.
1373. See id.
1374. See id. at 1365.
1375. See id.
1376. See id.
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dent did not occur on the insured’s premises for the purposes of li-
ability insurance coverage, the court concluded that the insurer
also was not liable for Jones’s medical expenses.1377
In Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co.,1378 the supreme court held that a li-
ability insurer had a duty to defend the State of Alaska pursuant to
a liability insurance policy entered into by the defendant insurer
and the lessees of the state-owned land on which the state was
named as an insured.1379  An automobile accident occurred on a
public road at Anchorage International Airport.1380  Because a lit-
eral interpretation of the insurance policy would have led to unrea-
sonably broad coverage, the court limited State Farm’s coverage to
claims that have a “fair relationship to the use of the leased prem-
ises.”1381  The court concluded that the collision, which involved a
motorcycle and a baggage train traveling toward the airport on a
public road within the boundaries of the leased premises, consti-
tuted a claim arising out of or incidental to the appropriate use of
the premises, and thus, the accident fell within the limits of the
scope of the policy.1382  Although the premises were subleased, the
court concluded that this fact did not relieve the insurer of the duty
to defend the claim.1383  The court also rejected State Farm’s argu-
ment that the professional services exclusion in the policy relieved
them of any duty to defend the claim against the state for negligent
design of the roadway.1384  Finally, the court noted that even if State
Farm was relieved of defending the negligent design claim, they
would still have a duty to defend the state, because “the fact that
one claim may be excluded by a policy provision does not relieve
an insurer from its obligation to defend where there are other
claims which are not excluded.”1385
In Grace v. Insurance Co. of North America,1386 the supreme
court held that an excess liability insurer has no obligation to
“drop down” to cover a policy holder where the primary insurer
became insolvent, and that a breach of the policy holder’s duty to
obtain consent for a settlement absolved the insurer of its duty to
1377. See id. at 1366.
1378. 939 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1997).
1379. See id. at 789.
1380. See id.
1381. Id. at 793.
1382. See id.
1383. See id. at 794.
1384. See id.
1385. Id.
1386. 944 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1997).
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indemnify unless the insurer’s behavior justified the breach.1387
Grace sued Bell Helmets and Ocelot Engineering for product li-
ability when a motorcycle helmet he was wearing cracked during
an accident.1388  Bell Helmets had several layers of insurance, with
Insurance Company of North America (“INA”) providing cover-
age for liability in excess of $5,100,000.1389  Ocelot confessed judg-
ment for $15,000,000 and assigned its rights to seek indemnifica-
tion from Bell Helmets to Grace in exchange for an agreement not
to execute on the judgment for at least three years.1390  Grace then
sought settlement from Bell Helmets, who agreed, without consent
from INA, to a final judgment amount in excess of $17,000,000.1391
The supreme court held that INA did not have a duty to “drop
down” to cover the liability previously covered by the primary in-
surer.1392  However, it did hold that Bell Helmet’s breach of its duty
to seek pre-settlement consent was excused by INA’s refusal to in-
demnify until the underlying liability coverage was spent.1393  The
court found that “INA is liable only for amounts in excess of the
liability limits of the [primary insurers], not for amounts in excess
of the sums actually paid by those policies.”1394  The court then re-
versed summary judgment on the grounds that a question of fact
existed regarding whether INA had improperly refused to pay its
obligation until the underlying coverage was actually paid.1395
In Wichman v. Benner,1396 the supreme court held that an as-
signee of rights to be reimbursed for workers’ compensation bene-
fits may recover for the full amount of the benefits paid to an em-
ployee regardless of the amount for which the rights were
purchased.1397  Wichman was injured while working for Benner, and
subsequently recovered $65,000 when a jury found that he was not
comparatively negligent in the accident resulting in his injury.1398
The jury’s finding of no comparative negligence was appealed and
reversed by the supreme court in a prior case.1399  Benner’s liability
insurer, Northland Insurance Company (Northland), purchased
the right to be reimbursed for the $33,837.53 already paid to
1387. See id.
1388. See id. at 462.
1389. See id.
1390. See id. at 463.
1391. See id.
1392. See id. at 465.
1393. See id. at 464-65.
1394. Id. at 465.
1395. See id. at 467.
1396. 948 P.2d 484 (Alaska 1997).
1397. See id. at 487-88.
1398. See id. at 485.
1399. See id. at 486 (citing Benner v. Wichman, 874 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1994)).
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Wichman in workers’ compensation benefits should a jury deter-
mine that Wichman was comparatively negligent on remand.1400
The jury found that Wichman was 6% negligent, and the court or-
dered Benner to pay $61,000 plus interest, costs and attorney’s
fees, totaling $111,000.1401  Benner agreed to pay $76,591.57 and de-
posited the remaining $35,211.43 with the court to be held until its
motion for attorney’s fees and costs and a reduction of the verdict
could be ruled upon.1402  Northland intervened and motioned for a
release of the funds, submitting evidence that it was entitled to
$34,654.95 because the amount of reimbursement should have
been reduced one-third for attorney’s fees.1403  The superior court
granted Northland’s motion, and Wichman appealed.1404  The su-
preme court held that the right to reimbursement of workers’
compensation benefits was properly assignable.1405  The court de-
termined that public policy preventing the assigning of personal
injury claims as “trafficking in lawsuits for pain and suffering” did
not apply in this case, but rather that this case involved only the
right to be reimbursed for overpayment of benefits.1406  Finally, the
court held that the fact that Northland had purchased the rights for
only $10,000 did not prevent it from recovering in excess of that
amount, as the assignment of the right included the potential risk
of no recovery and therefore did not amount to a windfall to
Northland.1407
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. F.H.1408 the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in exercising jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment
action of a professional liability policy.1409  St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Company (“St. Paul”) had sought a declaration in dis-
trict court that its professional liability policy for Big Brothers/Big
Sisters did not cover sexual abuse by an employee.1410  The victim
of the abuse countersued for damages and declaratory judgment
but the district court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary judg-
ment.1411  The circuit court reversed and remanded the case back to
1400. See id.
1401. See id.
1402. See id.
1403. See id.
1404. See id.
1405. See id. at 487.
1406. Id.
1407. See id. at 488.
1408. 117 F.3d 435 (9th Cir. 1997).
1409. See id. at 438.
1410. See id. at 436.
1411. See id.
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the district court, which then ruled against St. Paul.1412  St. Paul then
claimed that the district should have declined jurisdiction under
the Declaratory Judgment Act.1413  The court concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in exercising jurisdiction
over the matter because there was no pending state action and
there was a potential for undue cost and delay had jurisdiction not
been exercised.1414  Upholding jurisdiction, the circuit court con-
cluded that “[b]ecause the defendants K.W. and F.H. filed a coun-
terclaim for monetary damages with jurisdiction supported by di-
versity of citizenship, a dismissal of St. Paul’s declaratory judgment
action would not have saved the district court from having to adju-
dicate the controversy and deal with state law issues.”1415
In Allstate Insurance v. Shelton,1416 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage does
not cover a child who resided in the same household but was not
related by blood or affinity to the policy holder.1417  While Karen
Kohlbeck and Michael Shelton were cohabitating, Karen’s daugh-
ter, Brittany, was struck and killed by a motorist.1418  Brittany’s
biological parents asserted a claim for coverage under the unin-
sured/underinsured motorist provision of Michael Shelton’s insur-
ance policy.1419  The circuit court affirmed the district court’s ruling
that Brittany’s estate could not recover, as Brittany did not fit un-
der the term “relative” in Michael’s policy.1420  According to the
plain language standard used for statutory construction of Alaska
law, the plain meaning of the term “relative” means “a person
connected by blood or affinity.”1421  Extrinsic evidence also demon-
strated that Michael Shelton did not reasonably expect his auto-
mobile coverage would include Brittany, as he and Karen kept dif-
ferent policies and Brittany’s estate recovered under her mother’s
policy.1422  Finally, case law supported the district court’s determi-
nation, showing that courts have previously determined that a rela-
tive was a person connected by blood or marriage.1423
1412. See id. at 436-37.
1413. See id. at 437; 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
1414. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance, 117 F.3d at 437.
1415. Id. at 438.
1416. 105 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 1997).
1417. See id. at 517.
1418. See id. at 515.
1419. See id.
1420. See id. at 517.
1421. Id. at 516.
1422. See id.
1423. See id. at 516-17; see also Groves v. State Farm Life and Casualty Co., 829
P.2d 1237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 697
P.2d 40 (Haw. 1985).
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X. PROPERTY
A. Restrictions on Use
In Kohl v. Legoullon,1424 the Alaska Supreme Court upheld a
homeowner’s action to enforce common subdivision restrictions
against another homeowner.1425  The Kohls built on the lot directly
across the street from the Legoullons and repeatedly assured the
Legoullons that they were in compliance with the height and set-
back requirements or that they had obtained a waiver from these
restrictions.1426  The Legoullons sued when they noticed the walls of
a fifth story being added to the Kohl’s home.1427  The supreme court
upheld the Legoullon’s standing to enforce the covenants, as the
covenants were established as part of a common plan of develop-
ment.1428  The Kohls claimed that the homeowners had waived the
setback and height restrictions through a majority vote and ap-
proval of an architectural review committee, but the court found
the waiver was invalid on two grounds.1429  First, the setback re-
quirements which stated that “[n]o fence or wall shall be erected
. . . nearer to any street than the minimum . . . set-back line unless
[approved by the Architectural Control Committee],” applied only
to barriers, not houses.1430  Second, the covenants state they “are to
run with the land and shall be binding . . . for a period of twenty-
five . . . years from the date these covenants are recorded,” then
automatically extended for successive ten-year periods unless the
homeowners vote otherwise.1431  Because the covenants were re-
corded in 1986, they were not subject to modification before
2011.1432  The court also held that the action was not barred by
laches, because the Kohls continued to build at their own risk once
their neighbors had complained.1433  The Kohls led the Legoullons
to believe that their construction plans would not obstruct the Le-
goullons’ view, so the Legoullons should not be faulted for waiting
to bring an action.1434 However, the supreme court permitted the
height to remain and reversed the lower court’s order that the top
story be removed from the structure, as the Legoullons failed to
1424. 936 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1997).
1425. See id. at 519.
1426. See id. at 516.
1427. See id.
1428. See id.
1429. See id. at 517.
1430. Id.
1431. Id.
1432. Id.
1433. See id.
1434. See id. at 518.
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prove that burying the first two floors of the structure elevated the
land around the house above its natural level.1435  The supreme
court ordered the Kohls to cure the breach of the setback restric-
tion by converting the garage into an open deck or porch, which
would also alleviate the impact that the Kohls’ house had on the
Legoullons’ view.1436
In Methonen v. Stone,1437 the supreme court held that summary
judgment was improperly granted in enjoining a purchaser of land
with a well on it to continue to provide water to adjoining land.1438
Even though the purchaser did not have actual or constructive no-
tice of the unrecorded agreement that allegedly created an ease-
ment on the land, there were genuine issues of fact as to whether
Methonen was on inquiry notice and whether an implied easement
had been created.1439  In 1974, when the original owner of the land
conveyed the parcel to a subsequent owner, a “Water Agreement”
was executed, but not recorded until 1985, stating that the owner
of the land would furnish water to the other lots of the subdivi-
sion.1440  Methonen purchased the land in 1976, “‘subject to ease-
ments, restrictions, reservations and exceptions of record.’”1441  In
July 1994, Methonen discontinued water service to the other lots,
and Stone brought suit for an injunction and damages.1442  The par-
ties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the superior
court granted Stone’s motion.1443  On appeal, the supreme court
held that because Stone had failed to demonstrate that Methonen
had either actual or constructive notice, and because “the intention
to create a servitude must be clear on the face of an instrument,”
summary judgment was improperly granted.1444  Because the water
agreement was not recorded until 1985, after Methonen had pur-
chased the land, it did not bind Methonen.1445
However, the court denied that Methonen was entitled to
summary judgment, because there remained issues of material fact
concerning whether an easement was established on the ground of
implied easement or whether Methonen was on inquiry notice.1446
If Methonen was “aware of facts which would lead a reasonably
1435. See id. at 519.
1436. See id. at 520.
1437. 941 P.2d 1248 (Alaska 1997).
1438. See id. at 1251.
1439. See id.
1440. See id.
1441. Id. at 1250.
1442. See id.
1443. See id.
1444. Id. at 1251.
1445. See id.
1446. See id.
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prudent person to a course of investigation which, properly exe-
cuted, would lead to knowledge of the servitude,” then an ease-
ment might exist under a theory of “inquiry notice.”1447  The court
also noted that, under a theory of implied easement, an easement
might exist if the water lines leading off of Methonen’s property to
the adjoining lots indicated use that was “manifest, continuous,
and reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of” the other parcels.1448
In Persson-Mokvist v. Anderson,1449 the supreme court held
that a plat note for residential property restricting use of the land
to “residential/recreational use” is not violated by raising and
training sled dogs or by operating a bed and breakfast.1450  In 1982,
Persson-Mokvist purchased land in a subdivision formally owned
by the state.1451  In 1992, he filed claim against neighboring land
owners, alleging that their activities violated a plat note created
when the land was subdivided in 1981 limiting the land use to
“residential/recreational” uses.1452  The court affirmed the decision
of the trial court that raising and training sled dogs, as a hobby and
not for profit, qualifies as “recreational” under the note, as inter-
preted using definitions found in state land-use regulations.1453  Fur-
thermore, the court ruled that operating a bed and breakfast es-
tablishment is “incidental” to residential use, and appropriate
under the statute.1454
B. Transfers and Conveyances
In Amyot v. Luchini,1455 the Alaska Supreme Court established
that the statute requiring good faith disclosure of defects of resi-
dential real property transfers precluded any claims of innocent
misrepresentation of property conditions included in the manda-
tory disclosure form.1456  After purchasing a house from the Lu-
chinis, Amyot discovered the foundation had completely failed and
began replacing it at a cost of approximately $100,000.1457  Amyot
sued the Luchinis under theories of innocent, negligent, and inten-
tional misrepresentation.1458  The superior court concluded Alaska
1447. Id. at 1252.
1448. Id. at 1253.
1449. 942 P.2d 1154 (Alaska 1997).
1450. See id. at 1157.
1451. See id. at 1155.
1452. See id.
1453. See id. at 1157.
1454. See id.
1455. 932 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1997).
1456. See id. at 247.
1457. See id. at 245.
1458. See id.
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law precluded the innocent misrepresentation theory,1459 from
which Amyot appealed.1460  The supreme court reviewed the rele-
vant statutes and concluded that by explicitly adopting a negli-
gence standard of liability, the legislature implicitly rejected liabil-
ity based on a lesser degree of fault.1461  Additionally, consistent
with the “good faith” requirement of real estate disclosures, it was
clear that innocent misrepresentations did not violate that stan-
dard.1462
In James v. McCombs,1463 the supreme court held that absent
an actual defect in title, there was no breach of the covenants con-
tained in a warranty deed.1464  McCombs acquired land from the
state, which originally held it as part of the Alaska Mental Health
Trust.1465  Two years later, McCombs sold the land to James and
executed a warranty deed for the property in exchange for a
promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the property.1466
James began a dairy farm, but after it became apparent the farm
would fail, James informed McCombs he would make no further
payments on the note.1467  James filed suit for breach of warranty
based on litigation which invalidated the statute establishing lands
held under the Mental Health Trust as general grant lands.1468
McCombs counterclaimed for the principal and interest owed on
the note.1469
The supreme court affirmed the lower court’s finding that
there was no breach of warranty in the conveyance.1470  The court
found that the concepts of “cloud of title” and “marketable title”
were not applicable because they applied to a breach of sale con-
tract, and that once the deed was delivered, the relevant conve-
nants are only those contained in the deed itself.1471  James did not
assert which particular convenant was breached, and the court
noted that each covenant required title to actually be defective be-
fore holding the grantor liable.1472  James was required to show the
actual existence of paramount title to establish a breach; since
1459. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.70.010-.090 (Michie 1996).
1460. See Amyot, 932 P.2d at 246.
1461. See id. at 246-47.
1462. See id. at 247.
1463. 936 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1997).
1464. See id. at 526.
1465. See id. at 522.
1466. See id.
1467. See id.
1468. See id. at 525.
1469. See id. at 522-23.
1470. See id.
1471. See id. at 524.
1472. See id.
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McCombs was a bona fide purchaser of the land from the state,
McCombs’ title could not be stripped by the invalidation of the
statute, and James was not entitled to recission.1473  James’s defense
to the counterclaim was based on a failure of consideration be-
cause of defective title, but since the claim of defective title failed,
the court found his defense failed as a matter of law.1474
In Melendrez v. Bode,1475 the supreme court ruled that the su-
perior court abused its discretion by unconditionally granting quiet
title in the successors to original purchasers of land because the
landowner had not fully collected payment for the property.1476
The Bodes received the property that had originally been owned
by Melendrez through a quitclaim deed.1477  The prior owners of the
property had agreed to pay the remaining amount left on the sale
of the land to Melendrez, but after Meledrez did not respond to
the offer, they quitclaimed the interest in the property to the
Bodes.1478  The Bodes filed claim to quiet title on the property in
superior court and Melendrez failed to appear in court until over a
week after default was entered.1479  The Bodes then motioned for
entry of default judgment, requesting the court to order quiet title
in the Bodes in exchange for payment of the balance owed to Me-
lendrez.1480  The court struck the proposed payment from the mo-
tion for default judgment and granted Bode’s motion.1481  Melen-
drez moved for the default judgment to be set aside.1482  The court
ruled that it was an abuse of discretion to enter default judgment
greater than that prayed for by the Bodes, and reversed and re-
manded for the court to settle the issue of how much money was
owed to Melendrez.1483  Because the supreme court found Melen-
drez culpable for the default, however, it did not reverse the supe-
rior court’s refusal to set aside default judgment.1484
1473. See id. at 525-26.
1474. See id. at 526.
1475. 941 P.2d 1254 (Alaska 1997).
1476. See id. at 1256.
1477. See id. at 1255.
1478. See id.
1479. See id. at 1256
1480. See id.
1481. See id.
1482. See id.
1483. See id. at 1257-58.
1484. See id. at 1258.
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C. Takings
In Four Separate Parcels of Land v. City of Kodiak, 1485 the
Alaska Supreme Court held that “lost profits” did not constitute a
taking when there was no proof that the condemnation terminated
the landowner’s contract with a tenant.1486  The City of Kodiak
made public plans to condemn four parcels of land, two of which
belonged to Gerald Markham.1487  Markham contested the com-
pensation offered for his parcels and brought suit. 1488  He had en-
tered into an agreement with the City to relocate houses situated
on the land that the City was taking. 1489  Markham moved the
houses per the agreement so that a tenant could continue occu-
pancy of one of the houses, and claimed “lost profits” he would
have collected while the house was being moved. 1490  He had a deal
with the tenant under which he received certain benefits from a
management contract, and he claimed moving the house termi-
nated the deal with his tenant and cost him the profits of that
deal.1491  The court rejected Markham’s expert’s testimony on “lost
profits” as irrelevant, since Markham failed to demonstrate that
his benefit from the contract with the tenant was terminated by the
taking.1492  Nor was Markham entitled to compensation for the
“cost of cure” (moving the house) as the agreement specifically
stated he would have the right to remove the houses “at his sole
expense.” 1493
In Toney v. City of Anchorage Police Department,1494 the su-
preme court held that a six-year statute of limitations was proper
for a claim of conversion relating to the taking of property by the
police department.1495  Toney was charged with drug trafficking and
some of his property was seized and turned over to the federal
DEA without a forfeiture hearing.1496  Toney’s complaint for con-
version was dismissed by the superior court based upon a statute of
limitations.1497  The supreme court reviewed three different statutes
1485. 938 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1997).
1486. See id.
1487. See id. at 449.
1488. See id.
1489. See id. at 450.
1490. See id. at 452.
1491. See id. at 450.
1492. See id.
1493. Id. at 453.
1494. 950 P.2d 123 (Alaska 1997).
1495. See id. at 125.
1496. See id. at 124.
1497. See id.
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which set forth six, two, and three year periods of limitation for
Toney’s claim before determining that the six-year statute was ap-
propriate for conversion.1498  The supreme court did not allow
Toney’s conversion claim against the officers of the police depart-
ment as individuals because the incident occurred while they were
“acting in their official capacity.”1499
D. Landlord-Tenant
In Brigdon v. Lamb,1500 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
the Alaska Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
(“URLTA”)1501 did not apply to potential purchasers of property
who occupied the property under a contract of sale.1502  The Lambs
occupied the Brigdons’ property under two agreements, a “Receipt
and Agreement to Purchase” and an “Occupancy Agreement.”1503
The Lambs were notified after several months of occupancy that
their application to assume the loan on the property had been de-
nied, but declined to sign an addendum to extend the purchase
agreement.1504  After vacating the property, the Lambs sued under
URLTA for injuries suffered from being exposed to carbon mon-
oxide from a defective furnace, alleging a breach of the duty “to
maintain heating facilities in safe working order and to keep
premises in a fit and habitable condition.”1505  The supreme court
held that the URLTA did not apply because the Lambs occupied
the premises under a contract for sale until they were notified that
their loan application had been denied.1506  Additionally, the court
rejected the Lambs’ argument that the occupancy agreement was
created to avoid the application of the URLTA.1507  The supreme
court remanded for reconsideration the question of whether or not
URLTA applied after the Lambs were notified that their applica-
tion had been rejected.1508
1498. See id. at 125 (citing ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.10.050(3), .070(a)(2), and
.060(b) (Michie 1996)).
1499. Id. at 126.
1500. 929 P.2d 1274 (Alaska 1997).
1501. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.330(b)(2) (Michie 1996).
1502. See Brigdon, 929 P.2d. at 1277.
1503. See id. at 1276.
1504. See id.
1505. Id. at 1275-76.
1506. See id.
1507. See id. at 1277.
1508. See id. at 1277-78.
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E. Miscellaneous
In Osborne v. Hurst,1509 the Alaska Supreme Court held that
the owners of damaged property may be allowed to pursue dam-
ages equal to the cost of restoring their property to its original
condition instead of diminished market value.1510  The superior
court had granted summary judgment to defendant Hurst on the
issue of restoration costs, but the supreme court reversed, holding
that “restoration costs are an inappropriate measure of damages
when those costs are disproportionately larger than the diminution
in the value of land and there is no ‘reason personal to the owner
for restoring’ the land to its original condition.”1511  The court re-
manded for a determination of the appropriate measure of dam-
ages according to the “reason personal” test, to determine whether
Osborne was entitled to an award of damages exceeding dimin-
ished market value.1512
In Rush v. Alaska Mortgage Group,1513 the supreme court re-
versed summary judgment and held that a senior lienholder stated
a claim of equitable subrogation because there was no evidence
that the senior lienholder intended to subordinate the new deed of
trust and because “paramount equities” did not favor the junior
creditor.1514  Because Rush, the senior lienholder, affied that she
had no knowledge of any subsequent deeds of trust, the supreme
court concluded that it could not be definitively inferred that she
intended to subordinate her security position to subsequent deeds
of trust.1515  Because there was no evidence that the Alaska Mort-
gage Group had relied on Rush’s release of the deed of trust to
their detriment, the supreme court rejected the Alaska Mortgage
Group’s paramount equities theory.1516
In Weiss v. State,1517 the supreme court held that a settlement
agreement deciding a class action suit concerning lands granted in
public trust to Alaska under the Alaska Mental Health Enabling
Act (“AMHEA”)1518 represented a “fair, adequate and reasonable
settlement of the litigation.”1519  The approved settlement agree-
1509. 947 P.2d 1356 (Alaska 1997).
1510. See id. at 1360.
1511. Id. at 1359 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a)
(1977)).
1512. See id. at 1360.
1513. 937 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1997).
1514. See id. at 651.
1515. See id. at 651.
1516. See id. at 652.
1517. 939 P.2d 380 (Alaska 1997).
1518. Pub. L. No. 84-830, 70 Stat. 709 (1956).
1519. Weiss, 939 P.2d at 382.
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ment reconstituted the trust with land and cash, provided for im-
proved mental health programs and established institutional
mechanisms to protect the trust.1520  Not all of the plaintiffs named
in the underlying suit were proponents of the settlement agree-
ment.1521  Weiss, the named plaintiff in the original suit against the
state, appealed the trial court’s approval of the settlement agree-
ment alleging that the settlement was a “‘bad deal.’” 1522  Weiss ar-
gued that the trial court erred by undervaluing the probable out-
come of litigation and by overestimating the value of the remedy
to the plaintiffs.1523  Rejecting all of Weiss’s arguments and up-
holding the settlement approval as fair and adequate, the supreme
court held that the superior court did not err in evaluating the po-
tential outcome of litigation, nor did it err in valuing the settlement
lands.1524  Weiss also argued that the trial court erred in its evalua-
tion of the settlement’s provisions regarding the Trust Authority,
the budgeting procedures and land management.1525  The supreme
court also rejected this argument, stating that “the program bene-
fits [including the Trust Authority, the budgeting procedures and
land management] at best offer a considerable advantage over con-
tinued litigation” and “[a]t worst, . . . are as favorable as the likely
product of continued litigation.”1526  The supreme court concluded
that Civil Rule 60(b)1527 was an appropriate enforcement mecha-
nism, rejecting Weiss’ claim that the settlement was not legally en-
forceable.1528  Although the court concluded that there was evi-
dence that some of the plaintiff’s attorneys had legitimate
disagreements, the supreme court found no evidence of improper
collusion.1529  Finally, the court rejected Weiss’ due process claim,
concluding that he “clearly had ample opportunity to present his
case.”1530
XI. TORT LAW
In Griffith v. Taylor,1531 the Alaska Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff must show a duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence
1520. See id. at 382-86.
1521. See id. at 386.
1522. Id. at 387.
1523. See id. at 387-88.
1524. See id. at 387-92.
1525. See id. at 393-96.
1526. Id. at 396.
1527. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b).
1528. See Weiss, 939 P.2d at 396-97.
1529. See id. at 399-400.
1530. Id. at 402.
1531. 937 P.2d 297 (Alaska 1997).
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as other attorneys commonly possess and exercise; breach of that
duty; proximate cause between the negligent conduct and the re-
sulting injury; and actual loss or damage from the breach to estab-
lish a claim of professional legal malpractice.1532  The court reversed
a summary judgment decision against Griffith, a client of defen-
dant law firm that represented him in preparing a quitclaim deed
to settle a debt between him and his father, and that later repre-
sented his father in an attempt to divest Griffith of that same
property.1533
The court further held that the substantial relationship test
would be used to determine if an attorney-client relationship had
been formed in the absence of a showing that confidential knowl-
edge was actually gained from a previous professional relationship
with a former client.1534  The client therefore did not need to show
that confidential information was actually disclosed in past deal-
ings.1535  The court qualified its holding by requiring a showing of
confidential information if the attorney did not take a position ad-
verse to its former client.1536
In West v. City of St. Paul,1537 the supreme court held that a
harbormaster has no duty to warn a vessel of the danger posed by
an ice floe outside the harbor entrance because the ice was an open
and obvious condition.1538  The court held that the duties of a har-
bormaster extend to “warn[ing] the ship captain about such hidden
dangers as underwater obstacles in the approach and latent struc-
tural defects in the wharf,” but not to open and obvious conditions
that could be reasonably ascertained by a vessel. 1539  The court
found that the vessel’s captain did not use “reasonable diligence”
in attempting to enter the ice-filled harbor where the “ice was not
a hidden hazard.”1540
In Manes v. Coats,1541 the supreme court held that a travel res-
ervation service is not liable for an injury sustained at an inn be-
cause the reservation service is not the agent of the traveler.1542
Manes used a reservation service, One Call Does It All (“One
Call”), to arrange bed-and-breakfast accommodations for a trip to
1532. See id.
1533. See id.
1534. See id. at 301.
1535. See id.
1536. See id. at 303.
1537. 936 P.2d 136 (Alaska 1997).
1538. See id. at 138-39.
1539. Id.
1540. Id. at 139.
1541. 941 P.2d 120 (Alaska 1997).
1542. See id. at 123.
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Valdez.1543  One Call made a reservation for Manes at the Always
Inn.1544  Manes sustained an injury from falling down a stairway in
the Always Inn that was without handrails and adequate landing
area.1545  Manes sued both the reservation service and the owner of
the inn.1546  The superior court granted summary judgment in favor
of One Call on the grounds that One Call was not an agent of
Manes with the responsibility to inspect for hidden defects.1547  The
supreme court affirmed, noting that One Call did not act with the
power to alter the legal relations of Manes, and that Manes did not
exercise control over One Call, thus, no principal and agent rela-
tionship existed.1548
In Department of Transportation and Public Facilities v. Sand-
ers,1549 the supreme court held that the state has sovereign immu-
nity for its decision to allow aircraft support vehicles to use a pub-
lic road adjacent to an airport, but that it could be held liable if it
negligently ignored risks associated with allowing the vehicles to
use the roads.1550  Sanders was injured when he ran his motorcycle
into the rear of a baggage tug operating on Old International Air-
port (“OIA”) Road.1551  He subsequently sued the State of Alaska,
United Airlines, and Dynair, the owner of the tug.1552  The superior
court granted Sanders’ summary judgment motion against the
state, holding that it was not entitled to sovereign immunity re-
garding its decision to allow airport-related traffic on OIA Road
because it had breached its obligation to operate the airport
safely.1553  The supreme court held that the state is entitled to dis-
cretionary function immunity for its decision to allow airport-
related business traffic on OIA Road because “the [a]irport offi-
cials did not have a mandatory duty to enforce traffic regulations
on OIA Road.”1554  However, the court also held that once the state
has exercised its discretion, it may still be held liable if it acts neg-
ligently in failing to take reasonable measures to minimize the
risks associated with allowing unsafe vehicles to use the OIA
road.1555
1543. See id. at 122.
1544. See id.
1545. See id.
1546. See id.
1547. See id.
1548. See id. at 123-24.
1549. 944 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1997)
1550. See id.
1551. See id. at 455.
1552. See id.
1553. See id. at 456.
1554. Id. at 458.
1555. See id. at 459.
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In Rice v. Denley,1556 the supreme court remanded an alleged
settlement agreement made orally in open court to determine
whether the victim and the tort-feasor had reached a meeting of
the minds regarding whether the settlement included the victim’s
insurer’s subrogated claim.1557  The settlement was for $20,000, and
tort-feasor Rice made it clear in court that it “would include any
and all liens and costs and fees incurred.”1558  Rice felt that Denley,
who included a subrogation claim with her insurer, was to have the
responsibility of dealing with her insurer for the difference in the
settlement and what Rice owed directly to Denley.1559  Rice argued
that the settlement agreement was unclear whether it excluded
medical payment interest, and therefore asked the court to hold
that there was no contract, to grant him relief based on a unilateral
mistake as to a material term, or to void the contract based on mu-
tual mistake.1560  The court considered this argument because of the
interchangeable terms “lien” and “subrogation lien,” but re-
manded because the intent of the parties was unclear.1561
In Pluid v. B.K.,1562 the supreme court held that damages in a
bench trial that are based on reasonable estimates will not be re-
versed and also that evidence of a defendant’s wealth is not neces-
sary for awarding punitive damages, but may be offered at defen-
dant’s option.1563  Pluid was found liable by clear and convincing
evidence in a bench trial of sexually battering the minor daughter
of a woman who was living with him.1564  In awarding compensatory
damages, the judge calculated the amount of counseling that would
be needed by the victim as 100 sessions with a therapist at $120 per
session, and therefore awarded $12,000 for future medical ex-
penses.1565  The judge also awarded $25,000 for past and future pain
and suffering.1566  Finally, the judge awarded punitive damages at
five times the amount of compensatory damages ($185,000).1567
The supreme court found that the compensatory damages were
reasonably based and that the trial court did not commit clear er-
ror.1568  The court ruled that it was not error for the court to ac-
1556. 944 P.2d 497 (Alaska 1997).
1557. See id. at 501.
1558. Id. at 498.
1559. See id. at 499.
1560. See id. at 500.
1561. See id. at 500-01.
1562. 948 P.2d 981 (Alaska 1997).
1563. See id. at 985.
1564. See id. at 982.
1565. See id. at 983.
1566. See id.
1567. See id.
1568. See id. at 984.
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knowledge the criminal penalty in assessing punitive damages.1569
Recognizing a split in other jurisdictions, the court held that evi-
dence of the defendant’s wealth is not necessary for awarding puni-
tive damages, but that defendant may offer such evidence if he so
chooses.1570
In Harris v. Keys,1571 the supreme court upheld the jury’s dis-
cretion to decide issues of fact as its conclusions were clearly rea-
sonable and refused to overturn the decision because any error in
jury instructions was harmless.1572  Defendant Keys asked Satter-
white to stay in his motorhome to discourage theft of property
Keys was leasing.1573  Satterwhite left the site for a month in No-
vember, so Keys assumed Satterwhite had abandoned the site and
terminated the agreement.1574  When Satterwhite returned, Eliza-
beth and Seth Harris accompanied him.1575  Keys visited the site
several times, once allegedly asking Satterwhite to leave, yet Sat-
terwhite and his friends remained at the mobile home, frequently
drinking heavily.1576 On December 25, Keys, paramedics and police
found Elizabeth dead from an infection and Seth frost-bitten and
incoherent.1577  Seth lost both feet to frostbite and suffered neural
damage from shock.1578  He then brought suit against Keys for his
injuries.1579  The jury found Satterwhite negligent and a cause of the
injuries to Seth, but found that Keys was not negligent and Satter-
white was not his agent.1580
The supreme court rejected Seth’s appeal on several grounds.
First, the court affirmed the superior court’s refusal to disturb the
jury’s finding of no agency relationship between Keys and Satter-
white.1581  Recognizing that Alaska law did not clearly delineate be-
tween an agency relationship and a landlord-tenant relationship or
a bailor-bailee relationship, the court could still find no authority
that indicated every tenancy or bailment which serves the owner’s
purposes creates an agency relationship.1582  Mere occupancy of the
motorhome was not enough to create an agency relationship, and
1569. See id. at 985.
1570. See id. at 986.
1571. 948 P.2d 460 (Alaska 1997).
1572. See id. at 465-66.
1573. See id. at 463.
1574. See id.
1575. See id.
1576. See id.
1577. See id.
1578. See id.
1579. See id. at 462.
1580. See id. at 464.
1581. See id. at 465.
1582. See id. at 464.
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from the facts, the jury could reasonably conclude that Keys did
not exercise control of Satterwhite’s conduct; thus, Keys and Sat-
terwhite were not principal and agent.1583  Seth claimed the jury in-
structions were flawed, as the jury was not instructed that a servant
or employee was a subspecies of agent; however, the court con-
cluded this was not reversible error as it was unlikely that it af-
fected the jury’s judgment.1584  The supreme court further found no
error in excluding Elizabeth’s diaries, as the business records ex-
ception1585 did not apply due to the questionable veracity of the dia-
ries, and the entries did not concern a matter about which a wit-
ness used to have knowledge but now had “insufficient recollection
to discuss accurately.”1586  Finally, the court held that Seth had
waived any objection to lack of judgment against Satterwhite, as he
did not object until after the trial court began to prepare the final
judgment form, and thus his post-verdict objection was untimely.1587
In Schumacher v. City and Borough of Yakutat,1588 the supreme
court held that a city was not liable for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff’s son in a sledding accident because the city did not owe a
duty to protect children from the obvious dangers associated with
sledding in the streets.1589  Although the supreme court determined
that several factors militated in favor of finding the existence of a
duty in a case where a minor was injured when sledding into an in-
tersection, the court concluded that these factors were outweighed
by the burden that would result for the City of Yakutat and the
community if such a duty were imposed.1590  The supreme court
noted that other jurisdictions have held that municipalities owe a
specific duty to protect children playing in the streets against dan-
gers caused by harmful road conditions.1591  However, this duty
does not extend to dangers created by a child’s own conduct. 1592
Because the accident resulted from the dangerous conduct of the
plaintiff’s son and not a dangerous condition in the road, the su-
1583. See id. at 465.
1584. See id. at 466.
1585. The business records exception to the hearsay rule allows admission of a
record made “from information transmitted by [] a person with knowledge ac-
quired of a regularly conducted business activity . . . if it was the regular practice
of that business activity to make and keep the memorandum . . . unless the source
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness.”  ALASKA R. EVID. 803(6).
1586. Harris, 948 P.2d at 466.
1587. See id. at 468.
1588. 946 P.2d 1255 (Alaska 1997).
1589. See id. at 1257.
1590. See id.
1591. See id. at 1257.
1592. See id.
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preme court refused to find a duty in this case.1593  The supreme
court also rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the city had a duty to
protect her son from an inherently dangerous property condition,
remarking that “[t]he dangers inherent in sledding down a road do
not qualify as dangers caused by a ‘condition’ of land.”1594
In State v. Greenfield,1595 the supreme court held that the
Alaska Whistleblower Act1596  does not waive the state’s right to
immunity from punitive damages.1597  The relevant section of the
Act provides that “‘[a] person who alleges a violation of [Alaska
Statutes section] 39.90.100 may bring a civil action and the court
may grant appropriate relief, including punitive damages.’”1598  The
supreme court, based on its ruling in Alaska Housing Finance
Corp. v. Salvucci,1599 decided that “‘the amendment was added not
to make governmental entities liable for punitive damages, but to
ensure that individual defendants would not be immunized from
punitive damages’” in upholding the traditional presumption
against punitive damage awards towards government entities.1600
In Bowen v. Oistead,1601 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that an allegedly improper termination of a national guards-
man fell under the Feres doctrine1602 of intramilitary immunity
which bars all tort and constitutional claims against the govern-
ment.1603  Although Bowen was a state employee and the use of the
Feres doctrine was being applied to Alaska by the federal govern-
ment, his claim failed because “the military apparatus of the
United States cannot be divided into strictly state and federal
components.”1604
XII. TRUSTS AND ESTATES
In Johnson v. Doris,1605 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed a
probate order approving final accounting and distribution of an es-
1593. See id.
1594. Id. at 1258.
1595. 950 P.2d 1128 (Alaska 1997).
1596. ALASKA STAT. §§ 39.90.100-.150 (Michie 1996).
1597. See Greegfield, 950 P.2d at 1128.
1598. Id. at 1129 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 39.90.120(a)).
1599. 950 P.2d 1116 (Alaska 1997).
1600. Greenfield, 950 P.2d at 1129 (quoting Salvucci, 950 P.2d at 1126).
1601. 125 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1997).
1602. See Freres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (holding that mem-
bers of the armed services can not sue the government for injuries that “arise out
of or are in the course of activity incident to service”).
1603. See Bowen, 125 F.2d at 803.
1604. Id. at 805.
1605. 933 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1997).
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tate, holding that the initial failure to object to alleged excessive
fees and costs incurred during the estate’s administration pursuant
to Civil Rule 60(b)(2)1606 did not necessarily preclude a later hear-
ing to resolve these issues.1607  Johnson was denied the use of rule
60(b) by the trial court because of his involvement with the ad-
ministration of the estate, his discussions with the attorney work-
ing on the estate, and his later personal representation by coun-
sel.1608  While the trial court ruled that Johnson’s “‘claim of
excusable neglect and inadvertence [was] incredible,’” the supreme
court held that Johnson should get a hearing to establish his “lack
of knowledge and comprehension of the probate system.”1609  The
court ruled that Johnson’s meeting with the attorney who went
over the final figures was also insufficient because “[i]f Johnson
did not understand that the fees were objectionably high, it is not
determinative that [the estate attorney] told him what the numbers
were.”1610  Neither did Johnson’s representation by an attorney af-
fect his right to a hearing, because his attorney examined the final
figures of the estate with the belief that the final accounting issue
had already been resolved prior to his involvement.1611
Gregory M. Bair
Mercedes J. Caravello
Michael J. Chiaravalloti
Emily J. Grogan
1606. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2).
1607. See Johnson, 933 P.2d at 1139-40.  Civil Rule 60(b)(2) provides that a
court may set aside a probate order on the basis of a party’s ignorance or mistake
concerning fees and costs.
1608. See id. at 1144.
1609. Id.
1610. Id. at 1145.
1611. See id. at 1146.
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APPENDIX
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Human Resources Co. v. Alaska Commission on Post-Secondary
Education, 946 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1997)
(ruling that the Human Resources Company’s youth programs
and adult GED program do not fall within the statutory defini-
tion of post-secondary education and thus are not within the
Alaska Commission on Post-Secondary Education’s jurisdiction).
Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Pub-
lic Facilities, 941 P.2d 166 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that the state correctly rejected toilet and shower units
installed by Southwest pursuant to its contract with the state to
refurbish a ferry when the units did not conform to the federal
“Buy America Provision” requirements as specified in the con-
tract).
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the Reindeer Industry Act of 1937 does not pre-
vent nonnatives in Alaska from owning and importing reindeer).
Anowlic v. City of Nome, 948 P.2d 489 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that title 13, section 02.200(b)(1) of the Alaska Admin-
istrative Code does not require a driver to make a left turn from
the extreme left edge of the lane, in contrast to section 02.200(a)
which requires a driver to make right turns “as close as practica-
ble to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway”).
BUSINESS LAW
Anchorage Nissan, Inc. v. State, 941 P.2d 1229 (Alaska 1997)
(affirming a superior court ruling that a car dealer who fails to
disclose certain facts about a vehicle, including that the car has
been involved in a serious accident, thereby commits unfair or
deceptive business acts).
Distributel, Inc. v. State, 933 P.2d 1137 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that the mail order exemption of the Telephonic Solici-
tation Act did not apply to sales initiated by telephone call from
the seller following the seller’s delivery of a catalog to consum-
ers).
Howell v. Ketchkikan Pulp Co., 943 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that an injured worker cannot sue as a third-party bene-
ficiary to a contract in which a company agrees to indemnify a
contractor for lawsuits brought by an employee and where the
contract was not intended to benefit the employee).
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CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ghete v. Anchorage, 948 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that a pro se litigant in a condemnation hearing may not
raise on appeal the validity of a settlement agreement when she
failed to raise the issue in the superior court).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Hertz v. Storer, 943 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that a denial of a Permanent Fund Dividend (“PFD”)
to an incarcerated felon did not constitute double jeopardy be-
cause denial of a PFD is not a criminal punishment).
Wallace v. State, 933 P.2d 1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that the use of Alaska National Guard solders who
were not in service to execute a search warrant of defendant’s
home was properly authorized under Alaska law and did not
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights).
CRIMINAL LAW
State v. Page, 932 P.2d 1297 (Alaska 1997)
(dismissing petition for hearing as improvidently granted).
United States v. Check No. 25128, 122 F.3d 1263 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a check which was both proceeds of a suit against
the City of Fairbanks and of drug trafficking was sufficiently
traceable to drug transactions and therefore subject to federal
forfeiture laws).
Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997)
(remanding for a determination if the “inevitable discovery” rule
can be used to admit evidence found in the defendant’s home af-
ter the defendant was required to provide his address to the po-
lice as a condition of bail).
DeNardo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 938 P.2d 1099 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1997)
(holding that the litigation of a challenge for cause is not a
“subsequent pretrial proceeding” within the meaning of Alaska
Criminal Rule 25(d)(5), so that a party who argues a challenge
for cause before the judge being challenged does not forfeit the
right to exercise a subsequent peremptory challenge against the
same judge).
Rozkydal v. State, 938 P.2d 1091 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that Alaska Statutes section 12.55.120(a) governs only
appeals in which the defendant contends that the sentencing
judge abused his or her discretion and does not prohibit a defen-
dant from filing a petition for review pursuant to Alaska Appel-
late Rule 215(a)(2)).
State v. Simpson, 946 P.2d 890 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that both prongs of the Risher v. State test for ineffective
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assistance of counsel were met where the attorney was given ac-
cess to documents which could have been used to impeach the
credibility of adverse witnesses and failed to realize the value of
this evidence).
Municipality of Anchorage v. Baxley, 946 P.2d 894 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1997)
(finding that photo-radar evidence was insufficient to sustain
convictions for speeding absent independent corroboration).
Smithart v. State, 946 P.2d 1264 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that evidence of another person’s guilt was not admissi-
ble in the absence of showing a direct connection between the
other person and the actual crime charged).
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Schorr v. Frontier Transportation Co., 942 P.2d 418 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that a shipping company sued for basing its overtime
compensation on inaccurate driving times was not entitled to
summary judgment because an issue of material fact existed as to
the accuracy and legitimacy of the relied-upon driving times).
FAMILY LAW
Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Divison ex
rel. Hawthorne v. Rios, 938 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that the superior court erred in calculating child support
obligations from the time when paternity was established instead
of from the time of birth because the duty to support a child be-
gins at birth).
Borchgrevink v. Borchgrevink, 941 P.2d 132 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that the superior court’s decision to award legal and
primary custody to the mother was supported by substantial evi-
dence that this custody award was in the children’s best interest).
Brotherton v. Brotherton, 941 P.2d 1241 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that the superior court abused its discretion in not
valuing and allocating real property acquired during the mar-
riage as part of a divorce order).
Bellanich v. Bellanich, 936 P.2d 141 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that property inherited by a husband from his parents
should be separate from marital property because there was no
finding of intent or any evidence of acts by the husband signaling
a transmutation into marital property).
INSURANCE LAW
State v. Arbuckle, 941 P.2d 181 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that worker’s beneficiary may not recover under an ac-
cidental death insurance policy that does not cover death for ill-
ness or disease where the deceased died from a heart attack re-
sulting from a pre-existing severe heart condition).
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Bollerud v. Department of Public Safety, 929 P.2d 1283 (Alaska
1997)
(affirming the revocation of a driver’s license pursuant to the
Alaska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act for driving
without insurance and causing damage in excess of $500).
PROPERTY
Stadnicky v. Southpark Terrace Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 939 P.2d
403 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that the petitioners failed to preserve for appellate re-
view their claim as landowners that an attempt to enforce a
covenant not to construct a building with a metal roof was un-
reasonable).
TORT LAW
Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that, in regard to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Alaska Na-
tives failed to prove any “special injury” to their “subsistence
way of life” which would warrant recovery of noneconomic
damages for the public nuisance).
